For more information on the Su-24M, visit:
https://photosofmilitaryhistory.blogspot.com/2025/06/russo-ukrainian-war-sukhoi-su-24m.html
Captions of photographs in a book can only give so much information. Many times, the photographs simply exist to compliment the text and so a large caption isn't needed. Here, the idea of a caption is much expanded to provide a concise yet expansive history of a particular military photograph, be it of weapons, vehicles, personnel, or battles.
For more information on the Su-24M, visit:
https://photosofmilitaryhistory.blogspot.com/2025/06/russo-ukrainian-war-sukhoi-su-24m.html
The Russo-Ukrainian War is, for anyone that follows the weapons deployed by both Ukraine and Russia, a war of old and new arms technology. Both sides utilize weapons that saw manufacture in World War Two and built in the following decade past 1945. One example is shown here, the AZP S-60 57mm anti-aircraft gun. Standing for Avtomaticheskaya Zenitnaya Pushka (Automatic Anti-Aircraft Gun), the AZP S-60 first appeared in prototype form in 1946 and was accepted for service in 1950. Originally designed as a short- and medium range anti-aircraft gun, it is woefully obsolete in that role today without modern upgrades such as fully powered gun controls, improved ammunition,k and guidance systems. Instead, both the Ukrainians and the Russians are primarily using the AZP S-60 on ad-hoc self-propelled mountings as a rapid fire, short range artillery gun.
Normally, the AZP S-60 is mounted on a four-wheel carriage with outriggers to stabilize the platform when in action. The centrally mounted turntable permits 360 degrees of traverse while the gun mount allows for 85 degrees of maximum elevation and 4 degrees of depression. The combat weight of the AZP S-60 is five tons and a full crew consists of seven men. A 7mm thick gun shield offers a measure of protection to the gun crew from light small arms calibers and shell splinters. Typical gun crew in action is four men of which three are provided with seats (commander and two gunners to operate the power assisted, manual traverse and elevation/depression controls) and a loader. The remainder of the men are typically ammunition handlers, pushing clips to the loader. Speaking of clips, the AZP S-60 is fed from four-round clips which are pushed into a horizontal loading tray on the left side of the weapon. A well trained crew can maintain a sustained rate of fire of 70 rounds per minute though the AZP S-60 is capable of 120 rounds per minute.
The series of photographs here are screen captures from two different videos showing Ukrainian AZP S-60 crews in action, both posted on social media in February and March 2025. The first two show one of the self-propelled mountings, this particular one using a KamAZ-4310 6x6 truck. This is a typical mount, simply placing the gun and turntable onto a flat deck. The gun shield's upper half is folded down to lower the profile while to the left of the image (as one looks at it), the seat for the gunner can be seen along with the dual controls that raise and lower the gun. It is this gunner who fires the AZP S-60 via a foot trigger. Wooden crates of ammunition are lashed down to the bed. On the roof the KamAZ-4310's cab are at least two drone jammers. The next image shows the gun in action. The loader and commander are holding onto the traverse controls as the gun recoils and causes the truck to rock. The seat for the gunner who would have managed the traverse and the commander's seat (in the middle) have been removed though their mounts can be seen by the feet of the commander. As the gun is being used for indirect fire, to the right of the image is a panoramic periscope sight to enable the gunner to aim the weapon. Also of note, just behind the loader is a ready rack with a full clip for him to grab and load once the weapon is empty.
The second set show a AZP S-60 crew from the 112th. Territorial Defense Brigade preparing their gun for action while on a firing range. They are firing the UOR-281U HE-T (High-Explosive Tracer) ammunition. The sequence shows one of the ammunition handlers pushing the 4-round clip into the breech while the last image shows the loader cocking the charging handle. At this point, the weapon is ready to fire. Using such ammunition, the maximum range is around 3.8 miles.
Early in 2023, Russian Federation forces were seen fitting armored vehicles with weapon systems taken from Russian naval ships. This was taken as a sign that Russian tactics, which took (and still do) a toll on armored vehicles, saw the inability for the Russian military to replace such losses. Thus, units took it upon themselves to scavenge various naval weapons with the most common being the 2M-3 turret that mounts two 25mm 110-P autocannons. Another relatively “popular” naval weapon seeing use is the RBU-6000 Smerch-2 which is a 12-tube, 212mm anti-submarine rocket launcher and this is shown here, burned out along with the T-72 tank it is mounted upon. The vehicle was destroyed on August 1, 2024 by an FPV drone from the Drone Battalion, 3rd. Assault Brigade. The location is Ploshchanka, Luhansk Oblast.
The RBU-6000 has been in service since 1961 and can be found on a host of Russian warship classes. When fitted to ships, the RBU-6000 enjoys the benefits of the Burya FCS (Fire Control System) which itself is tied into the vessel's sonar system (for munition guidance), power aiming (traverse, elevation, and pitch/roll stabilization), and a below-deck automatic loading system from either a 72 or 96 round magazine. Of course, being mounted onto the hull of a T-80 tank means the RBU-6000 has to be manually aimed and loaded by the crew. The RBU-6000 can be traversed 180 degrees to the left or right of center, elevated to a maximum of 65 degrees, and depressed to a total of 15 degrees. Without power, the manual rate of traverse is 4 degrees per second.
The RBU-6000, as an anti-submarine weapon, fires two types of rockets. The first is the 250 pound RGB-60 and this is a unguided rocket with a impact or proximity fuzed 50 pound explosive warhead. The RGB-60 has a variable range depending on how far or close the enemy submarine is. The minimum range is .2 of a mile to a maximum of 3.4 miles. Maximum depth is .3 of a mile. It is presumed that the Russians are utilizing the RGB-60 in their land-launched RBU-6000 systems as it is the least sophisticated munition the RBU-6000 fires and probably more plentiful. Plus, the RGB-60 has a larger warhead and a longer range compared to the other rocket the RBU-6000 fires. That other rocket, the 90R, is a guided weapon and uses a 43 pound shaped charge that is meant to actually strike the submarine or torpedo rather than act as a depth charge. However, it can be fitted with a proximity fuze if needed. Minimum range of the 90R is .4 of a mile to a maximum range of 2.7 miles. Regardless of the rocket type, the RBU-6000 can be set to fire a single rocket at a time, all 12 rockets simultaneously, or ripple fire 2, 4, or 8 rockets at a time.
