The Lahti-Saloranta M/26: Finland's Machine Gun Miscalculation

 

     A view from a Finnish machine gun position somewhere in a forest in Finland. To the right of the photograph are two M32 varsikäsikranaatti (stick grenades) and to the left is a Lahti-Saloranta M/26 light machine gun. The M/26 was first developed in 1925 and after being successfully tested before the Finnish Army, production commenced at the Valtion Kivääritehdas (State Rifle Factory) in 1927 with the weapon entering service soon after. Chambered for the Finnish 7.62×53mm round, the M/26 used a 20-round magazine or could be fitted with a 75-round drum for anti-aircraft use. The M/26 fired from an open bolt, was short-recoil operated, and had a cyclic rate of fire of up to 550 rounds per minute though the weapon could also fire single shots. 

     In action, the M/26 was found wanting by many soldiers who used it. As was typical for many machine guns, changing barrels was a means to lower the rate of wear by allowing it to cool after a certain number of rounds were fired. With the M/26, the bolt came out with the barrel which meant it took longer to change the barrel (about 30 seconds) and this was not always a desired thing when under fire. Also, the M/26 was made up of 188 parts which meant cleaning the weapon was not an easy task. It was also found that dirt and extreme temperatures tended to foul the M/26 but this was attributed to improper cleaning of the packing grease applied at the factory. Finally, the M/26 was picky about the ammunition it used, requiring more powerful firing caps in order to operate reliably. This earned the M/26 the nickname “Kootut Virheet” which meant “Assorted Mistakes”. The M/26 remained in production until 1942 but in the field, troops much preferred captured Russian Degtyaryov DP-27 light machine guns over the M/26. Nevertheless, the M/26, in the right hands, proved reliable and robust and so it saw action throughout World War Two and a small number remained in service until 1985 as training weapons. 

     The M/26 was served by two men, a gunner and assistant. Typical equipment used included special canvas ammunition pouches for the magazines, a spare barrel with carrier, and a canvas pouch containing tools, gun oil, and spare parts to service the weapon. It was intended to offer the M/26 for export sale but large scale sales never came. China was the only customer, ordering 30,000 M/26 weapons chambered in 7.92×57mm Mauser in 1937 but only 1,200 of them ever arrived in China before Japanese diplomatic pressure on the Finns stopped further shipments.

The Loire-Nieuport LN.401: The French Stuka

 

The remains of a LN.401 that belonged to Aéronavale Escadrille AB2 being examined by curious German troops. From a photo album belonging to a unknown German soldier.

     While not the best quality photograph, it does present what some today call the “French Stuka”. The aircraft, almost certainly, is the Loire-Nieuport LN.401. If accurate, then the most likely unit for this aircraft would have been Escadrille AB2. This picture was one of many in a collection of a soldier’s personal photographs but who the soldier was and from what unit he was in isn’t known.

     The LN.401 was the continued evolution of the earlier LN.40 whose development began in 1936 for a single-seat naval dive bomber. The most notable feature of the LN.40 was its use of inverted gull wings, something the much more well known German Junkers Ju 87 “Stuka” dive bomber used as well and so accounts for the modern nickname for the LN.40 series. As a naval aircraft, the inverted gull wing offered several advantages. One, it allowed for better propeller clearance and this was a factor if using a large diameter propeller with a powerful engine but it also provided a buffer zone between the propeller and the carrier deck during landings in rough seas. Related to the need to accommodate landings in adverse conditions, using a inverted gull wing meant that the landing gear did not have to be tall in order to provide propeller clearance. By consequence, the landing gear could be made stronger to absorb rough landings. Another advantage was the ability to carry a large external bomb beneath the fuselage and finally, the overall wing design provided for drag reduction, easier wing folding, and more economical internal wing space. Like many dive bombers of the time, the center-line bomb was connected to a swing arm that ensured the bomb cleared the propeller upon release. The monocoque fuselage was derived from the LN.161, a fighter project that first flew in 1935, and for dive brakes, the LN.40 had a interesting split lower rudder in which the two halves opened up into the slipstream. The landing gear was not fully retractable and instead, was partially nestled into shallow, faired wheel wells. The first LN.40 was completed and flown for the first time on July 6, 1938 and by the close of the month, another four pre-production LN.40 aircraft were delivered for testing. The aircraft successfully conducted carrier trials on the French carrier Béarn but continued flight testing showed that the rudder dive brakes were ineffective and so when the aircraft entered production in 1939 as the LN.401, the dive brakes were eliminated and instead, the expedient method was to simply extend the landing gear doors as a makeshift air brake. Another obvious change in the LN.401 was the addition of vertical fins on the ends of the horizontal stabilizers to boost the surface area of the vertical tail surfaces. The French Aéronavale (French Naval Aviation) ordered an initial thirty-six LN.401 aircraft while the Armée de l’Air (French Air Force) ordered thirty-six of the LN.411. The LN.411 was the LN.401 without the naval additions such as the folding wings, arrestor hook, and emergency raft. As it happened, the Armée de l’Air decided that the LN.411 lacked the performance it desired in a dive bomber and so the LN.411 order was shifted to the Aéronavale.

