The Vickers-Carden-Lloyd A4E12: An Export Success Story

The A4E12 under test, demonstrating its amphibious capability. (Author's Collection)

     In the 1930s Britain, there was an apathy in the high command towards modernizing and expanding Britain’s tank force. In part, this was a legacy of World War One thinking in which tanks were not seen as being a true, equal component of an armed force and also that it was felt World War One would be the last global conflict. Despite this, there was fairly significant tank development in England and in most cases, it wasn’t to interest the British military but to entice foreign buyers. Numerous nations either did not have the technical ability to build tanks or they did not have the manufacturing infrastructure to produce tanks and so looking elsewhere and using hard currency was a way to obtain tanks and other armored vehicles. One such vehicle was the Vickers-Carden-Lloyd A4E12 light amphibious tank. 

     To achieve buoyancy, the A4E12 sacrificed so much armor protection that it could barely hold the designation of light tank. At the maximum, the A4E12 sported 11mm of armor. Additional buoyancy came from the balsa wood floats which were encased in sheet steel and fitted to the hull sides above the tracks. The A4E12, on water, moved via a propeller fitted to the rear of the tank and a rudder provided steering. Armament consisted of a single Vickers .303in. machine-gun. Export sales, however, were fairly brisk for the A4E12 and China, the Dutch East Indies, Thailand, and the Soviet Union were all buyers of the tank. The Chinese 12th. Army Group would deploy the A4E12 into action against the Japanese in the Second Sino-Japanese War which began on July 7, 1937. In the end, all but one remained in Chinese service (as a training tank) though during the battles, the Japanese captured a few in functional condition and used them against the Chinese. 

     The Soviet Union purchased eight A4E12 tanks for trials and enamored with the A4E12, used it as the basis for the T-37 light amphibious tank. The T-37 was not an outright copy of the British design but the A4E12 did provide the influence for the Soviet tank. The T-37 saw extensive action against the Finnish in the Winter War and against the Germans following the 1941 invasion. However, the severe lack of armor (9mm maximum) saw most of the T-37 tanks destroyed with the few which survived being relegated to the training role. 

     One of the Soviet Union’s purchased A4E12 tanks survives today and is on display at the Kubinka Tank Museum outside Moscow, Russia.

Ordnance BL 15in. Howitzer Mk.I: A Gun The British Military Didn't Want

     In October 1914, the Royal Marines were reorganized in order to create two Royal Marine Artillery brigades. One served as an anti-aircraft artillery brigade while the other became the Royal Marine Howitzer Brigade (RMHB) under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel G. R. Poole. With a strength of around 1,000 men, the RMHB was split into twelve, one gun batteries. Each battery was composed of 60 men. A training facility was arranged for at Fort Cumberland, located in Portsmouth, UK. The guns deployed by the RMHB was the Ordnance Breech Loading (BL) 15in. Howitzer Mk.I and the RMHB would be the only unit to use them. 

     Coventry Ordnance Works, buoyed by their success with the 9.2in. howitzer, designed the BL 15in. gun on their own. However, with no military request for the gun, Coventry Ordnance Works used its influence within the British Admiralty to attempt to get interest in the product. At that time, Winston Churchill was First Lord of the Admiralty and saw the opportunity to get the Royal Navy involved in the land conflict in France. He authorized the purchase of 12 of the guns and so equipped, the RMHB would be sent to the Western Front in February 1915. The BL 15in. howitzer weighed around 94 tons and required three Foster-Daimler 105hp tractors to move. It could throw a 1,450lb shell out to a maximum range of 6.1 miles. Although effective enough when it came to eliciting destruction on German forces, the range was less than other, more capable guns and the time it took to bring the gun into action and the support required to operate it were detriments to its continued use. 

     Churchill’s support for the RMHB faded away in light of the performance of the howitzers and in time, the guns were forced onto the British Army who did not want them. Still, under Army oversight, RMHB crews served the weapons during the Battle of the Somme (September 1916) and the Third Battle of Ypres (October 1917). The guns were declared obsolete shortly after World War One and all of them were scrapped by 1920.