The tank, which appears to be a T-72B, likely had a non-operational turret which was removed and the RBU-6000 (replete with its naval vessel base) put in its place. The crew fitted anti-drone screens to the top of the launcher and what looks like the engine decking as well. Slat armor panels are on the sides and rear as well as flat upon the front glacis plate. What looks like a work platform can be seen on the front. The RBU-6000 was no doubt electrically fired using a length of cabling and aiming was likely done using the common PG-1 series panoramic telescope. However, the rather short range of the RBG-60 rocket means any vehicle mounting the RBU-6000 has to be close to the front line, making it vulnerable to attack. As a comparison, the BM-21 122mm MLRS (Multiple Launch Rocket System) can fire the basic 9M22U HE-FRAG (High Explosive Fragmentation) rocket out to 12 miles. This is a possible reason some of the RBU-6000 launchers are fitted to tanks such as the T-72 seen here but also T-80 tanks.
A soldier of a territorial defense brigade posing for the camera with his “Dushka”, the venerable DShK M1938 12.7mm heavy machine-gun. First introduced in 1938, the DShK (standing for Degtyarov-Shpagin Krupnokaliberny; Degtyarov-Shpagin Large-Caliber) remains in service with dozens of military forces around the world and it has seen combat starting in World War Two and in just about every military conflict since then, to include the Russo-Ukrainian War. This particular make is the DShKM, evidenced by the muzzle brake, which appeared in 1946. When production ended in 1980, over 1 million DShK machine-guns had been built and to date, it has yet to be fully replaced in Russian Federation service despite newer weapons such as the NSV and Kord machine-guns. In addition to ground mounts, the DShK is also used on armored vehicles and tanks as a anti-aircraft machine-gun.
The DShKM seen here is utilized by a rapid reaction anti-drone unit, hence being mounted in the bed of a pick-up truck. The locally fabricated pedestal mount permits traverse and elevation and it even has minimal gun shield. Usually, the DShK uses a 60-round metal ammunition can and this constitutes a single belt (which is usually 50 rounds). However, when engaging drones such as the Shahed-136, volume of fire is a factor in scoring a successful hit. As such, a single belt can be expended very quickly and in some cases, the drone(s) can leave the kill zone quickly, meaning the DShK is out of action while a new belt is fed into the weapon. Here, the fabricator of the gun mount adapted a 20 liter (5 gallon) metal fuel canister to act as an extended ammunition can. From appearances, it can hold up to five ammunition belts for a ready ammunition count of 250 rounds.
Empty, the “Dushka” weighs 74 pounds and it uses a gas-operated flap-locking action. The 5.4 foot long DShK has a cyclic rate of fire of 600 rounds per minute but a practical rate of fire is between 100 to 200 rounds per minute. The most often used round is the B-32 steel-cored API (Armor-Piercing Incendiary) bullet which, despite being introduced in 1936, remains in production. The B-32 can penetrate 20mm of rolled homogeneous armor at 500 meters. As such, the DShK is a threat to lightly armored vehicles. A similar round is the BZT-44 APIT (Armor-Piercing Incendiary Tracer) and this is often mixed into ammunition belts of B-32 rounds. Another round used is the MDZ incendiary bullet and this might also be mixed with API ammunition. The maximum effective range is 1.2 miles with a maximum range of 1.6 miles.
Francis Pulham's excellent book entitled Fallen Giants: The Combat Debut of the T-35A Tank catalogs the fates of the 61 Soviet T-35 heavy tanks that went into battle in 1941 to repel the German invasion of Mother Russia. A 45-ton monster of a tank that had five turrets and featured heavily in pre-World War Two Soviet military parades, the T-35 rarely engaged German forces and instead, ended up broken down and abandoned due to mechanical problems. Even when they did, the T-35 had a maximum of 30mm of armor, paltry for a tank meant to operate independently as a breakthrough vehicle. Despite their poor combat history, the T-35 enthralled German soldiers who came across one and because of this, photographs taken by German soldiers and kriegsberichter (war correspondents) abound of the T-35 with which Pulham was able to illustrate his book.
While Pulham is able to identify most of the T-35 tanks, this particular tank remains unknown. Pulham believes it to be chassis number 0183-5 which was a T-35A built in 1936, one of sixteen produced that year. The tank was assigned to the 67th. Tank Regiment. Combat records for the regiment only list the tank as lost near Lwów (Lviv), Ukraine but no chassis number was given. Pulham examined known losses in the area and was able to identify the tank was abandoned along what is today the H17 highway, some 20 miles outside Lviv. Still, despite his evidence, Pulham cannot positively state the tank is, indeed, 0183-5.
Pulham's book uses a photograph similar to the one here, perhaps taken by soldiers in the same unit, which shows the T-35 as it was found. As the tank was in the road, a later photograph shows it pushed off into the ditch. The tracks had been removed and white bands were painted on the left rear of the tank as a warning to drivers at night as the left side was still partially in the roadway. The white paint was repeated on the left front as well. A third picture in the book shows the derelict T-35 with some missing components, namely the turret mounted antenna. Following the war, the tank was most likely scrapped.
Primary Source:
Pulham, Francis Fallen Giants: The Combat Debut of the T-35A Tank (Stroud, Gloucestershire: Fonthill Media, 2017)
When the T-34 was first encountered by the Germans in combat during the invasion of the Soviet Union (Operation Barbarossa), starting on June 22, 1941, the tank came as a nasty surprise. In part, this was due to the belief in the higher levels of German command that the Soviets were incapable of fielding a modern tank. This notion was strengthened by the fact that the Soviet tank forces were equipped primarily with tanks that were adapted from foreign tank designs from the late 1920s and early 1930s. For example, the Soviet T-26 light tank was derived from the British Vickers 6-ton tank (whose design started in 1928) and the BT fast tank from the American M1931 tank. These tanks made up the bulk of Soviet tank forces in 1941 but Soviet tank designers knew that these tank designs were on borrowed time. As a side, it should be noted that the Soviets deployed three new heavy tanks in their war with Finland during the Winter War which occurred from November 30, 1939 to March 13, 1940. These new heavy tanks, the SMK, T-100, and KV-1, were reported to the Germans by the Finnish. In particular, the Finns told the Germans that the KV-1 was a formidable foe due to its thick armor. However, this appeared to have little effect on the German command's opinion of Soviet armor.
The Soviets, though, as far back as 1937, began work on a replacement for the BT series of tanks. What resulted was the A-20 which utilized a diesel fuel engine (less flammable) but more importantly, used sloped armor derived from experimental BT projects (such as the BT-IS). By sloping the armor, it increases the effectiveness of the armor both by shot deflection potential as well as increasing the relative thickness of the armor based on the angle of the plate. Lessons learned from the Soviet skirmishes with the Japanese in Manchuria in 1938 saw the A-20 prototype joined by a newer, improved tank designated the A-32. More heavily armored and armed, the A-32 went against the A-20 in trials and it was the A-32 that came out the victor. Approval for production was granted for the A-32 as the T-34. Deliveries of the new T-34 medium tank began in 1940.