     The LN.401 was powered by a single Type 76 Hispano-Suiza 12Xcrs 12-cylinder, water-cooled Vee engine that developed 690 horsepower at 13,000 feet. This provided a maximum speed at that same altitude of 240mph. The LN.401’s cruise speed was 186mph. All of the fuel was carried in the wing center section and this gave the aircraft an operational range of 750 miles. The maximum service ceiling was 31,200 feet. For armament, a single 20mm Hispano-Suiza HS.404 cannon was fitted between the engine’s cylinder banks and fired through the propeller hub while in each wing was a single 7.5mm Darne machine-gun. The center-line bomb capacity was either one 496 pound BEA M1938 bomb or a single 330 pound Type 12 bomb. Empty, the LN.401 weighed 4,945 pounds with a combat weight of 6,250 pounds.

     Aéronavale Escadrille AB2 and Escadrille AB4 were initially equipped with the LN.401 starting in November 1939 but in April 1940, Escadrille AB4 changed over to the LN.411 with AB2 receiving their some of their LN.401 aircraft. By May 10, 1940, AB2 was based at Berck while AB4 was at Cherbourg-Querqueville though AB4 very soon joined AB2 at Berck by mid-May. On May 19, 1940, both units combined put a total of 20 aircraft in the air to attack targets near Berlaimont, some 118 miles west of their Berck airfield. It was a disaster. The flight ran headlong into German flak (anti-aircraft fire) that riddled each and every aircraft. Flak crews claimed ten confirmed kills with the remaining ten aircraft limping back to Berck. So severe was the damage to the surviving aircraft that only three were operational. By May 21, 1940, only a single aircraft was left between the two units. A trickle of new aircraft and successful repairs of the existing planes raised the total to ten aircraft operational by the following day. However, both units moved to the southern coast of France, arriving in Hyères on June 4. From here, the units conducted reconnaissance operations and provided air cover for French Marine Nationale ships shelling Genoa, Italy during Operation Vado from June 13 to June 14, 1940. On June 23, 1940, both units (with a total of eight LN.411 aircraft) left Hyères and arrived in Bône (today Annaba), Algiers where both AB2 and AB4 traded the five LN.411 aircraft that survived the trip and converted to the twin-engine Martin 167 light bomber.

     The photograph shows a derelict LN.401 being examined by German soldiers. The likely location was either Berck or Hyères. Souvenir hunters have already cut away the Aéronavale roundel on the fuselage as well as the French state-owned manufacturer (SNCAO;Société Nationale des Constructions Aéronautiques de l’Ouest) and aircraft model stencil that would have been on the rudder. It is missing the landing gear doors and the bent propeller blades suggest it made a hard landing which damaged it and thus was abandoned after some parts were possibly cannibalized to service other aircraft. Both of the wings have been removed and lay on the ground on either side of the aircraft.

     As a side note, under German supervision, SNCAO completed twenty-four aircraft, a mixture of LN.401 and LN.411 using a combination of existing components as well as scavenged parts from aircraft that remained in France. All of them were flown to Hyères in March 1942 but were not incorporated into the Armée de l’Air de Vichy. Even so, some modern art pieces and models sometimes show the aircraft in Vichy colors. Twelve of the aircraft were seized by the Germans following Fall Anton (Case Anton) which was the German and Italian occupation of the French Zone Libre (Free Zone) that commenced on November 10, 1942. These aircraft, while put into German markings, were deployed only as airfield decoys and as such, a handful survived the war and saw a very brief service period in the post-war Armée de l’Air.

The Holt 55–1: The Beginning of U.S. Self-Propelled Guns

 

The Holt 55–1 fitted with the Vickers BL 8in. Mk. VIII howitzer under test at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland in 1917. Retouched photograph by Underwood & Underwood.

     Even as far back as 1915, the U.S. Army Ordnance Department was investigating the mechanization of field artillery beyond simply using tractors to move artillery pieces about the battlefield. During World War One, the Holt Tractor Company was the largest producer of tractors and supplied not only the U.S. Army but also the armies of Britain and France with all three nations using the tractors to pull their respective heavy artillery pieces across the battlefield where horses and trucks could not tread. It would be the British that beat the U.S. to the punch with the development of the Gun Carrier Mk. I, the world’s first production self-propelled gun. Using components from the original British Mk. I tank, the fully tracked Gun Carrier Mk. I was designed to carry either the Ordnance BL 6in. howitzer or the Ordnance BL 60-pounder gun. The vehicle was meant to move the guns to firing positions where they would be dismounted and set up but if need be, the 6in. Gun (not the 60-pounder) could be fired while still on the Gun Carrier. Deliveries of the Gun Carrier Mk. I started in mid-1917 and in all, some 48 vehicles were delivered by the end of the war. As it was, in practice, the Gun Carrier Mk. I was used more as a supply vehicle and rarely as a self-propelled gun. Two major occasions where the Gun Carrier Mk. I functioned as a self-propelled gun was during the Battle of Pilckem Ridge (that ran from July 31, 1917 to August 2, 1917) and the Battle of Amiens (from August 8 through August 12, 1918) and in both cases, the crews fired the howitzers then shifted positions in order to avoid any German counter-battery fire. This is a tactic used even today by self-propelled artillery.