Char B1 (n° 257) “Bourrasque”: The French Tank Terror

German soldiers pose beside "Bourrasque" after the crew surrendered to elements of Panzer-Abteilung I near Mortiers. (Author's Collection)

     The brief story of the Saint-Chamond constructed Char B1 “Bourrasque” (n° 257) practically steps out of a Hollywood war film. Originally, the tank was delivered to the 508e RCC (Régiment de Chars de Combat) early in 1939 but by September 1939, the tank had been transferred to the 15e BCC (Bataillon de Chars de Combat) and assigned to 1ère Compagnie. In charge of “Bourrasque” was Lieutenant Sauret and his crew consisted of Sergent Seguin (driver), Caporal Gentner (gunner), and Chasseur Mogrédien (radio operator). 

     On May 16, 1940, the day before what would become the Battle of Montcornet, four tanks plus “Bourrasque” were gathered together at a rally point. Each of them had some battle damage, some worse than others but the common problem all the tanks had was a lack of fuel. It was decided that two of the tanks (“Martinique” [n° 207] and “L’Aquitaine” [n° 213]) would have their fuel and ammunition removed and distributed to the other tanks and then the two tanks would be scuttled. “Bourrasque” would tow the remaining two tanks (“Toulon” [n° 235] and “Tempête” [n° 267]) towards the jump-off point in order to preserve as much fuel as possible. On March 17, the attack on Montcornet commenced at 4:14am and as the tanks moved towards the Germans, at around 6am, a German truck laden with infantry blundered into the path of the tanks. The alert French commanders quickly brought the 47mm turret guns into action and destroyed the truck and the surviving German soldiers scattered and fled in the face of the tanks’ machine-gun fire. The tanks continued on but soon “Bourrasque” was nearly empty of fuel and the convoy stopped. It was decided that the fuel tanks of “Toulon” and “Tempête” would be drained and transferred to “Bourrasque” and the tank would travel towards Pargny where it was believed resupply could be had. 

     “Bourrasque” reached Pargny but the hoped for fuel was nowhere to be found and so Lt. Sauret kept driving south in search of any French refueling point. On the way, the tank ran into motorcycle elements (likely Kradschützen-Battalion 1) of Kampfgruppe Nedwig which had been advancing on Mortiers. Lt. Sauret ordered the tank to drive right into and through the motorcycle column, firing every gun the tank had into the panicked German troops who were thrown into complete disarray. Word of a lone French tank reached the 1st. Panzer Division and the unit dispatched a full battalion of anti-tank gun and armor assets from Panzer-Abteilung I to deal with “Bourrasque”. 

     The Germans caught up with “Bourrasque” outside of Mortiers and took it under fire. Repeated hits by PaK 36 37mm guns and even the short barrel 7.5 cm KwK 37 L/24 guns of Panzer III medium tanks failed to stop “Bourrasque” but both ammunition and fuel finally ran out for the French tank and at 11:15am on May 17, 1940, Lt. Sauret and his crew surrendered to the troops of Panzer-Abteilung I.

 

The Battles of Rzhev: Into the "Meat Grinder"

German trench line in the Rzhev Salient amid the wreckage of three knocked out Soviet tanks, two Lend-Lease Valentine infantry tanks and one BT-7 fast tank.

     On January 8, 1942, a series of Soviet offensives were launched within the salient in and around Rzhev and Velikie Luki. Collectively, the combat actions that ended on March 31, 1943 are called the Battles of Rzhev. However, for those Soviet soldiers that survived, it had a far more dark and grim name, the “Rzhevskaya Myasorubka” or “Rzhev Meat Grinder”.

     There were four main Soviet offensives, beginning with the Rzhev-Vyazma Strategic Offensive which, itself, contained five successive operations that started on January 8, 1942 and ended on April 20, 1942. Committed to the battles were the Kalinin Front and Western Front each of which contained three to five armies. A single Soviet army contained between three to five divisions in addition to support units. All told, the Soviets committed 3,680,300 men to the offensives. The intent was to eliminate the German 9. Armee which was under Heeresgruppe Mitte (Army Group Center). 9. Armee held the salient which, while in German hands, kept the threat to Moscow from a renewed push on the Soviet city alive. One of the more interesting operations during this time was the Vyazma Airborne Operation in which the Soviet 4th. Airborne Corps was deployed in one of only two airborne operations conducted by the Soviets in World War Two. Beginning on January 18 through January 22, 1942, the 201st. Airborne Brigade and the 250th. Airborne Regiment night parachuted behind German lines with the goal to cut the Vyazma-Yukhov highway and the Vyazma-Bryansk railroad. The 8th. Airborne Brigade was deployed on January 27 but it was a disaster. There were not enough Tupolev TB-3 transport planes available to move the entire brigade and so the planes had to make the drops in waves. Without fighter cover, the TB-3 (a four-engine bomber that entered service in 1932) was extremely vulnerable and several were shot down. Due to the weather and losses, only three battalions were landed (2,100 troops) but due to the conditions and scattering, only 1,320 paratroopers were able to assemble into combat units. The main opposition to the Soviet paratroopers was the 4. Panzer-Armee and initially, the Soviets had some success against German forces but by February, the paratroopers had failed to encircle the Germans and so between February 16 and February 24, the 9th. Airborne Brigade and the 214th. Airborne Brigade landed 1,525 men and supplies near Zelanje. Despite the added men, the Soviets could not finish the encirclement and the offensive stalled in the face of determined German resistance.