Many consider the T-34 tank the best medium tank of World War Two and on paper, the T-34 did combine armor protection, mobility, and firepower very well. However, the T-34, when it first appeared in Soviet units in 1940 and then in battle in the summer of 1941, had many flaws that blunted the impact of the new tank. Mechanically, the T-34 had problems. Initial low production quality saw the expected life span of the engines diminished. In addition, the gearbox and transmission was also prone to breaking. The latter saw some crews strapping a replacement transmission onto the engine deck of their tanks on the chance their unit's supply train had no spares if difficulties arose. Only into 1943 could the factories guaranty a service life of at least 100 hours. Another issue was the poor deployment of the T-34 in combat and the crews that were, as a whole, little trained on the T-34. By consequence, these two factors squandered the capability of the tank. It was not long before German troops in the field got over their initial reactions to the new tank and simply adjusted tactics to deal with them effectively. Nevertheless, the T-34 became the de facto Soviet medium tank of World War Two and later models, such as the T-34-85, continue to see service in the world today.
Returning to the destroyed tank here, it is notable for the cross-hatch camouflage pattern seen on the turret. The tank is likely a T-34 Model 1941 built by the STZ Factory if judging by the bolted rear plate on the turret. This same tank was designated by the Germans as the T-34/76B. Many sources attribute the cross-hatch camouflage to select units, such as the 11th. Tank Brigade or the 1st. Guards Tank Brigade. This, however, would be incorrect. The reason is because the camouflage, consisting of white wash over the tank's base dark green paint, was applied at the factory and not by units in the field. Thus, any unit that was shipped replacement tanks (or equipped with them from the outset) from the factory would receive them with the camouflage already applied. It does appear, however, that this particular camouflage pattern appeared in the winter of 1941 disappeared after the winter of 1942. As a note, this same style of camouflage was also applied to other equipment, such as trucks and even artillery, and was not exclusive to armor.
Primary Source:
Michulec, Robert and Zientarzewski, Mirosław T-34: Mythical Weapon (Mississauga, Ontario: Air Connection, 2007)
Many of the main models of tanks deployed by the Soviets in the first two years of World War Two had a flamethrowing variant. The most numerous were those based on the T-26 light tank. The T-26 made up the bulk of Soviet tank forces and thus there were no less than four flamethrowing variants. The first was the OT-26. Fielded in 1933, the OT-26 (OT stood for Ognemetniy Tank; flamethrowing tank) was based on the early twin-turreted T-26 mod. 1931. The left turret was removed and within the right turret, a flame gun was fitted. However, the OT-26 was not very successful as the cramped turret made using the flame-projector difficult and the amount of fuel able to be carried was paltry. It was soon replaced by the OT-130. This was the T-26 mod. 1933 single turret tank with the 45mm gun replaced by a flame-projector. OT-130 tanks saw action against the Japanese during the September 1939 Battles of Khalkhin Gol and later against the Finnish in the Winter War which ran from November 30, 1939 to March 13, 1940. Survivors then met the Germans at the start of Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of Russia, that kicked off on June 22, 1941. The OT-130 was supplemented with the OT-133 that was the T-26 mod. 1939, again with the 45mm gun replaced with the flame-projector though the flame-projector was much shorter than the one used in the OT-130. The final model was the OT-134 and it was the more radical, but more useful, variant. Like the OT-133, it used the T-26 mod. 1939 but was fitted with the same turret as used on the T-50 light tank. The flame-projector was fitted centrally in the hull. Unlike the other T-26 flamethrowing tanks, the OT-134 retained its tank gun which meant once all the fuel was expended, it still had a weapon to fight with. Only a small number were built in 1941. Typically, the OT-130, OT-133, and OT-134 carried 400 liters of fuel in the hull along with four compressed air tanks that provided the propelling force on the fuel. At best, the range was only 40 yards.
Another numerous tank in Soviet forces was the BT fast tank and to a lesser degree, the T-28 medium tank. There was a flamethrowing version of the BT-7, the OT-7, which had the flame-projector fitted to one side of the hull, facing forward. The OT-7 remained a prototype. The Germans, following their invasion of the Soviet Union, made reports of the existence of an OT-28 but no such variant of the T-28 was ever made, even in prototype form. The T-28 had two machine-gun armed supplementary turrets in the front of the tank along with the central, main turret. Some believe the larger, five-turreted T-35 heavy tank carried a flamethrower, replacing one of the two machine-gun armed turrets (the other two supplementary turrets housed 45mm guns). This was not a factory fitted armament but was one done in the field and thus not an official model. It could be that the Germans believed the more numerous T-28 might also carry a flamethrower and gave it the spurious OT-28 designation.
Finally, the Soviets created the OT-34 and the KV-8. The OT-34 was simply the T-34/76 medium tank with the hull machine-gun replaced with a ATO-41 flamethrower. The KV-8, and the subject of the photograph, was a variant of the KV-1 heavy tank. The Soviets learned that when the enemy sees a flamethrowing tank approaching, that tank attracts a high degree of attention. With the exception of the OT-134, the Soviet flamethrowing tanks had obvious differences from their regular T-26 counterparts. Thus, they suffered accordingly, especially when they had to get very close to the enemy to effectively deploy their weapon. The OT-34 was, more or less, the T-34/76, and the hull mounted flame-projector meant the turret could retain its 76mm gun. The same could not be said for the KV-8. Instead of mounting the flame-projector in the hull, it was decided to fit the flame-projector in the turret. This would give the advantage of being able to bring the flamethrower to bear anywhere the turret was facing rather than being limited to strictly straight ahead as with hull-mounted flamethrowers. Unfortunately, the flamethrowing apparatus was too large to fit alongside the KV-1's 76mm gun. A compromise was made and in place of the 76mm gun was the smaller, 45mm Model 32/38 gun. To make it appear that the KV-8 had the KV-1's original gun, a tube was fitted around the 45mm gun's barrel that matched the length of the 76mm gun. This also helped to camouflage its true nature if deployed with other KV-1 tanks. The KV-8 carried 960 liters of fuel along with the compressed air tanks. The ATO-41 could fire three bursts every 10 seconds with each burst draining 10 liters of fuel. If using plain kerosene, the range was no more than 71 yards but if firing a kerosene/oil mixture, the range was out to 109 yards. Another benefit of the KV-8 was its thick front and turret armor which was difficult to penetrate by the majority of German anti-tank weapons. Thus, it was better able to close with the enemy and unleash its flame. Production commenced in 1942 and some 42 examples of the KV-8 were built. Another 25 were built as the KV-8S which utilized the KV-1S tank as the basis and upgraded the flamethrower to the ATO-42 model. A chemical battalion, at the time the KV-8 was deployed, consisted of two companies of KV-8 tanks (10 per company) and one company of OT-34 tanks (11 per company).
