Russo-Ukrainian War: 155mm M107 Projectile with UZRGM Grenade Fuze

Source: CasualArtyFan on X™

     A casual glance through combat footage from the Russo-Ukrainian War would suggest a good portion of the skirmishes and engagements occur in and around trench lines, within patches of wooded terrain, and in relatively open plains or farm fields. But, at least in the eyes of Russian military leadership, progress is more often than not measured in what village, town, or city has been taken from the Ukrainians and occupied. As such, there is plenty of combat that occurs within the streets and ruins of houses and buildings. The latter is due to the Russian tactic of simply bombarding urban areas with artillery, rockets, drones, and aerial bombs. The U.S. Army used to call combat operations within built-up (urban) areas as MOUT (Military Operations on Urban Terrain) though today, it is usually referred to Urban Operations (UO).

     MOUT missions require specific training and awareness as urban areas present a much different set of problems for attacking troops. For one, a defending force can be fewer in number than the attacking force but the very urban terrain offers advantages to the defenders that make up for any deficit in manpower. Buildings offer concealment and ambush potential, streets running between buildings or houses constrain the movement of vehicles, rubble can provide hiding places for mines or IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices), taller buildings may offer protection from vehicle armament that may not have the elevation to reach higher positions, basements can hide troops in addition to making it risky for vehicles to crash through houses lest they fall into the basement and become immobile, more built-up urban areas could have underground infrastructure (sewer lines or even subway tunnels) which allow the defender to shift forces unseen, and there is the risk that within the urban combat zone, civilians may remain.

     That said, it is clear that urban combat is a significant challenge to undertake and be successful at it without suffering sizable casualties. Given Russian bombardment tactics, the Ukrainian Army often will not hold a village or town if there is no strategic or tactical reason for doing so. Instead, the Ukrainian Army often makes use of surveillance drones to reconnoiter a captured village or town, looking for Russian positions. If found, FPV drones may be sent in to take out as many of the Russian soldiers as possible. Likewise, if Ukrainian troops conduct a counterattack or raid against Russian positions, aerial drone reconnaissance is key in allowing the Ukrainians to formulate the best avenues of attack to minimize casualties. Sometimes, Russian resistance can be stubborn within a building or residence. If able, Ukrainian troops will attempt to convince the Russians to surrender rather than have to storm into a building or basement. This is surely to lead to injuries or death as there are only so many ways into a building or basement. If the Russians refuse to come out, then Ukrainian troops will utilize grenades and other explosives to finish off the Russian soldier(s) rather than go in and get them. 

     Perhaps the ultimate means to deal with Russians that refuse to surrender is shown here. The shell is a 155mm M107 High-Explosive projectile. The 95 pound M107 is a very old munition, having entered service in 1958. Yet, it remains in production and in use today as a training round as it is relatively inexpensive to produce. This particular M107 has 14.6 pounds of TNT in the main body. Other M107 shells use 15.4 pounds of Composition B (Comp-B) explosive. Such M107 rounds would have COMP “B” stenciled on the shell. This particular shell also has a .3 pound TNT supplementary explosive charge near the nose. This is designated by the stencil that reads “ W / SUPPL CHG”. Instead of the normal fuze (of which there are many with the most common being the M728), there is a UZRGM fuze from a F-1 hand grenade situated in the nose. UZRGM stands for Universal'nyi Zapal, Ruchnaya Granata, Modernizirovannyi (Universal Igniter, Hand Grenade, Modernized) and it, along with the F-1, have been in production since 1939. Ukraine currently produces a variant of the F-1 grenade which entered service in late 2024. The fuze has a delay between 3.2 to 4.2 seconds. The M107 has a lethal radius of 150 meters and out to 250 meters, injury is possible thanks to the approximately 1,950 fragments that are created upon detonation.

     Given the UZRGM's quite short delay coupled with the sizable blast radius of the M107, it makes one wonder exactly how this “grenade” would be employed. A long string perhaps? It would be assumed the UZRGM's fuze would detonate the supplementary charge which in turn would set off the rest of the shell. While the Ukrainian Army does have heavy drones that can (and do) drop 122mm and 155mm artillery shells, they do not utilize grenade fuzes. Also, Ukrainian troops do use hand thrown 120mm mortar bombs for clearing houses and even TM-62 anti-tank mines as satchel charges. Neither are large caliber artillery shells.

     Of course, this could very well be some Ukrainian artillerymen having a bit of fun and making a completely rubbish contraption to get some laughs from the social media world. In fact, when one considers the practicality of this improved explosive, it is a solid 99.9% chance this is a joke which has made a bunch of us discuss it to no end in the halls of Reddit and Facebook.