     On July 2, 1942, the 9. Armee launched Operation Seydlitz to deal with all of the Soviet troops in their rear area. Most of the forces were concentrated in the swamps between Rzhev and Bely. To ensure they ensnared the Soviet troops, the Obsha Valley was blocked as this was the escape avenue out of the swampland. Elements from the 9.Armee succeeded in dividing the Soviet forces into two pockets and after eleven days of combat, the trapped Soviet troops were wiped out.

     From July 30, 1942 to March 31, 1943, the Soviets launched three more offensives, again using forces from the Kalinin Front and Western Front. The third (and last) attack was the Rzhev-Vyazma Offensive that kicked off on March 2, 1943. But this coincided with the final phases of the withdrawal of Heeresgruppe Mitte from the Rzhev Salient which was done under Unternehmen Büffel (Operation Buffalo). The Soviets had been aware of the German retreat but Soviet command reacted to the information too slowly to take advantage. So, when Soviet forces were ordered to advance, it was too late and by March 3, 1943, Soviet troops entered Rzhev without a shot. Now that the Germans had shrunk the front by some 230 miles, when the Soviets reached the new German lines, they were pounded hard to the point that, coupled with lack of ammunition and supplies, the Soviet offensive ground to a halt. It should be noted that Unternehmen Büffel was one of scorched earth, exterminations, and deportations of civilians for slave labor.

     The losses on both sides are not fully known and at least on the Soviet side, have wildly varied numbers. Depending on the source, Soviet casualties ranged from 1,160,787 men killed, wounded, or missing to 2,300,000 killed, wounded or missing. German forces, of which 1,659,000 started the offensives, by the end, around 668,000 were either dead, wounded, or missing in action. With at least one million casualties, little wonder survivors called it a meat grinder.

     The photograph shows German trenches somewhere on the Rzhev Salient, surrounded by the wreckage of Soviet tanks. The two tanks nearest the camera are Lend-Lease British Valentine infantry tanks. Numerous makes of Valentine tanks were sent to the Soviet Union between 1941 and 1944. Given the time period of the offensives, they are not Valentine Mk. IX or Valentine Mk. X and so both are likely Valentine Mk. VII tanks. The Valentine was a Lend-Lease tank the Soviets liked as they appreciated the tank's mobility, cross-country performance, and General Motors 6-71 engine reliability of Canadian built Valentine Mk. VII tanks. Overall, the tank had a weight of 16 tons, a maximum armor thickness of 65mm down to a minimum of 8mm, was equipped with a Quick Fire 2-pounder (40mm) gun and a co-axial 7.92mm BESA machine-gun, and had a top road speed of 15mph with a maximum operational range of 90 miles on roads. The tank in the background is a Soviet BT-7 Model 1937 Fast Tank (Bystrochodnij Tankov). It had a similar armament to the Valentine, using a 45mm gun with three 7.62mm DT machine-guns (co-axial, rear mounted, and anti-aircraft). Armor protection was much less, having a maximum of 22mm down to a minimum of 6mm. Weight was nearly 14 tons but speed was much better at 31mph cross-country and up to 53mph on the road and the BT-7 had a modestly better operational range of 120 miles.