The photograph depicts one of the original KV-8 tanks, belonging to the 500th. Independent Flamethrower Tank Battalion, and it appears to have been stopped just before crushing a German 8.8cm Flugabwehrkanone 18, better known as the “88”. It was not unusual for Soviet tank crews, especially at the early stages of the war, to simply crash into and run over German guns. The reasons were many but the more common was not having ammunition left (or being sent into battle without it) or a gun malfunction. The KV-8 appears to have been knocked out, likely by another Flak 18 gun, and the tank had caught fire as indicated by the dark patches on the front and rear of the turret and hull side. The tank hit the Flak 18 just enough to crumple the fender before it came to a halt. The Flak 18 appears to have been in a prepared position judging by the leveled ground it is emplaced on and the small berm in front of it. There is a slogan on the KV-8's turret which translates as "Onwards...to the West!" and the photograph was taken sometime between August and September 1942 near Voronovo, Russia.
On October 20, 1941, LV. Armeekorps deployed the 101. Leichte-Division, the 57. Infanterie-Division, and Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 197 to commence the taking of Kharkov. Defending the city was the Soviet 216th. Rifle Division and the ad-hoc Separate Armored Unit which was made up of twenty-five T-27 tankettes, thirteen KhTZ-16 vehicles (improved tank built on a STZ-3 tractor), five T-26 light tanks, and four of the five T-35 heavy tanks. The Soviets were to defend the city and buy time for factory equipment to be evacuated. The actual assault on the city began on June 23, 1941 by which time the evacuation of the equipment was completed and the next day, the city was in German hands. The T-35 in the photograph was being driven along Stalin Prospekt, a main road leading out of Kharkov, when the tank either broke down or was abandoned. The crew had enough time to plant charges and scuttle the tank which blew the roof off the main turret, upended the rear facing 45-mm gun turret, and completely blew the two machine-gun turrets off the tank.
The tank would remain on the road, becoming a sign post and attraction for photographs. By May 1942, the tank had been pushed off the road and photographs taken by German troops show the tank as losing more and more pieces. Some of the last photographs were taken in 1943 and show that the T-35, despite being derelict, was mistaken for an active tank and sustained a penetrating hit to the rear. It is presumed that following the Fourth Battle of Kharkov (which ended August 23, 1943) in which the Russians reclaimed Kharkov for good, the T-35 was scrapped.
Prior to the 1930s, the Soviet Union did not have much in the way of indigenous motorcycles and relied heavily on imports. In fact, during World War One and into the Russian Civil War, the major brands of motorcycles in use by the Russian military were Indian and Harley-Davidson. By the mid-1930s, the Soviets were well on the path to producing their own motorcycles such as the TIZ-AM-600 (a copy of the British BSA Sloper 600), the PMZ-A-750, and the Dnepr M-72 (copy of the BMW R71). Still, Harley-Davidson motorcycles continued to see use and during World War Two, the Soviets received over 30,000 Harley-Davidson WLA motorcycles via Lend-Lease. So, a Harley-Davidson motorcycle was selected for the testing of a sidecar mounted ChK-M1 37mm anti-tank gun as a means of moving the gun around the battlefield. As a side note, the gun was also fitted to Lend-Lease Willys MB Jeeps and the GAZ-67 (the Soviet equivalent to the Jeep) among other transports.
The ChK-M1 was the final result of development of the ChKSh-1 which appeared in prototype form in the summer of 1941. The intent was to produce a anti-tank gun that could be airdropped and provide airborne troops with some capability to tackle enemy armor. Testing showed that the gun was flawed. It was deemed overly complex, had a slow rate of fire (between 8 to 10 rounds per minute), was inaccurate, and the armor penetration of the 37mm round was found wanting. In 1942, the Soviets set up a special design bureau, OKBL-46, to continue development of the ChKSh-1 and two designs emerged, the ChK-M1 and the ZIV-2. Between April 18, 1943 and May 28, 1943, both guns were put to the test but it was the ZIV-2 that came out the loser and the ChK-M1 was ordered into production on June 14, 1944. The first examples started to enter service in July 1944 and production continued through June 1945 with some 472 guns being produced.
The ChK-M1 had several features designed to both lighten the weight (in keeping with the need to be airdropped) and limit both size and recoil. The gun barrel was surrounded by a cylindrical shroud and within the shroud was a inert mass and a recoil spring. When the gun was fired, the barrel recoiled a maximum of 3.9 inches and the inert mass disengaged from the barrel, moving backwards 3.5 feet, compressing the recoil spring which then moved the gun back into battery. The entire gun, excluding the muzzle brake, was 7.6 feet long. The muzzle brake also added to the reduction of the rearward recoil. A good crew was able to put 15 to 25 rounds through the gun. The ChK-M1 fired the BR-167 armor-piercing round which weighed 1.7 pounds (7 ounces being the charge weight) and the penetration was approximately 20mm at a 60 degree slope and 25mm at a 90 degree angle from 500 meters. The other round the ChK-M1 fired was a high-explosive round, the OR-167. The 1.6 pound round had a 7 ounce explosive warhead fitted with a MG-8 fuze.
Some question if the ChK-M1 was actually able to be fired from the sidecar. The answer to that is that yes, it could, if the crew had no option to dismount the gun. The photograph makes it appear as if the gunner is resting the breech on his shoulder but he is not. When the gun recoiled, the breech would move to the right of the gunner's shoulder. The man seated behind the driver was the loader and both he and the driver carried ammunition in backpacks so in action, he would pull rounds from the driver's pack to hand to the gunner or load the gun himself. The ChK-M1 was fired via a trigger, which can be seen in the gunner's right hand. His left hand was used to effect traverse and what little elevation and depression the gun had via a vertical grip offset to the left of the breech. The far more normal operation of the ChK-M1 was for the crew to dismount it from the motorcycle, assemble the carriage, and deploy it in the ground role. A skilled crew could do this in 80 seconds. To that end, behind the loader were the simple, all-metal spoked wheels and carriage legs while the gun shield can be seen secured to the side of the sidecar. The gun shield was not large and had a meager 4.5mm of armor thickness which was, at best, proof against some small arms and fragments. The gunner was provided with a periscopic sight which allowed him to keep his head low and behind the gun shield. The entire gun carriage was very low and provided only 5 degrees of elevation and at most, 5 degrees of depression. The carriage also provided 45 total degrees of traverse. The low profile of the weapon usually forced the crew to operate the gun from the sitting or prone position. A typical ChK-M1 team consisted of six men and two motorcycles. The motorcycle shown here included the driver, gunner, and loader while the second motorcycle was manned by the driver, the gun team commander, and a ammunition bearer.