Kradmelder (Regimentsstab, Artillerie-Regiment 110)

Source: Flickr

     Somewhere on the Eastern Front, a kradmelder (dispatch rider) for the regimental headquarters (Regimentsstab) of Artillerie-Regiment 110 prepares to get under way. Of all the belligerents during World War Two, the German military was the largest user of both motorcycles as well as dispatch riders. These men played a critical role in delivering urgent orders and messages between headquarters and units out in the field. Often, this was because wire communications between units and their headquarters was either not yet in place, the distance too far to establish such communication, time was not available to set up wire lines, or the wire lines run had been broken, sabotaged, or in some way destroyed thus severing such communication channels. Typically, dispatches were sent back and forth by foot when moving messages between züge (platoons) and kompanie (companies) but when communicating to bataillone (battalions) and higher units, the kradmelder was utilized. Obviously, the job of a kradmelder, or any dispatch rider regardless of nation, was a dangerous one as they often operated alone. Even moving behind friendly lines, front depending, was no guarantee of safety. Each kradmelder was trained to maintain his motorcycle and spare parts were often carried so that any common mechanical failure could be corrected in the field.

     The Germans issued the kradmelder, and other users of motorcycles, a unique piece of protective clothing which was called the Schutzmantel für Kraft Radfaher which translates as Protective Coat for Motorcyclists. The double-breasted coat was rubberized so that it was waterproof and it also fit loosely. The coat also featured a wool faced collar, split tail, and four large pockets (two on the front, one on each side) with button-closure flaps. Each tail could be gathered around the rider's leg and buttoned into place. This made for a more snug fit and thus made the coat less awkward to wear when sitting on the motorcycle and also lessened the chances the coat material might catch on objects, to include the motorcycle's own rear tire. The coat was standard for both enlisted men as well as officers who operated motorcycles. The rider in the photograph has wrapped the coats' tails around his legs and the bottom of one of the front pockets can just be seen beneath his arm. The clear shield he is using to protect his face is not often seen in photographs with the usual protective equipment being a pair of goggles and conditions depending, a scarf or piece of cloth to cover the mouth and nose. In cold weather, some kradmelder used their gas masks, without the filter, to protect their face from the frigid temperatures. Other equipment visible includes the cylindrical gasmaskenbüche (gas mask case) and the square, rubberized pouch for the gaskap (gas cape). Strapped to his back is a Mauser 7.92mm k98 bolt-action rifle.

     The motorcycle he is riding is a DKW (DampfKraftWagen) NZ 350. By the time this photograph was taken, DKW was building the NZ 350 exclusively for the Wehrmacht. The motorcycle was powered by a 1-cylinder, 2-stroke, air-cooled 346cc engine which developed approximately 12hp. This was paired with a 4-speed transmission. Top speed of the NZ 350 was 65mph. Fuel capacity came from a 3.6 gallon fuel tank with the engine consuming, under normal operating conditions, almost one gallon of gasoline every 62 miles. Of interest, however, is that the license plate affixed to the top of the front fender is not military but a civilian plate. This is because all Wehrmacht military plates started with WH (Wehrmacht Heer for the Army), WL (Wehrmacht Luftwaffe for the Air Force), WM (Wehrmacht Kriegsmarine for the Navy), or SS for Waffen-SS license plates. The “M” on the plate is the Roman numeral that corresponded to a German city or district in which the motorcycle had been registered. The circular red object is the registration proof of issue by the local police. The upper portion read “Der Polizeiprälident” (Chief of Police) and below it would be the city name. It was not uncommon that civilian owned motorcycles were impressed into German military service given that demand for them was high.

     Finally, when this photograph was taken, the regimental headquarters staff for Artillerie-Regiment 110 had been attached to the I. Armeekorps (1st. Army Corps), 18. Armee (18th. Army) which was a part of Heeresgruppe Nord (Army Group North) during the invasion of Russia that commenced on June 22, 1941 with the launch of Unternehmen Barbarossa or Operation Barbarossa. By October 1941, it was subordinated to L. Armeekorps on several occasions. By the close of 1944, the unit was the 17. Armee and by the spring of 1945, it was under 1. Panzerarmee, LIX. Armeekorps in Silesia. As for the remainder of the unit, I.Abteilung (which encompassed three batteries) was assigned to Artillerie-Regiment 74 in 1939 and III.Abteilung (also three batteries) joined Artillerie-Regiment 74 on July 29, 1940. Artillerie-Regiment 110 was designated a heavy artillery regiment which meant it was equipped with 150mm or 170mm caliber guns.