     Returning to the U.S., the Ordnance Department was looking to mount the new 3in. M1917 anti-aircraft gun on a tractor and the Holt Tractor Company stepped up to the plate and suggested a proposal by Pliny E. Holt for just such a mount. Authorization was received to commence development and construction of a prototype and sometime in 1917, the all caterpillar tracked Holt 55–1 was completed and submitted for testing. The Holt 55–1 was a relatively simple affair, consisting of a rectangular riveted metal chassis with the engine, fuel tank, and driver’s station in the rear and the M1917 gun fitted to a high-elevation pedestal mount in the center of the chassis. There was no armor or shielding to protect the power-train, crew or gun though the 55–1 did have outriggers that were deployed to stabilize the vehicle during firing. Testing showed that the 55–1 did have some problems but nevertheless, it demonstrated that the concept of a self-propelled artillery gun was worthwhile. The 55–1 was refitted to carry the heavy Vickers built BL 8in. Mk. VIII howitzer and that is what is shown in this picture distributed by the news photography division of Underwood & Underwood. The mount for the howitzer was made of thick oak planking and does not appear to have had any elevation capability. However, as it was simply a test mount, the Holt 55–1 performed adequately, being able to absorb the recoil of the howitzer without any difficulty. Like the previous gun mount, the revised Holt 55–1 had two extendable outriggers on each side though in this retouched photograph, they appear to be missing. Very few actual photographs exist of the 55–1 and those that do don’t show any camouflage paint applied. In addition to the two gun mounted variants, the 55–1 was also tested as a unarmed (and unarmored) transport, the driver’s station having been moved to the front of the vehicle. The Holt engine along with it’s radiator can be seen with the driver sitting in front of it. On the other side of the driver is the fuel tank for the engine. It appears that there is another man with steering levers on the front of the 55–1 but he is likely just holding on to the outrigger components as there was no room for a driver station in front with the gun mounting. Thus, the driver worked both the speed control as well as the steering levers for the vehicle. The driver actually had no seat and instead, he is sitting on the oak planking that went around the top of the vehicle. Likewise, the three standing men are also atop the oak planks, one of them holding on to a metal brace supporting the gun. It is unknown what the crank is for as an original photograph of the 55–1 doesn’t show such an apparatus so it may have been added to the photograph.

     The 55–1 weighed 11 tons, was 20.6 feet long, 10 feet wide, and 9.5 feet high. Power came from a single Holt 4-cylinder engine that developed 75 horsepower. The engine was tied into a Clark 5-speed transmission. This gave the 55–1 a maximum speed of 5mph. The 8in. Mk. VIII howitzer fired a 200 pound high-explosive shell at a muzzle velocity of 1,500 feet per second. This gave the gun an effective range of just shy of 7 miles. The normal elevation of the gun was 0 degrees to a maximum of 45 degrees and a traverse of 4 degrees to the left or right. The breech was of the Welin interrupted screw type with a Asbury Breech Mechanism that opened the breech by combining the unscrewing, withdrawing, and swinging clear movements of the breech into one continuous action. Likewise, the closing of the breech after the round and charge was loaded was also one action. This sped up the loading and unloading of heavy guns which allowed for a increase in the rate of fire. Recoil was absorbed by a hydro-pneumatic recuperator and hydraulic buffer.

     Only one Holt 55–1 was constructed and it was not put into production. Pliny Holt was lured away from the Holt Tractor Company and went to work for the Rock Island Arsenal, Rock Island, Illinois and while there, he oversaw the development of a series of self-propelled guns, the Mark I through the Mark X between 1918 and 1922. Fifty Mark I (with the 8in. Mk.VIII howitzer), fifty Mark II (with a 155mm M1918 gun), and a total of 250 Mark III and Mark IV (with a 240mm Schneider TR M1914 howitzer) self-propelled guns were contracted but the end of World War One saw the contract drastically cut back to only a handful of vehicles for experimentation use only. Despite none of Holt’s vehicles making it into production service with the U.S. Army, they did provide significant knowledge in design that would come into play when war once again loomed on the horizon.

The KS-108 “Reaktivnyy Minomet“: A Quest for More Range

 

One of the only known photographs of the KS-108 rocket launcher as mounted on a ZiS-6 truck.

     Of all the belligerents in World War Two, perhaps the Soviets were the only warring power that made extensive use of rocket artillery. From 1941 to 1945, three main rockets were used and these were the M-8 82mm rocket, the M-13 132mm rocket, and the M-31 300mm rocket. The smaller of the rockets was derived from the RS-82, a commonly used air-to-ground rocket. Launch rails carrying 24, 36, or 48 rockets were constructed and mounted on ZiS-6 6X6 trucks (BM-8–36), Lend-Lease Studebaker 6X6 trucks (BM-8–48), and obsolete T-60 light tanks (BM-8–24). Each M-8 rocket had a 1.1lb. explosive warhead and had a maximum range of 3.6 miles. The most widely used of the rocket launchers was the M-13 and it was fired from launch rails that supported 16 rockets. All manner of trucks were used, including Chevrolet, Ford, Studebaker, and International, and all carried the designation BM-13–16. In addition to high-explosive rockets, armor-piercing rockets were used when targeting armor formations and other types included illumination, incendiary, and signal rockets. The standard high-explosive rocket carried 10.8lbs. of explosive and had a maximum range of 5.3 miles. A special rocket, the M-13-DD, contained two rocket motors which gave the rocket a range of 7.3 miles. The limitation, however, was that the rocket could only be fired from the top set of rails which meant each launcher could only fire 8 total M-13-DD rockets. The biggest rocket (and last to be deployed), the M-31, was derived from an earlier ground launched rocket, the M-30. The launch rail could only fit 12 rockets and ZiS-6 and Studebaker trucks were fitted with the rails under the designation BM-31–12. Each rocket had 63.7lbs. of high-explosive in the warhead but the trade-off was a short range, only 2.7 miles.