The ChK-M1 had a total weight of 478 pounds and it could be carried easily within the two major Russian airborne troop gliders; the Antonov A-7 and Gribovsky G-11. It could also be carried by the Lisunov Li-2 (the Soviet copy of the Douglas DC-3). The gun was usually airdropped via parachute from the Ilyushin Il-4 but the Li-2 was also used for airdrops as well. The sole user of the ChK-M1 was the 98th. Guards Infantry Division, its personnel from the 13th. Guards Airborne Division that had been formed on December 20, 1943. On January 19, 1944, the unit was included within the 37th. Guards Airborne Corps until reorganized again December 18, 1944 to the 103rd. Guards Rifle Division. The unit never saw combat during World War Two. On June 7, 1946, the unit became the 103rd. Guards Airborne Division and reformed on October 15, 1948 after absorbing several other units. Finally, on April 25, 1955, the unit was disbanded. It was likely just as well that the division did not see action as the ChK-M1 was not well liked in service. It was found that the barrel rapidly wore out while the accuracy of the BR-167 round dropped off quickly. In addition, the penetration value of the round was, by 1944 and into the early post-war period woefully inadequate in comparison to the later war Soviet 45mm anti-tank guns (such as the 45mm M-42). Finally, crews complained that the simple sight of the ChK-M1 suffered in low-light conditions, something that also plagued the 45mm guns but rather than improve the ChK-M1, the 45mm guns were recommended to be improved upon rather than a light gun that had little value.
Of interest is the fact that the RAD troops are equipped with old Gewehr 98 rifles which are of World War One vintage. This is evidenced by the straight bolt handle, the location of the front rifle strap fitting, and the overall length of the rifle. Some of them appear to have been modified in some degree to post-WW1 Karabiner 98b standards. These changes included using a tangent-leaf rear sight instead of the Lange tangent sight, turning down the bolt handle, and the removal of the front and rear rifle strap swivel mounts and replacing them with simple loop on the front barrel band and a lateral slot cut into the stock. The RAD soldier nearest the camera appears to only have the newer tangent-leaf sight as it retains the straight bolt handle and given the way the rifle is slung, appears to have the original swivel strap mounts. Notice also the variance in the wood coloration of the rifle stocks among the soldiers. RAD units were not considered, at this time, as front line combat troops and so had to make do with elderly weapons. Given the lack of equipment, these men may have been taking an excursion to visit the T-35 wreck. The distinctive RAD service cap can be seen tucked into the front of the belts of some of the soldiers. What informs the viewer they are RAD men is due to the arm shields (Dienststellenabzeichen) seen above the armband but the photograph is too blurry to make out the numbers on the shields which would identify their unit. As a note, by 1942, there were some 427 RAD units deployed on the Eastern Front and as the war ground on and the Soviet war machine ground up regular Wehrmacht forces, these units saw more and more combat rather than the rear echelon tasks they had originally been deployed to do.
Heavily reliant on imported combat aircraft due to having little indigenous aircraft production capability, the Finnish made much use of captured Soviet aircraft. One such aircraft was this Soviet Polikarpov I-16 fighter (“Red 64”) that made a crash landing on the frozen, snow covered Lake Ladoga and was captured by the Finnish on December 10, 1941. The I-16 was the primary Soviet fighter in 1941 and would soldier on into 1943 before being completely replaced by more modern designs. This particular I-16 was equipped with four underwing rails, two per wing, which carried the RS-82 air-to-surface rocket. The Finnish recovered “Red 64” and sent it to the State Aircraft Factory where it was given the Finnish code IR-104 but it was not able to be returned to a flyable state. In fact, only one captured I-16 (IR-101) was ever deployed starting with 3./Le.Lv.6 (3rd. Flight/Flying Squadron 6) and later 2./Le.Lv.30 and even then, it was not used in combat and instead served as a test plane and aerial aggressor for pilots to train against.
Photographed by a kriegsberichter (war correspondent) attached to the 257. Infanterie-Division, a T-35 (chassis 744-62) belonging to the Soviet 67th. Tank Regiment sits abandoned in the village of Gorodok along the T1425 road. On June 26, 1941, the tank was reported as broken down due to its clutch friction discs having burnt out. It was intended that the tank be towed away for repairs and tow ropes were deployed (not visible in this photograph) but the tank was abandoned instead, apparently in haste as only one of the two ropes was attached to the hull front’s two rings. Still, the crew stripped the tank of its machineguns before departing the area between June 27-30, 1941. This hasty departure was perhaps due to the continued advance of Army Group South (which contained the 257th.) through the region.
This T-35 is notable as being one of the last six T-35 tanks built in 1939 before production ceased. It features the final modifications to the design, the most obvious being the conical shaped turrets which afforded better protection due to its sloped armor.
After sitting in the road for months, by February 1942, the derelict tank had been pushed off the road where it continued to attract the photographer’s eye. Photographs of the T-35 in the summer of 1942 show the tank missing all of its tracks (possibly taken by tank and assault gun troops to affix to their vehicles for added armor). The ultimate fate of this tank is unknown but presumably it was scrapped.
The same, however, wasn't the case on the Eastern Front. 22% of all the M3 tanks built were sent to Russia under Lend-Lease and of the 1,386 sent, only 969 made it to Russia due to shipping interception by the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe. The main models sent were the M3A3 and M3A5 and they were deployed into combat in 1942, mainly with the 13th. Corps under the 1st. Tank Army. The Soviets had no love for the M3, stating that its armor was inadequate against the more potent anti-tank guns fielded by the Germans, its cross-country performance was poor due to its narrow tracks (in comparison to the wider T-34 tracks), its high profile and hull mounted main gun made going hull down impossible (a tactic to hide the tank's chassis with only the turret exposed), and the need to turn the tank to aim the 75mm gun resulted in longer engagement times. Soviet tankers gave the M3 the grim nickname "Bratskoy Mogiloy na Shesterykh" which meant "Mass Grave for Six".
Despite the faults, the Soviets used the M3 to fill gaps in their forces until T-34 production could replace them. The M3 was used in the Battle of Kursk, the largest armor battle of World War 2, and was deployed with three units: the 200th. Tank Brigade (6th. Tank Corps), the 237th. Tank Brigade (31st. Tank Corps) and the 242nd. Tank Brigade (also 31st. Tank Corps). These brigades ran into elements of the II SS Panzer Corps during the opening engagements at Kursk along the Voronezh Front and were decimated as these two tanks attest. The only other user of the M3 was the 120th. Tank Brigade but it was held in reserves until early 1944 when it was deployed in support of the Belorussian Front before being disbanded in June 1944. Those M3 tanks which remained after Kursk were often redeployed to fronts where resistance was expected to be minimal or put into reserves or used for training. Returning to the M2, the original order of 1,000 M2A1 tanks was reduced to 126 and of that, 94 were received by the U.S. Army between November 1940 and August 1941. These tanks were utilized for training and for testing purposes within the U.S. and were never used in combat.