 

The Linke-Hofmann R I: The See-Through Bomber

 

Photograph of the second prototype, the R I 40/16

     World War One saw a rapid evolution within the field of aviation between 1914 to 1918. By 1918, military aircraft on all sides, especially the British and Germans, had evolved from slow and relatively cumbersome planes to fast and agile ones. Another aspect of aircraft by 1918 was a clear demarcation between types of aircraft. By the end of World War One, most of the warring powers had an array of aircraft classes such as fighters, interceptors, bombers, reconnaissance planes, fighter-bombers, and even ground support aircraft. If one examines the breadth of German aircraft design during the World War One years, there were a number of rather odd aircraft which appeared. It should be remembered that the start of World War One in 1914 was over ten years after the Wright Brothers made the first controlled and sustained flight in December 1903. As such, if a theory for some aeronautical advantage was determined to be feasible, it was investigated by aircraft designers and in some cases, turned into an actual airplane to fully put the idea to the test. One such aircraft was the German bomber, the Linke-Hofmann R I.

     The Modellversuchsanstalt der Motorluftschiff-Studiengesellschaft (MLStG; Institute for Testing of Aerodynamic Models of the Powered Airship Society), established in 1907 in Göttingen, Germany, had designed and tested a model aircraft concept in which it was seen that if the space between a biplane's wings (the interplane gap) was completely enclosed, it provided for a more aerodynamically clean surface by eliminating some of the drag induced by exposed struts, pilot windscreens, engine radiators, and oil coolers. The study by the MLStG was taken up by the Linke-Hofmann company (founded in 1834) who sought to compete in the Riesenflugzeuge (giant aircraft) arena in which several German aviation companies built large three to four engine bombers for the Deutsche Luftstreitkräfte (German Air Force). Despite Linke-Hofmann being well known for designing and constructing locomotives and not aircraft, the company brought in former A.E.G. engineer Paul Stumpf to design and oversee the new bomber which was designated the R I. What resulted was evidence that what works in the laboratory does not always translate to success when put into production.

     To facilitate the MLStG's study results, the fuselage of the R I was immense in size. Within the cavernous interior were two pairs of Mercedes D IVa engines, each of the four engines rated at 260 horsepower. Also inside the fuselage were the gearboxes and clutch systems for each pair which were connected to a driveshaft that drove a large, two-bladed wooden propeller on each side of the aircraft. The propeller mountings, along with dual radiators, were situated between the wings. The propeller mountings were not connected to the wings and thus did not pass on vibration forces to them. If required, the engines, gearboxes, and clutches could all be serviced by flight mechanics without exposure to the elements. So large was the interior of the R I that it had three decks. The top deck contained the cockpit and the wireless radio operator's station. The middle deck was the engine compartment and the lower deck contained the bombardier's position, the fuel tanks, and the bomb bay. The R I utilized all-steel tires rather than rubber and used a multi-spring suspension system. The first prototype, R I 8/15, was completed and used Cellon for skinning over the wooden airframe. Cellon was cellulose acetate and since it was clear, the intent was to make the R I less visible in the sky. The maiden flight of R I 8/15 took place in the spring of 1917 with test pilot Hauptmann Krupp at the controls.

     Suffice it to say, a host of problems quickly manifested themselves. The wings were found to be less than robust due to their light weight and tended to warp in flight, leading to sluggish aileron flight controls. Another problem was the engines did not get adequate cooling and significant vibration from the engines while running was felt throughout the aircraft. The Cellon skinning was also a problem. While clear, it was highly reflective which had the opposite effect on reducing the visibility of the R I. In addition, Cellon very quickly yellowed in sunlight and any dirt and grime easily stained the material. Finally, Cellon flexed when temperatures changed, causing shrinking and expansion on control surfaces which impacted performance. Another concern was the poor pilot who, sitting some 20 feet up in the cockpit, had a very difficult time in landing the R I. The R I was found to have a handful of qualities in that the rudder and elevator controls were adequate and the unusual fuselage design did not overly result in reducing the handling in the air. However, it was not anywhere close to what the MLStG study determined would be the resulting benefit. In May 10, 1917, the R I 8/15 was flying at low altitude when the wings collapsed and the aircraft plummeted to the ground. Amazingly, of the six man crew (which included the pilots Dr. Wittenstein and Leutnant Hebart), only two (both mechanics) perished in the crash. The damage was too extensive and so the bomber was written off but work on a second aircraft, R I 40/16, had already been underway (shown in the photograph). Some of the lessons learned in the first prototype were worked into the second with the most notable being the replacement of the Cellon with regular fabric which was painted in a multi-color lozenge pattern (Buntfarbenaufdruck or Lozenge-Tarnung). The handling of the second prototype was marginally better but the overall performance was not to expectations. The end of the R I program came when the second prototype landed hard, broke an axle, and nosed over, crushing the forward portion of the bomber. It was never repaired and although two additional aircraft had been finished by January 1918, R I 41/16 and R I 42/16, it is believed that neither the third nor fourth bomber prototypes were ever flown.