     Collectively, these rocket launchers were called “Katyusha” which was the name of a song about a girl who longed for her lover who had been called to the front to fight. The name itself is the Russian equivalent to the English name Katie, the diminutive form of the name Katherine. The Germans, however, had another name for these rocket launchers and that was “Stalinorgel“ or “Stalin’s Organ“ due to the howling wail of the rockets in flight. Interestingly, the heavy BM-31–12 had the nickname of “Andryusha“, which was the Russian version of the name Andrew. Typically, a battery consisted of four launcher trucks, two ammunition trucks, and two service trucks. A trained six man crew could reload within 3–4 minutes. A company consisted of three batteries (12 launchers) and three companies made up a rocket artillery regiment (36 launchers). A single battery of BM-13–24 launchers could deliver 4.35 tons of high-explosive across a 4,300,000 square foot impact zone. This blanket effect had both physical destructive power as well as psychological impact on those unfortunate enough to be underneath a “Katyusha“ barrage. To prevent counter-battery fire, the firing unit would relocate upon unleashing a salvo before firing again. All together, some 10,000 total “Katyusha“ launchers were constructed during the war.

     The photograph depicts the KS-108 “Reaktivnyy Minomet“ or “Jet Mortar“ and this vehicle was a prototype rocket launcher that initially sought to extend the maximum range of the M-30 rocket. Since the M-30 was fired from ground launch rails, the range was 1.7 miles which was relatively short. The rails were essentially open frames within which the rockets sat and because of this arrangement, not only was the range low, the accuracy was also low. The KS-108 project commenced in August 1942 and the initial design utilized four tubes and the launch apparatus was designed in such a way that it could be mounted to any of the trucks then in use by the Soviet military. The KS-108 was fitted to a ZiS-6 truck for testing. For the prototype, the rails had no traverse ability outside of turning the entire truck. The tubes were able to be elevated from a minimum of 15 degrees to a maximum of 45 degrees. To stabilize the truck, a plate was fitted to the rear which was deployed once in action. The stowed position of the plate meant the bottom row of tubes was forward of the top set. To load, the screw breeches were opened, the rockets placed within the tubes, and the breeches closed. The launch control was within the cab of the truck. The intent was to utilize the gasses expelled by the rockets as they launched to create pressure in the tube which propelled the rocket at a higher velocity upon exiting the tube. The length of the tube, at 13 feet, gave the rocket a better trajectory path which improved accuracy. By September 1942, the prototype KS-108 was complete and testing began. Firing the standard M-30 rocket, the KS-108 was able to extend the range to 2.1 miles. While an improvement to the ground launched M-30, it was less than the M-13 already in service. To that end, a new rocket was designed, the M-108. The M-108 was a modified M-30 rocket and it was hoped the new ammunition would be able to reach a range of 3.1 miles but when the new rocket was ready for testing in October 1942, the results were below expectations. The last gasp for the KS-108 was in February 1943 when a new rocket, the 304mm MK-30, was designed and testing showed it could attain a range of 4 miles. Still, this was not enough to warrant continued development and the single prototype is believed to have been scrapped. Still, the work on the MK-30 led to the M-31 which was deployed in 1943 from ground frames until March 1944 when the launch rails were fitted to trucks as outlined above.

     In total, the Soviets had 518 rocket artillery batteries in service during World War Two. The BM-13–24 was the only rocket artillery that continued in widespread use after the war and did so for many years. The Soviets continued to improve the “Katyusha“, replacing the BM-13 with the 140mm BM-14 in 1952 and the BM-31 was replaced with the 240mm BM-24 in 1947. The BM-14 was superseded in service in 1963 by the 122mm BM-21 which continues to see service to this day. Massed rocket artillery and regular artillery remains a key component in Soviet operational doctrine. Soviet offensive maneuvering units rely on the artillery to suppress enemy defenses in order to achieve a decisive victory.

The Kagnew Battalion: Ethiopia's Korean Conflict Warriors

An Ethiopian officer (armed with the M1 Carbine) and an enlisted man (armed with the M1 Garand). For the most part, they are fully equipped with U.S. weapons, uniforms, and equipment. The exception is the Ethiopian insignia pinned to the collars (visible on the officer). Photograph via the U.S. Army Signal Corps.

      In August 1950, Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie heeded the United Nations call for an international force to combat the North Koreans and halt their advance into South Korea. In discussions with the U.S., it was decided to field a single infantry battalion of Ethiopian troops. Despite the country lacking resources, Selassie put out the call for volunteers from Ethiopia’s 1st Division Imperial Bodyguard and due to the overwhelming response, the troops to fill out the battalion were handpicked by Brig.Gen. Mulugetta Bulli. A good portion of the unit was made up of experienced soldiers, officers, and many WW2 veterans. The new unit was given the name Kagnew Battalion after the steed of General Mäkonnen Wäldä-Mika’él Gudessa, Selassie’s father. Although there was one battalion, in actuality, there were three. However, only one battalion was ever in-country at a time. Intensive training was given to acclimate the troops to the conditions, terrain, and environment they’d find in Korea. Under the initial command of Lieutenant Colonel Teshome Irgetu, the Kagnew Battalion boarded the USNS General J.H. McRae on April 12, 1951 and departed for Korea, arriving on May 6, 1951. The troops wore British Pattern 37 uniforms but as time went on, it was replaced with U.S. uniform items with the Pattern 37 uniforms only being worn for ceremonial duties. Due to the older, outdated weapons the Ethiopian military had (and also because of logistical concerns), the U.S. also outfitted the battalion with U.S. small arms, infantry weapons, and equipment and so, after a short period of training on the new weaponry, the Kagnew Battalion was incorporated into the U.S. 7th. Infantry Division as a replacement for one of its battalions. In fact, Kagnew Battalion soldiers would often put the combat service identification badge on their M1 helmets (others the Ethiopian roundel). 