As a note, the object on the end of the M3's main gun in the front of the photograph is a counterweight that balanced the M2 75mm gun with its gyro-stabilizer. The longer barreled M3 75mm gun used in later M3 models eliminated the need for the counterweight. Not all of the short barrel guns had the counterweight fitted.
0200-0 was struck by anti-tank fire which caused it to veer off the road into the ditch. It is believed either track damage or a hit to the driver’s position was the reason for the crash. The tank continued to give battle by means of its 45mm gun armed secondary turret before a German anti-tank round struck the barrel (visible in the picture as a whitish spot on the barrel). This finally rendered the tank silent. Overall, the Soviet attack, devoid of any kind of support, was easily repulsed with every one of the Soviet tanks being put out of action though the Germans suffered the loss of two PzKpfw III tanks and three trucks in the process.
0200-0 would be photographed by passing soldiers well into 1942 by which time the tank had completely slid into the ditch. Soviet tanks were usually devoid of extensive markings and the Red Star can just be made out next to the soldier closest to the tank and on the central, main turret can be seen two white lines which denoted the tank belonging to the 68th. Tank Regiment.
On January 8, 1942, a series of Soviet offensives were launched within the salient in and around Rzhev and Velikie Luki. Collectively, the combat actions that ended on March 31, 1943 are called the Battles of Rzhev. However, for those Soviet soldiers that survived, it had a far more dark and grim name, the “Rzhevskaya Myasorubka” or “Rzhev Meat Grinder”.
There were four main Soviet offensives, beginning with the Rzhev-Vyazma Strategic Offensive which, itself, contained five successive operations that started on January 8, 1942 and ended on April 20, 1942. Committed to the battles were the Kalinin Front and Western Front each of which contained three to five armies. A single Soviet army contained between three to five divisions in addition to support units. All told, the Soviets committed 3,680,300 men to the offensives. The intent was to eliminate the German 9. Armee which was under Heeresgruppe Mitte (Army Group Center). 9. Armee held the salient which, while in German hands, kept the threat to Moscow from a renewed push on the Soviet city alive. One of the more interesting operations during this time was the Vyazma Airborne Operation in which the Soviet 4th. Airborne Corps was deployed in one of only two airborne operations conducted by the Soviets in World War Two. Beginning on January 18 through January 22, 1942, the 201st. Airborne Brigade and the 250th. Airborne Regiment night parachuted behind German lines with the goal to cut the Vyazma-Yukhov highway and the Vyazma-Bryansk railroad. The 8th. Airborne Brigade was deployed on January 27 but it was a disaster. There were not enough Tupolev TB-3 transport planes available to move the entire brigade and so the planes had to make the drops in waves. Without fighter cover, the TB-3 (a four-engine bomber that entered service in 1932) was extremely vulnerable and several were shot down. Due to the weather and losses, only three battalions were landed (2,100 troops) but due to the conditions and scattering, only 1,320 paratroopers were able to assemble into combat units. The main opposition to the Soviet paratroopers was the 4. Panzer-Armee and initially, the Soviets had some success against German forces but by February, the paratroopers had failed to encircle the Germans and so between February 16 and February 24, the 9th. Airborne Brigade and the 214th. Airborne Brigade landed 1,525 men and supplies near Zelanje. Despite the added men, the Soviets could not finish the encirclement and the offensive stalled in the face of determined German resistance.
On July 2, 1942, the 9. Armee launched Operation Seydlitz to deal with all of the Soviet troops in their rear area. Most of the forces were concentrated in the swamps between Rzhev and Bely. To ensure they ensnared the Soviet troops, the Obsha Valley was blocked as this was the escape avenue out of the swampland. Elements from the 9.Armee succeeded in dividing the Soviet forces into two pockets and after eleven days of combat, the trapped Soviet troops were wiped out.
From July 30, 1942 to March 31, 1943, the Soviets launched three more offensives, again using forces from the Kalinin Front and Western Front. The third (and last) attack was the Rzhev-Vyazma Offensive that kicked off on March 2, 1943. But this coincided with the final phases of the withdrawal of Heeresgruppe Mitte from the Rzhev Salient which was done under Unternehmen Büffel (Operation Buffalo). The Soviets had been aware of the German retreat but Soviet command reacted to the information too slowly to take advantage. So, when Soviet forces were ordered to advance, it was too late and by March 3, 1943, Soviet troops entered Rzhev without a shot. Now that the Germans had shrunk the front by some 230 miles, when the Soviets reached the new German lines, they were pounded hard to the point that, coupled with lack of ammunition and supplies, the Soviet offensive ground to a halt. It should be noted that Unternehmen Büffel was one of scorched earth, exterminations, and deportations of civilians for slave labor.
The losses on both sides are not fully known and at least on the Soviet side, have wildly varied numbers. Depending on the source, Soviet casualties ranged from 1,160,787 men killed, wounded, or missing to 2,300,000 killed, wounded or missing. German forces, of which 1,659,000 started the offensives, by the end, around 668,000 were either dead, wounded, or missing in action. With at least one million casualties, little wonder survivors called it a meat grinder.
The photograph shows German trenches somewhere on the Rzhev Salient, surrounded by the wreckage of Soviet tanks. The two tanks nearest the camera are Lend-Lease British Valentine infantry tanks. Numerous makes of Valentine tanks were sent to the Soviet Union between 1941 and 1944. Given the time period of the offensives, they are not Valentine Mk. IX or Valentine Mk. X and so both are likely Valentine Mk. VII tanks. The Valentine was a Lend-Lease tank the Soviets liked as they appreciated the tank's mobility, cross-country performance, and General Motors 6-71 engine reliability of Canadian built Valentine Mk. VII tanks. Overall, the tank had a weight of 16 tons, a maximum armor thickness of 65mm down to a minimum of 8mm, was equipped with a Quick Fire 2-pounder (40mm) gun and a co-axial 7.92mm BESA machine-gun, and had a top road speed of 15mph with a maximum operational range of 90 miles on roads. The tank in the background is a Soviet BT-7 Model 1937 Fast Tank (Bystrochodnij Tankov). It had a similar armament to the Valentine, using a 45mm gun with three 7.62mm DT machine-guns (co-axial, rear mounted, and anti-aircraft). Armor protection was much less, having a maximum of 22mm down to a minimum of 6mm. Weight was nearly 14 tons but speed was much better at 31mph cross-country and up to 53mph on the road and the BT-7 had a modestly better operational range of 120 miles.