     The dimensions of the R I were huge. The R I had a length of 51.2 feet, a height of 21.1 feet, a wing span of 108.1 feet, and a wing area of 2,851 square feet. Empty, the R I weighed 17,640 pounds and when loaded, 24,696 pounds. The four engines gave the R I a maximum speed of 81 miles per hour with enough fuel to give the bomber a five hour endurance. It took the R I two hours to attain an altitude of 9,840 feet. Defensive armament was not fitted to any of the R I aircraft though dorsal, ventral, and beam machine-gun positions were provisioned.

Lydia Vladimirovna Litvyak: The White Lily of Stalingrad

     Striking a pose on the wing of her Yakovlev Yak-1 single-engine fighter, Mládshiy Leytenánt (Junior Lieutenant) Lydia Vladimirovna Litvyak, the “White Lily of Stalingrad”, held an interest in aviation early in life. Born in Moscow on August 18, 1921, at the age of 14, she became involved with the Kirovsky District Flying Club of Moscow and by age 15, Litvyak had achieved her first solo flight. Soon, she was attending flight school at the Kherson Aviation School in Kherson, Ukraine and upon graduation, Litvyak became an instructor at the Kalinin Aero Club. By the time of the June 22, 1941 German invasion of Russia, Litvyak had trained and graduated 45 pilots.

     Seeking to do her part for Mother Russia, Litvyak sought to enlist in the military as an aviator but despite her credentials as a pilot and instructor, she was turned down because it was said she lacked the experience and did not have enough flight hours. Not to be denied, Litvyak went to the Moscow Komintern RVK in October 1941 and lied about her pre-war flight hours by increasing the amount by some 100 hours. Her flight hours, apparently, were not validated and so her purposeful exaggeration saw her admitted into the military and she was assigned to the all-female 586th. Fighter Aviation Regiment under the command of Stárshiy Leytenánt (Senior Lieutenant) Yevgeniya Filippovna Prokhorova. Litvyak commenced training in flying the Yakovlev Yak-1 fighter and in short order, she achieved mastery of the aircraft. Her first combat sorties occurred in the summer of 1942, flying over Saratov, a major port city along the Volga River, and around the region. While her flights encountered the enemy, Litvyak did not achieve any kills or assists.

     In September 1942, Litvyak (along with other female pilots) was transferred to the 437th. Fighter Regiment which was regular aviation unit flying Lavochkin-Gorbunov-Gudkov LaGG-3 fighters. The 437th. Fighter Regiment flew sorties in and around the Stalingrad combat theater and it was here that Litvyak would finally draw blood and earned her “White Lily of Stalingrad” moniker in the Soviet press. Her Yak-1 emblazoned with the number “White 02”, on September 13, 1942, Litvyak was flying her third sortie over the Stalingrad area when her group attacked a flight of Ju 88 bombers escorted by Messerschmitt Bf 109 fighters. In the melee, Litvyak claimed one Ju 88 and shot down a Bf 109G-2 flown by Unterfeldwebel Erwin Meier of 2./Jagdgeschwader 53. Some sources claim Litvyak shot down another Bf 109G-2 on September 14 with the pilot thought to have been German ace Leutnant Hans Fuss of II.Stab/Jagdgeschwader 3. However, there remains some debate on if any of these victories belonged to Litvyak as some sources claim that a Junkers Ju 88 from 2./Kampfgeschwader 3 and flown by Oberleutnant Johann Wiesniewski which was downed by Litvyak on September 27, 1942 was her first kill.