     In rotation, the Ethiopian soldiers of each battalion would see combat from 1951 to 1954, engaging in some 238 total actions with a total of 121 KIA and 536 WIA. That there were no POWs or MIAs was because no Kagnew Battalion soldier allowed themselves to be captured and they never left any man behind. In all, one Silver Star and eighteen Bronze Stars were awarded to Kagnew Battalion soldiers while Lt.Col. Irgetu and 2nd. Lieutenant Haptewold Mamo were awarded the Ethiopian gallantry decoration the Order of Menelik II. Other decorations for the unit included the Korean Order of Military Merit, the Presidential Unit Citation, and the Korean Service Medal. Finally, soldiers earned the Ethiopian Kagnew Combat Pin (very much styled after the U.S. Combat Infantry Badge). The unit was disbanded in 1965.

Kapteeni Jorma Karhunen: Finnish Brewster Ace

Taken in June 1943, Karhunen poses with his Brewster B-239E (serial BW-366) with 31 kill marks on the tail.

    Sitting on the horizontal stabilizer of his Brewster B-239E (serial BW-366) is Kapteeni (Captain) Jorma Karhunen of the Ilmavoimat (FAF; Finnish Air Force). Upon the vertical stabilizer are the markings for his 31 confirmed kills against the Soviet Air Force (Voyenno-Vozdushnye Sily; VVS). The photograph was taken in June 1943 when Karhunen was made the commander of Lentolaivue 24 (Fighter Squadron 24; LLv 24) under Lentorykmentti 2 (Flight Regiment 2). The location of the photograph was Suulajärvi on the Karelian Isthmus.

    Karhunen was born in Pyhäjärvi, Finland on March 17, 1913 and after he graduated from secondary school (equivalent to high school in the United States) in 1933, he turned around and enlisted into military service, seeking to be an aviator. He was sent to the Ilmasotakoulu (Air Force Academy) and in 1936, he successfully completed the training and graduated as a Vänrikki which was the most junior rank of flying officer. Flight training had been done at the Lentosotakoulu (Training Air Wing) which was located in Kauhava, Finland. His first posting was to Lentoasema 1 (Air Station 1) but by January 1, 1938, the unit designation changed to Lentorykmentti 2.

    On November 30, 1939, the Soviet Union invaded Finland in what became the Winter War. Karhunen, at this time, had the rank of Yliluutnantti (equivalent to a 1st. Lieutenant) and was the deputy commander of 1. Lentue (1st. Flight) of LLv 24. The flight was equipped with six Fokker D.XXI, a Dutch built monoplane fighter which first flew in March 1936. Karhunen’s personal Fokker carried the serial FR-112 and in this plane, he scored 4 confirmed kills through January 30, 1940. On this date, he assumed command of 2. Lentue (2nd. Flight) of LLv 24 but he would not fly in combat for the remainder of the Winter War, which ended on March 13, 1940. Although the Soviets gained some territory from Finland after the signing of the Moscow Peace Treaty, Finland was able to give the Soviets a very bloody nose which went far to stinging the pride of the Soviet Union in the eyes of the world.

    Returning to Karhunen, he had been sent to Trollhättan, Sweden where representatives from the Brewster Aeronautical Corporation had arrived with the first six of 44 Brewster B-239E fighters. These were de-navalized U.S. Navy Brewster F2A-1 fighters which had the tail hooks, life raft containers, and other navy specific equipment taken out. The B-239E also did not have cockpit armor nor self-sealing fuel tanks. The aircraft did, however, have a more powerful motor, the 950hp Wright R-1820-G5 radial engine, and had the ability to carry up to four machine-guns rather than the F2A-1’s two machine-guns. Karhunen flight tested the first example completed in February 1940 but unfortunately, being unfamiliar with the aircraft, managed to burn out the engine during a low altitude, high speed run. He belly landed the Brewster into a snow covered field, damaging the propeller and crumpling numerous belly panels. Despite this inauspicious start, as the Finnish pilots became more aware of the capabilities of the Brewster, they grew to appreciate the aircraft and used it to great effect against the VVS. The Finnish gave the portly plane nicknames such as the ”Lentävä Kaljapullo” (”Flying Beer Bottle”) and ”Taivaan Helmi” (“Sky Pearl”) among others.

    When Germany invaded Russia on June 24, 1941, Finland joined in on the invasion the following day. Called the Continuation War, many justifications have been given for Finland’s actions which included seeking to take back the territory it lost to the Soviet Union following the Winter War and even to take Karelia. While Finland was on the Axis side, it did not sign the Tripartite Pact and thus was not officially a part of the Axis which included Germany, Italy, and Japan. It did, however, sign the Antikominternpakt (Anti-Comintern Pact) in 1941. Karhunen returned to LLv 24 and was put in command of 3. Lentue (3rd. Flight). He was now flying his Brewster (BW-366) and on July 4, 1941, he earned his fifth kill by downing a Soviet SB bomber. This made Karhunen an ace and saw him promoted to Kapteeni (Captain). Karhunen continued to lead his flight through the remainder of 1941 and 1942. On September 8, 1942, Karhunen was awarded the 92nd. presentation of the prestigious Mannerheim-Risti (Mannerheim Cross) to recognize both his leadership and his tally of 25 confirmed kills. As the Continuation War moved into 1943, the pilots flying the Brewster were encountering improved Soviet aircraft such as the Yakovlev Yak-1, Lavochkin La-5, and even Lend-Lease Supermarine Spitfires. In addition, Soviet pilots had gained in experience and ability. In many cases, the obsolete Brewsters came out on top due to the superior skill of the Finnish pilots who understood both their own aircraft and that of their enemy in order to maintain superiority. For Karhunen, he achieved his 31st. kill by downing a Polikarpov I-153 on May 4, 1943. On June 1, 1943, Karhunen was made the commander of LLv 24 and in September 1943, he was promoted to Majuri (Major) and in so doing, his frontline flying career was over after having flown 350 combat sorties. In addition to the Mannerheim Cross, Karhunen also received the Vapaudenristin Ritarikunta (Order of the Cross of Liberty) 2nd. Class with Swords and the German Eisernes Kreuz 2. Klasse (Iron Cross 2nd. Class). On September 19, 1944, the Continuation War came to a close. LLv 24, in total, had 763 confirmed kills for the loss of only 30 aircraft (of which 26 was due to enemy action) which meant an astounding kill ratio of 29 enemy kills for every one loss.