Seeking to do her part for Mother Russia, Litvyak sought to enlist in the military as an aviator but despite her credentials as a pilot and instructor, she was turned down because it was said she lacked the experience and did not have enough flight hours. Not to be denied, Litvyak went to the Moscow Komintern RVK in October 1941 and lied about her pre-war flight hours by increasing the amount by some 100 hours. Her flight hours, apparently, were not validated and so her purposeful exaggeration saw her admitted into the military and she was assigned to the all-female 586th. Fighter Aviation Regiment under the command of Stárshiy Leytenánt (Senior Lieutenant) Yevgeniya Filippovna Prokhorova. Litvyak commenced training in flying the Yakovlev Yak-1 fighter and in short order, she achieved mastery of the aircraft. Her first combat sorties occurred in the summer of 1942, flying over Saratov, a major port city along the Volga River, and around the region. While her flights encountered the enemy, Litvyak did not achieve any kills or assists.
In September 1942, Litvyak (along with other female pilots) was transferred to the 437th. Fighter Regiment which was regular aviation unit flying Lavochkin-Gorbunov-Gudkov LaGG-3 fighters. The 437th. Fighter Regiment flew sorties in and around the Stalingrad combat theater and it was here that Litvyak would finally draw blood and earned her “White Lily of Stalingrad” moniker in the Soviet press. Her Yak-1 emblazoned with the number “White 02”, on September 13, 1942, Litvyak was flying her third sortie over the Stalingrad area when her group attacked a flight of Ju 88 bombers escorted by Messerschmitt Bf 109 fighters. In the melee, Litvyak claimed one Ju 88 and shot down a Bf 109G-2 flown by Unterfeldwebel Erwin Meier of 2./Jagdgeschwader 53. Some sources claim Litvyak shot down another Bf 109G-2 on September 14 with the pilot thought to have been German ace Leutnant Hans Fuss of II.Stab/Jagdgeschwader 3. However, there remains some debate on if any of these victories belonged to Litvyak as some sources claim that a Junkers Ju 88 from 2./Kampfgeschwader 3 and flown by Oberleutnant Johann Wiesniewski which was downed by Litvyak on September 27, 1942 was her first kill.
Because the 437th. Fighter Regiment flew LaGG-3 fighters, the ability of the unit to service the Yak-1 was diminished even though Litvyak and the other female pilots had brought mechanics with them. Thus, in very short order, the women were transferred to the 9th. Guards Fighter Regiment which also flew the Yak-1. From October 1942 to January 1943, Litvyak flew numerous missions but did not add to her kill tally. However, the 9th. Guards Fighter Regiment was converted to Lend-Lease Bell P-39 Airacobras and so once again, Litvyak was transferred, this time to the 296th. Fighter Regiment. Her Yak-1 renumbered to “Red 32” and later “Yellow 44”. Litvyak added four more kills to her score, including a Junkers Ju 87D-3 from 5./Sturzkampfgeschwader 77 and a Bf 109G-4 flown by Leutnant Franz Müller of 9./Jagdgeschwader 3. During this time, in February 1943, Litvyak was promoted to Mládshiy Leytenánt and awarded the Order of the Red Star. On March 22, she was wounded in combat for the first time. Litvyak had a romantic interest in ace pilot Kapitán Aleksey Solomatin with whom she often flew with as a wingman. However, she only realized this after his death in a crash on May 21. In the summer of 1943, the 296th. Fighter Regiment was re-designated to the 73rd. Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment and on June 13, 1943, Litvyak was appointed flight commander of the 3rd. Aviation Squadron. Her Yak-1 would be renumbered for the last time to “White 23” and while flying under the 73rd. Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment, she would rack up another 9 kills. On July 22, 1943, Litvyak was awarded the Order of the Red Banner and she would also earn the Order of Lenin.
On August 1, 1943, Litvyak took her Yak-1 up for the fourth time that day, meeting up with a flight of Ilyushin Il-2 ground-attack aircraft to act as air cover. The sortie completed, the aircraft were returning to their bases when near the city of Orel, the flight of Yak-1 fighters spotted a group of German bombers and took them under attack with Litvyak in the lead. Litvyak was bounced by two escorting Bf 109 fighters which had been flying above the bombers. Initially, Litvyak had not seen the fighters but was able to turn in time to face the Bf 109s diving on her. Another Yak-1 pilot involved in the melee, Ivan Borisenko, was the last to see Litvyak, her Yak-1 trailing smoke and hounded by up to eight German fighters. Borisenko, once able to, dropped his altitude to see if he could find her but he found nothing, not even a plume of smoke from a crash. Sources claim that one of two German pilots downed Litvyak: Feldwebel Hans-Jörg Merkle of 1./Jagdgeschwader 52 or Leutnant Hans Schleef of 7./Jagdgeschwader 3. The debate remains as Merkle claimed a Yak-1 near Dmitryevka where Litvyak was last seen while Schleef, who claimed a LaGG-3 on the same day, may have mistaken Litvyak's Yak-1 for a LaGG-3 (which was not uncommon) as, many decades later, the wreck of Litvyak's aircraft was finally located in 1979 near where Schleef had made his claim.
Litvyak's death is listed as August 1, 1943 at the age of 21. Today, some refute that she died in the crash and Litvyak had managed to crash land her Yak-1 and was taken prisoner by German troops. There was a female fighter pilot buried in the village of Dmitryevka and some reports stated the body was exhumed, examined, and determined that death came from a massive head wound and that the body was, indeed, that of Litvyak. Such a wound would make sense in a crash in that her head struck the dashboard on impact. However, at least one source refuted this autopsy ever took place. Just as her death is a point of controversy, so is her kill tally. With totals ranging from 5 to 14 solo kills, it was not at all unheard of for Russian aviators' kill counts to be inflated. In-depth research has confirmed that Litvyak achieved five kills on her own with two shared kills. While certainly less than the higher tallies, it still made her an ace.
Posthumously, Litvyak was promoted to Stárshiy Leytenánt, received the Order of the Patriotic War 1st. Class on September 10, 1943, and was decorated with the Hero of the Soviet Union title on May 5, 1990 by President Mikhail Gorbachev. The reason for the long delay was because at the time of her death, the commander of the 73rd. Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment had wanted to award Litvyak with the Hero of the Soviet Union but this was declined and the award changed to the Order of the Patriotic War and it was not until November 1971 that Litvyak's death was officially recorded as dying while performing a combat mission. This, then, paved the way for her to receive the 11,616th. Hero of the Soviet Union title and decoration.
There were a number of variants of the T-26A, usually changing armaments in one of the two turrets to either a 12.7mm heavy machine-gun, a 27mm gun, or a 37mm gun. The idea of having two turrets was to enable the tank to have a far wider engagement range that would be the case with a single turret. A lock in each turret ring prevented the two turrets from having their weapons entangle but this still provided each turret with 265 degrees of rotation. The T-26A-2 was equipped with a air-cooled 7.62mm Degtyaryov DT machine-gun in each turret. In the photograph, the DT machine-guns are missing and the lack of any apparent combat damage suggests that the tank had suffered mechanical difficulties and the crew removed the weapons before abandoning the tank.