     Because the 437th. Fighter Regiment flew LaGG-3 fighters, the ability of the unit to service the Yak-1 was diminished even though Litvyak and the other female pilots had brought mechanics with them. Thus, in very short order, the women were transferred to the 9th. Guards Fighter Regiment which also flew the Yak-1. From October 1942 to January 1943, Litvyak flew numerous missions but did not add to her kill tally. However, the 9th. Guards Fighter Regiment was converted to Lend-Lease Bell P-39 Airacobras and so once again, Litvyak was transferred, this time to the 296th. Fighter Regiment. Her Yak-1 renumbered to “Red 32” and later “Yellow 44”. Litvyak added four more kills to her score, including a Junkers Ju 87D-3 from 5./Sturzkampfgeschwader 77 and a Bf 109G-4 flown by Leutnant Franz Müller of 9./Jagdgeschwader 3. During this time, in February 1943, Litvyak was promoted to Mládshiy Leytenánt and awarded the Order of the Red Star. On March 22, she was wounded in combat for the first time. Litvyak had a romantic interest in ace pilot Kapitán Aleksey Solomatin with whom she often flew with as a wingman. However, she only realized this after his death in a crash on May 21. In the summer of 1943, the 296th. Fighter Regiment was re-designated to the 73rd. Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment and on June 13, 1943, Litvyak was appointed flight commander of the 3rd. Aviation Squadron. Her Yak-1 would be renumbered for the last time to “White 23” and while flying under the 73rd. Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment, she would rack up another 9 kills. On July 22, 1943, Litvyak was awarded the Order of the Red Banner and she would also earn the Order of Lenin.

     On August 1, 1943, Litvyak took her Yak-1 up for the fourth time that day, meeting up with a flight of Ilyushin Il-2 ground-attack aircraft to act as air cover. The sortie completed, the aircraft were returning to their bases when near the city of Orel, the flight of Yak-1 fighters spotted a group of German bombers and took them under attack with Litvyak in the lead. Litvyak was bounced by two escorting Bf 109 fighters which had been flying above the bombers. Initially, Litvyak had not seen the fighters but was able to turn in time to face the Bf 109s diving on her. Another Yak-1 pilot involved in the melee, Ivan Borisenko, was the last to see Litvyak, her Yak-1 trailing smoke and hounded by up to eight German fighters. Borisenko, once able to, dropped his altitude to see if he could find her but he found nothing, not even a plume of smoke from a crash. Sources claim that one of two German pilots downed Litvyak: Feldwebel Hans-Jörg Merkle of 1./Jagdgeschwader 52 or Leutnant Hans Schleef of 7./Jagdgeschwader 3. The debate remains as Merkle claimed a Yak-1 near Dmitryevka where Litvyak was last seen while Schleef, who claimed a LaGG-3 on the same day, may have mistaken Litvyak's Yak-1 for a LaGG-3 (which was not uncommon) as, many decades later, the wreck of Litvyak's aircraft was finally located in 1979 near where Schleef had made his claim.

     Litvyak's death is listed as August 1, 1943 at the age of 21. Today, some refute that she died in the crash and Litvyak had managed to crash land her Yak-1 and was taken prisoner by German troops. There was a female fighter pilot buried in the village of Dmitryevka and some reports stated the body was exhumed, examined, and determined that death came from a massive head wound and that the body was, indeed, that of Litvyak. Such a wound would make sense in a crash in that her head struck the dashboard on impact. However, at least one source refuted this autopsy ever took place. Just as her death is a point of controversy, so is her kill tally. With totals ranging from 5 to 14 solo kills, it was not at all unheard of for Russian aviators' kill counts to be inflated. In-depth research has confirmed that Litvyak achieved five kills on her own with two shared kills. While certainly less than the higher tallies, it still made her an ace.

     Posthumously, Litvyak was promoted to Stárshiy Leytenánt, received the Order of the Patriotic War 1st. Class on September 10, 1943, and was decorated with the Hero of the Soviet Union title on May 5, 1990 by President Mikhail Gorbachev. The reason for the long delay was because at the time of her death, the commander of the 73rd. Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment had wanted to award Litvyak with the Hero of the Soviet Union but this was declined and the award changed to the Order of the Patriotic War and it was not until November 1971 that Litvyak's death was officially recorded as dying while performing a combat mission. This, then, paved the way for her to receive the 11,616th. Hero of the Soviet Union title and decoration.