    Karhunen remained commander of LLv 24 until December 4, 1944 when, following a reorganization, LLv 24 became Lentolaivue 31 (LLv 31). After World War Two ended, Karhunen became the deputy commander of the Ilmavarasto (Air Depot) from 1946 to 1949. During that time, Karhunen returned to the Ilmasotakoulu from 1948 to 1949 and was soon promoted to Everstiluutnantti (Lieutenant-Colonel) and given command of a flight regiment. In 1952, Karhunen became the commander of 2. Lennosto (2nd. Air Force) until his retirement in 1955.

    During his retirement, Karhunen became a prolific author, writing on the topics of the air war during the Winter War and Continuation War. In 1967, he was made a Eversti (Colonel) and in 1994, his writings earned him the Harmon-Patsas (Harmon Statue) which was presented to him by the Suomen Ilmailuliiton (Finnish Civil Aviation Association). Karhunen would pass away on January 18, 2002 at the age of 88 in Tampere, Finland.

    As for LLv 31, it remains in operation to this day, currently flying McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 Hornet fighters. It is commanded by Everstiluutnantti Inka Johanna Niskanen who was the first Finnish female fighter pilot and the first woman to achieve the rank of Everstiluutnantti. The unit flies out of Siilinjärvi Rissala.

Captain Pratima Dharm: The U.S. Army’s First Hindu Chaplain

(Photograph courtesy of the U.S. Army)

      In 2006, Pratima Dharm received her commission in the U.S. Army and in 2008, she was selected to attend the Army’s Clinical Pastoral Education Program while in her year long deployment to Iraq. It was during her tour that she received the Bronze Star for conducting a series of humanitarian operations in Northern Iraq to provide needed supplies and care to the populace in the region, including the Kurds. Dharm grew up in New Delhi and in mid-2001, she immigrated to the United States. Prior to coming to America, she attended Notre Dame Academy (a Roman Catholic secondary school) and would go on to attend Mithibai College and later, Shreemati Nathibai Damodar Thackersey Women’s University, both of which are in Mumbai. This would earn her a Masters in Psychology. Dharm was raised a Hindu but she was exposed to many religions through her education, from her family who was open to other religious thought, as well as growing up in New Delhi which was a mixed religious city. An inner drive to know God saw Dharm enter into theological study after her immigration where she studied Judaism and Christianity in addition to maintaining her Hindu faith. Upon entering the U.S. Army, she was assigned to the Staff Specialist Corps, the combat service support branch and one in which unassigned officers were placed. In order to become a chaplain, the individual must train at a seminary and be endorsed by a religious organization in order to serve on active duty. At the time, there was no seminary which offered Hindu studies and so Dharm attended a Protestant seminary and was endorsed by the Pentecostal Church of God. Upon her ordination, Dharm wore the cross insignia on her uniform, denoting a Christian chaplain. This was because at the time, there existed no Hindu uniform device nor even a specification for a Hindu chaplain. This led to the Clinical Pastoral Education Program which was the result of a Department of Defense endorsement for a Hindu chaplaincy and Dharm submitted her interest in the program. Chinmaya Mission West became the endorsing religious organization and in 2011, now Captain Pratima Dharm became the U.S. Army’s very first Hindu chaplain as well as the first Indian female chaplain. At that time, there were approximately 1,000 Hindu soldiers in the Army. Dharm, though, was not a Hindu priest and thus could not perform sanskaras which are Hindu rites of passage that include such things as wedding ceremonies, various child rituals (naming, entrance into school, and other child “firsts”), and cremation rites. Still, she provided worship services (Hindu and Christian) and Hindu festival celebrations. In 2014, Dharm left the U.S. Army and became the Hindu chaplain at Georgetown University but within a year, resigned the post, to paraphrase her words, seek direction from God on what her future may be.

     The photograph here of CPT Dharm shows her prior to receiving her endorsement and advancement to chaplain and so she wears the Staff Specialist Corps branch insignia. It was not until 2012 when a Chaplain Candidate specific branch insignia was issued. The main difference was the replacement of the sword with a shepherd’s crook. Upon becoming a chaplain, she wore the cross insignia of a Christian chaplain given she was taught in a Christian seminary and endorsed by a Christian religious organization but in May 2012, the U.S. Army authorized a Hindu specific insignia which consisted of the Sanskrit syllable for Om. There are many interpretations of what Om is but in Hinduism, it is the most sacred syllable and mantra of Brahman, the Almighty God of Hinduism. Some interpretations consider Om to be absolute truth, the essence of life, and the vehicle of deepest knowledge and self-knowledge. Images exist of CPT Dharm wearing all three insignia over the span of her career. Dharm’s ribbons are: Bronze Star, Army Commendation Medal, National Defense Service Medal, Iraq Campaign Medal (with Bronze Campaign Star; likely Phase 5 “Iraqi Surge”), Global War on Terror Service Medal, Army Service Ribbon, and Army Overseas Service Ribbon. The ribbon over her right breast is the Army Superior Unit Award. Above that is the DUI (Distinctive Unit Insignia) for the Chaplain Corps whose motto is “Pro Deo et Patria” which means “For God and Country.” Barely visible in the photograph beneath her name plate is the crest of the 3rd. Infantry Division.

     Sadly, in 2014, some no morals, unscrupulous spammer utilized a photograph of CPT Dharm as part of his phishing campaign emails.

The Canon de 305 Modèle 1893/1896 TAZ: France’s “Colony” Railway Guns

 

A Canon de 305 Modèle 1893/1896 TAZ sending a round downrange. (Author’s Collection)

     In 1918, the French withdrew the eight Canon de 305 Modèle 1893/1896 TAZ (Tout-Azimuth) railway guns which had been in service since 1916 in order to refit them. The main reason for this was that the 305mm guns were simply too large a caliber for the carriages and so it was decided to replace them with a smaller gun. Chosen were eight Canon de 240 de Côte Modèle 1893 coastal defense guns that had originally been installed in French forts located in Dakar, Senegal and Saigon, Vietnam. The St. Chamond company, who constructed the 305mm railway gun carriage, handled the required modifications in order to fit the 240mm guns. The work was completed and in 1918, the Canon de 240 Modèle 1893/1896 TAZ railway guns were deployed and served out the remainder of World War One.

     The guns, sometimes nicknamed the “Colonies” due to them having been taken from French colonies, fired a 357lb. high-explosive shell to a maximum range of 15 miles. The shell used a separate powder charge and a trained crew could fire one round every three minutes. The gun sat on a turntable which could traverse 360 degrees but in practice, it was never traversed more than 10 degrees from either side of the centerline of the carriage due to instability caused by the recoil. When traversed, the gun had an elevation of 15 degrees up to 35 degrees but if the gun was parallel to the carriage, maximum elevation was only 29 degrees. Any higher and the breech would strike the carriage during recoil. The carriage, once a firing position was chosen, was ground anchored in place to help absorb some of the vertical forces created by firing. In addition, outriggers and screw jacks were used to create stability in the carriage. Finally, to lessen some of the recoil forces, there was a 4 degree elevated ramp the gun cradle rode up on before returning to battery. Loading the gun was accomplished by a elevated shell trolley at the rear of the carriage.

     The photograph depicts one of the Canon de 240 Modèle 1893/1896 TAZ guns, having just fired. Each of the gun crew visible are wearing the metal canister that held the Modèle 1917 Appareil Respiratoire Spécial (ARS 17) gas mask and so this can date the photograph to at least 1918 when the gun was in service or possibly in the immediate post-WW1 years as the ARS17 continued to be issued until it was replaced with the Modèle 1920 Appareil Respiratoire Spécial. This suggests that, despite the rather exposed firing position, the gun was in action rather than firing on a range. The crew has traversed the gun 90 degrees and has only deployed four of the eight outriggers. It is possible the powder charge was lessened to reduce the chance of the recoil tipping the carriage over or the crew was simply taking their chances. As was usual, none of the men remained on the carriage when the gun was fired. The man nearest the carriage was the gunner, having been the one who pulled the lanyard which fired the cannon. The box car held the powder and ammunition for the gun as well as other supplies. Wheelbarrows and railroad ties can be seen, the latter likely used during the construction of the ground anchors.

     When World War Two started, the eight guns were still in service with the 374e Regiment Artillerie Lourde sur Voie Ferrée (ALVF; Heavy Artillery on Railroad), four guns with the 10e Bataillon ALVF and four with the 11e Bataillon AVLF. These guns were situated in the south of France and all of them fell intact into German hands following a brief period of combat against Italian forces in June 1940. As was common practice for the Germans, they were pressed into service as the 24cm Kanone (E) 558 (f) and all eight were incorporated into the Atlantikwall (Atlantic Wall) coastal defenses that ran from the continental European coast all the way up through the Scandinavian coast. Four guns were positioned in Saint-Nazaire, France while the other four were sent to Narvik, Norway in 1942 before moving to Nærbø, Norway sometime in 1944.

The Silvansky I-220 IS: How Not to Design a Fighter Aircraft

     In the annals of aviation history, there have been some questionable aircraft designs that, in hindsight, one wonders how they ever managed to get built. This applied to civilian aircraft as well as military aircraft. The disaster of the British Tarrant Tabor bomber (1919), the horror show that was the American Cantilever Aero Bullet (1918), and the fatal failure of the Soviet Kalinin K-7 bomber (1933) are all examples of extremely flawed aircraft that got from the drawing board, to prototype, and in many cases, a disastrous end. The Soviet Silvansky I-220 IS (Iosef Stalin) was one such plane that history has added to this list and some consider the IS the worst warplane ever to be designed.