The PzF 44 Lanze: Germany's Post-War Panzerfaust

(Bundeswehr Photograph; Author's Collection)

     When the German Bundeswehr (Federal Defense) was founded on November 12, 1955, much of the equipment it received was supplied by the United States. In part, this was due to the fact that the German arms industry was not fully recovered from World War Two but also that there was some surplus of German wartime weapons (mainly the Karabiner 98k bolt-action rifle) as well as ready availability of U.S. arms, field equipment, and uniform items. In the latter, it was purposely designed that the new Bundeswehr uniforms bore almost no resemblance to the Wehrmacht uniforms of the war and so they had a very U.S. Army influence such as uniform cut, the wearing of U.S. steel helmets, and usage of U.S. Army style boots.

     By the end of the 1950s, the main anti-tank weapon for Bundeswehr infantry panzerjäger (tank hunter) was the U.S. Army M20A1 and M20B1 “Super Bazooka” which fired a 88.9mm HEAT (High-Explosive Anti-Tank) rocket out to a maximum range of 1,000 yards. At an effective range of 200-300 yards, the HEAT round could penetrate up to 280mm of armor. The U.S. Army also unloaded many obsolete M9 and M9A1 60mm “Bazooka” weapons on the Bundeswehr, most of which had been built during the war. The HEAT round on the M9 could penetrate 102mm of armor at 120 yards. The M9, however, was typically kept for training rather than utilized as a front-line anti-tank weapon. Despite the decent performance of the M20, the Bundeswehr wanted a German designed and built anti-tank weapon developed that could replace the M20 but more importantly, surpass it in terms of capability.

     In 1960, Dynamit Nobel AG commenced work on just such a weapon and the result was the reloadable Panzerfaust 44mm DM2 Ausführung 1 (Tank Fist 44mm DM2 Version 1). The PzF 44, nicknamed the “Lanze” (“Lance” or “Spear”), utilized a smooth launch tube which was 44mm in diameter. Fitted to the tube was the fire control handle, pistol grip, firing mechanism, and an optical sight. During travel, the optical sight was removable and to protect it, the PzF 44 operator carried it in a case. In an emergency, the PzF 44 had a simple mechanical sight graduated out to 180 meters. The PzF 44, perhaps not to any surprise, encompassed some aspects of the German wartime Panzerfaust. Like the Panzerfaust, the PzF 44 operated on a recoilless principle. The projectile was propelled out of the launch tube by a charge which, at the same time, blew a counterweight of finely grained iron powder out the back of the tube, thereby canceling out the recoil. However, unlike the wartime Panzerfaust which lobbed an unpowered warhead, the PzF 44 launched a rocket. After firing, folding fins deployed (as they did with the Panzerfaust) and several meters away from the firer, the rocket motor ignited, propelling the rocket towards the target at a speed of 210 meters per second. The original rocket, the DM-22, had a oversize 67mm warhead shape that was very similar to the Panzerfaust 150m which had managed to enter troop trails in the final weeks of World War Two. At an effective range of 300 meters, the DM-22 could penetrate 280mm of armor. This, however, was on par with the M20 and so the 90mm DM-32 was introduced that could punch through 375mm of armor but at the cost of a reduced effective range of 200 meters. The actual launch of the rocket was done by an ignition cartridge. A magazine held several cartridges with the magazine fed into the pistol grip and a bolt-action mechanism loaded a new cartridge and expelled the spent cartridge case after each firing. Following trials, the PzF 44 was accepted for service in 1963 and was later supplemented by the Leuchtbüchse 84mm, the German designation for the Swedish 84mm Carl Gustaf recoilless rifle. Each infantry platoon was equipped with one PzF 44. By 1992, the PzF 44 was replaced by the disposable Panzerfaust 3 (Pzf 3) anti-tank weapon, the latter of which was also developed by Dynamit Nobel AG.

     The photograph shows a gathering of soldiers and civilians in which a Heer (Army) officer is holding a PzF 44. His rank appears to be that of Oberst (Colonel) as is the rank of the officer across from him. Both of the men, as are a few of the soldiers behind them, are wearing the Bundeswehr-Splittermuster (Splinter Pattern) camouflage feldbluse. This pattern was derived from the World War Two German Heer camouflage but was not an exact copy. Curiously, the camouflage was deliberately printed with slipped printing screens which caused the white border on some of the edges of the camouflage pattern. This Kampfanzug (battle suit) encompassed both the tunic as well as trousers and was issued beginning in 1956 before being phased out in the mid-1960s. Some of the feldbluse did not have epaulets and so the rank which would have been fitted to them was sewn directly onto the shoulders. Interestingly, the Oberst on the left has his rank both on the epaulets as well as the shoulder while the Oberst on the right does not. The soldier directly behind the Oberst does not appear to have epaulets at all. A noticeable uniform feature which the Bundeswehr managed to retain from the outset was the World War Two style M43 Einheitsmütze (field cap) that the PzF 44 holding officer is wearing as are a number of the soldiers behind him.