     The man behind the IS was Alexander Vasilievich Silvansky. Silvansky was a graduate of the Moscow Aviation Institute and although he had the degree in his hand and actually had practical experience working in aircraft manufacturing plants, historians are clear to say that Silvansky nary knew the difference between a aileron and a wing spar. In fact, noted Soviet aviation historian Vadim Borisovich Shavrov compared Silvansky to the fictional con man Ostap Bender created by the Soviet authors Ilya Ilf and Yevgeni Petrov. The story of the IS begins in 1937 when Mikhail Moiseyevich Kaganovich, the People’s Commissar of Defense Industry, gave Silvansky the task of designing a new, single-engine fighter. This task came to Silvansky because Silvansky had a connection within the elite circles. Silvansky, having no concept of how to design an aircraft, sought out anyone who did understand aircraft and he ran into Ivan Lemishev, a 1922 graduate of the Aviation Engineers School located in Kiev, Russia. As Silvansky had his own design bureau which was funded, stocked with the needed equipment, and housed in a section of the Novosibirsk Aviation Factory №153, Lemishev signed on in February 1938. Lemishev was joined by a number of employees from the former Kalinin, Grigorovich, and Nazarov aircraft design bureaus. In short order, work began on the IS but when the majority of the members of the design bureau were more technically inclined rather than aeronautical inclined, the IS was off to a poor start. Silvansky spent his time trying to get his design bureau moved closer to Moscow and hyped the IS as the best fighter in the world. In the meantime, Lemishev and the others did the best they could and when the initial design was nearly completed, only then did Silvansky step in to “fix mistakes”. A mock-up of the IS was constructed and presented and against all logic, after the mock-up and design drafts were reviewed, the IS was approved to proceed. Silvansky’s IS hype included a heavy armament of two cannons, four machine-guns, and a bomb load while boasting the IS would best the Messerschmitt Bf 109 and the Polikarpov I-180, then under development, could simply be canceled as the IS would best it. The fact that Silvansky’s claims swayed the men who witnessed the mock-up points to Shavrov’s con-man comparison.

     Work on the first prototype commenced and was completed in 1939 and already, Lemishev and many of the other bureau employees saw the IS was a disaster. Construction issues included miscalculating the length of the landing gear to the point that they would not fit into the wheel wells. After shortening the landing gear, they then found out that the wheel wells were too shallow to allow the wheels to be fully withdrawn (this was never corrected). This was not helped by Silvansky himself who decided to fix some of the issues with the IS his way. Following the landing gear fiasco, the propeller blades were too close to the ground and Silvansky literally took a hacksaw and sawed four inches off the end of each blade. In addition, any engine component that poked up and ruined the contours of the cowling, Silvansky’s solution was to take a hammer and beat them down. The IS commenced taxi trials on September 24, 1939 without, apparently, too much mishap. Silvansky’s constant needling to get his design bureau moved finally paid off when it was shifted to Kimry, some 100 miles from Moscow in February 1940. Perhaps not surprisingly, Silvansky spent more time in Moscow than at his design bureau. By this time, personnel of the Silvansky Design Bureau started to find any reason to leave, not wanting to be anywhere around when the IS failed. The first flight occurred on February 17, 1940 and it was a colossal failure. The test pilot managed to get the IS off the ground but the altitude never exceeded 492 feet and so horrid was the control that it took everything the test pilot had to land the IS. In total, only three test flights were made, none of the flights lasting longer than a few minutes. Worse, in order to even get the IS off the ground required all of the armaments to be removed in order to lighten the aircraft. The IS was not helped by having to use an under-powered engine (see below) and the aerodynamics of the wings was spoiled by the protruding wheels. One of the test pilots was quoted as calling the IS “bad shit” and all of the test pilots unanimously said the IS was all but unflyable. Following the horrible showing of the IS, the People’s Commissar of the Aviation Industry Alexey Ivanovich Shakhurin ordered the Silvansky Design Bureau dissolved, the personnel dispersed, and Silvansky himself held liable for the utter disaster. A second prototype of the IS had been under construction but this was halted and presumably, it was scrapped. The first prototype IS was seized and shipped to the Moscow Aviation Institute where it was put on display as an illustration of how not to design an aircraft. Silvansky was banned from further involvement in aviation and, amazingly, escaped both prosecution and persecution but Lemishev was not so lucky when, on February 15, 1941, he disappeared in Baltimore, Maryland and was never heard from again.

     The IS, in appearance, oddly (or not surprisingly) bore a resemblance to the successful Polikarpov I-16 fighter. For an engine, the IS was to use the Tumansky M-88A 14-cylinder, air-cooled, twin-row radial engine that developed 1,085 horsepower at 15,584 feet. However, the IS was actually fitted with the 950 horsepower M-87A engine as the M-88A was not yet available. The ZSMV-2 propeller was a three-bladed, variable-pitch type. Total fuel carried was 79 gallons and if required, a total of 52 gallons of extra fuel could be carried in two under wing drop tanks. For weapons, two 12.7mm ShVAK machine-guns were fitted, one in each wing. Two 7.62mm ShKAS machine-guns were fitted, one in each wing root, while another two ShKAS machine-guns were fitted into the nose, between the engine cylinders. A single 110 pound bomb could be carried under each wing. The IS was 21.9 feet long, 9.1 feet high, had a 29.6 wingspan, and a 150.7 square foot wing area with a wing loading of 35.8 pounds per square foot. Because the IS never was put through its paces, performance was never validated. It was estimated that the top speed with the M-88A engine was 364mph at 15,584 feet with an estimated 6 minute climb to 16,404 feet. Operational ceiling was estimated to be 35,597 feet with a maximum range of 357 miles with an operational range of 270 miles.

     As a note, the Silvansky I-220 should not be confused with the Mikoyan-Gurevich I-220 high-altitude interceptor project which commenced in 1942.