     The PzF 44 seen here may be a prototype and it is not fitted with a rocket. There is a simple folding bipod seen to good effect but this did not appear to have been kept as production models used a pistol foregrip. There is a basic cheek-pad for the firer but again, on production PzF 44 weapons, it does not appear as it does here. The magazine for the ignition cartridges can be seen at the bottom of the pistol grip while the cocking handle for the bolt can be seen between the officer's fingers. The PzF 44 was also fitted with an adjustable wire shoulder stock, shown here fully collapsed. This, too, changed to an adjustable stock with a single shoulder piece, not the wire type seen here, on the production PzF 44.

 

The Canon de 155 C Modèle 1917 Schneider: Still Seeing Service

(Author's Collection)

     A battery of Canon de 155 C modèle 1917 Schneider (abbreviated as C17S) sit at rest on the range, likely during a training exercise. That this is likely the case is that if at the front, such an exposed and tightly packed position would spell disaster if located by the enemy and counter-battery fire brought to bear. In addition, there appears to be a wooden rectangular area which each cannon is sitting within. Finally, having the limbers right up with the guns was something not often done when in combat. The crews seem to be gathered near the second to last gun, perhaps getting instruction or taking a break from firing practice.

     The 155mm caliber C17S was a development of the earlier Canon de 155 C modèle 1915 Schneider (C15S) with the only difference being the breech of the C17S was changed to use bagged propellant rather than a cased shell as used in the C15S. Schneider-Creusot developed the C17S starting in 1915 and the change in the breech was actually done for cost savings as it was cheaper to use bagged charges with the round instead of a cased round which contained both the round and the propellant. Production began in 1916 with the first examples reaching French artillery troops in 1917. Schneider-Creusot continued to build the gun into 1918. Over 3,000 examples were built, including C15S models being converted to C17S standards. In addition to equipping the French, the C17S was used by the U.S. (as the M1917/M1918), Portugal, Russia, Belgium, and Italy during World War One.

     By the start of World War Two, some 2,040 examples of the C17S were still in French service. Prior to the war, the U.S., due to the delay in the 155mm M1 howitzer reaching troops, modernized the stocks of M1917 and M1918 which were still in service by adding air-brakes, using metal wheels, and putting rubber tyres on the wheels. These weapons went to war with U.S. artillery forces until the M1 finally began replacing them in 1942. Surplus M1917/1918 were sent to Britain under the Lend-Lease program. The Russians purchased the gun prior to World War Two but also captured a number of them from Poland. It is believed the Russians re-barreled the cannons to fire 152mm rounds. The Germans, after defeating the French, came into a large number of captured C17S guns and put them into service as the 15.5cm sFH 414(f). These guns remained in France, being used by second-line troops as well as being emplaced along the Atlantic Wall. Captured Russian guns were given the German designation 15.2cm sFH 449(r). Poland had been another heavy user of the 155mm Haubica wz. 1917 prior to the war with 340 in service. Many of these also fell into German hands who used them under the designation 15.5cm sFH 17(p). Italy was another user, having obtained 8 during the Battle of the Alps (which ran from June 10 through June 25, 1940 as part of the invasion of France) and another 96 from the Greeks. In Italian service, they were designated the Obice da 155/14 PB but once Italy surrendered in 1943 and the Germans seized Italian military equipment, the howitzers were given a new name, the 15.5cm sFH 414(i). Yugoslavia had 36 C17S guns in service and Belgium had 134 C17S guns available at the outbreak of World War Two. When the Germans invaded both countries and captured the howitzers, they were designated 15.5cm H 427(j) and 15.5cm sFH 413(b) respectively. Thus, the Germans had some six different designations for what was basically the same gun. Other countries not mentioned that used the C17S were Finland, Argentina, Bolivia, the Philippines, Romania, and Spain. 

     A testament to the soundness of the design is that Finland and Argentina used the guns into the 1980s while Bolivia received enough of the guns from Argentina to equip two artillery regiments who still use a modernized version of the gun to this day.