By the model of the T-26, it is reasonable to place the year and general time the photograph was taken to the summer of 1941, specifically, after the commencement of Unternehmen Barbarossa (Operation Barbarossa). This was the invasion of Russia by Germany which began on June 22, 1941. The T-26 light tank made up a significant portion of the tanks which equipped Soviet armor forces. Starting in 1933, the Soviets ceased production of the twin-turret T-26 tanks and switched to a single-turret design. In all, 2,038 T-26A tanks were constructed. By 1941, a large number of these tanks still remained in Soviet service, the majority without the heavier armament as previously mentioned and thus they were greatly outmatched by most German tanks. The all-around armor thickness of 15mm was able to afford some protection from the 2cm KwK 30 cannon which equipped the Panzerkampfwagen II light tank but against the Panzerkampfwagen 35(t) and 38(t) light tanks, the 3.7cm KwK 34(t) and KwK 38(t) guns could punch through up to 24mm of armor out to 1,500 meters.
The photograph also tells us that a specific unit, or at least elements of it, had passed by the T-26 and elected to use it as a road sign. The unit was the 12. Panzer-Division (nicknamed the Pommerische Division (Pomeranian Division) and this can be told by the symbol painted on the turret. Consisting of a circle with a “Y” inside it, the 12. Panzer-Division used the symbol on their vehicles as an identifier. In this case, it was left on the T-26 with an arrow pointing down the road, informing anyone who saw it (and knew what the symbol was) that elements of the 12. Panzer-Division were somewhere ahead. The division was created in October 1940 from another unit, 2. Infanterie-Division (mot). For the Russian invasion, 12. Panzer-Divsion was under the LVII Panzerkorps which was commanded by General der Panzertruppe Adolf-Friedrich Kuntzen. LVII Panzerkorps itself was under Panzergruppe 3, the latter under Heeresgruppe Mitte (Army Group Center) whose commander was Generalfeldmarschall Fedor von Bock. 12. Panzer-Division's initial commander was Generalmajor Josef Harpe and he remained in command through the initial Operation Barbarossa actions before being replaced on January 12, 1942. The unit saw combat in the taking of Minsk and Smolensk but when the Soviets launched their winter counteroffensives in 1941-1942, the 12. Panzer-Division suffered significant casualties and was withdrawn to Estonia for refitting. The division was put back into action under Heeresgruppe Nord before seeing battle at Kursk. The unit would eventually become trapped within the Courland Pocket by July 1944 and what remained of the division surrendered to the Soviets on May 8, 1945.
Of all the belligerents in World War Two, perhaps the Soviets were the only warring power that made extensive use of rocket artillery. From 1941 to 1945, three main rockets were used and these were the M-8 82mm rocket, the M-13 132mm rocket, and the M-31 300mm rocket. The smaller of the rockets was derived from the RS-82, a commonly used air-to-ground rocket. Launch rails carrying 24, 36, or 48 rockets were constructed and mounted on ZiS-6 6X6 trucks (BM-8–36), Lend-Lease Studebaker 6X6 trucks (BM-8–48), and obsolete T-60 light tanks (BM-8–24). Each M-8 rocket had a 1.1lb. explosive warhead and had a maximum range of 3.6 miles. The most widely used of the rocket launchers was the M-13 and it was fired from launch rails that supported 16 rockets. All manner of trucks were used, including Chevrolet, Ford, Studebaker, and International, and all carried the designation BM-13–16. In addition to high-explosive rockets, armor-piercing rockets were used when targeting armor formations and other types included illumination, incendiary, and signal rockets. The standard high-explosive rocket carried 10.8lbs. of explosive and had a maximum range of 5.3 miles. A special rocket, the M-13-DD, contained two rocket motors which gave the rocket a range of 7.3 miles. The limitation, however, was that the rocket could only be fired from the top set of rails which meant each launcher could only fire 8 total M-13-DD rockets. The biggest rocket (and last to be deployed), the M-31, was derived from an earlier ground launched rocket, the M-30. The launch rail could only fit 12 rockets and ZiS-6 and Studebaker trucks were fitted with the rails under the designation BM-31–12. Each rocket had 63.7lbs. of high-explosive in the warhead but the trade-off was a short range, only 2.7 miles.
Collectively, these rocket launchers were called “Katyusha” which was the name of a song about a girl who longed for her lover who had been called to the front to fight. The name itself is the Russian equivalent to the English name Katie, the diminutive form of the name Katherine. The Germans, however, had another name for these rocket launchers and that was “Stalinorgel“ or “Stalin’s Organ“ due to the howling wail of the rockets in flight. Interestingly, the heavy BM-31–12 had the nickname of “Andryusha“, which was the Russian version of the name Andrew. Typically, a battery consisted of four launcher trucks, two ammunition trucks, and two service trucks. A trained six man crew could reload within 3–4 minutes. A company consisted of three batteries (12 launchers) and three companies made up a rocket artillery regiment (36 launchers). A single battery of BM-13–24 launchers could deliver 4.35 tons of high-explosive across a 4,300,000 square foot impact zone. This blanket effect had both physical destructive power as well as psychological impact on those unfortunate enough to be underneath a “Katyusha“ barrage. To prevent counter-battery fire, the firing unit would relocate upon unleashing a salvo before firing again. All together, some 10,000 total “Katyusha“ launchers were constructed during the war.
The photograph depicts the KS-108 “Reaktivnyy Minomet“ or “Jet Mortar“ and this vehicle was a prototype rocket launcher that initially sought to extend the maximum range of the M-30 rocket. Since the M-30 was fired from ground launch rails, the range was 1.7 miles which was relatively short. The rails were essentially open frames within which the rockets sat and because of this arrangement, not only was the range low, the accuracy was also low. The KS-108 project commenced in August 1942 and the initial design utilized four tubes and the launch apparatus was designed in such a way that it could be mounted to any of the trucks then in use by the Soviet military. The KS-108 was fitted to a ZiS-6 truck for testing. For the prototype, the rails had no traverse ability outside of turning the entire truck. The tubes were able to be elevated from a minimum of 15 degrees to a maximum of 45 degrees. To stabilize the truck, a plate was fitted to the rear which was deployed once in action. The stowed position of the plate meant the bottom row of tubes was forward of the top set. To load, the screw breeches were opened, the rockets placed within the tubes, and the breeches closed. The launch control was within the cab of the truck. The intent was to utilize the gasses expelled by the rockets as they launched to create pressure in the tube which propelled the rocket at a higher velocity upon exiting the tube. The length of the tube, at 13 feet, gave the rocket a better trajectory path which improved accuracy. By September 1942, the prototype KS-108 was complete and testing began. Firing the standard M-30 rocket, the KS-108 was able to extend the range to 2.1 miles. While an improvement to the ground launched M-30, it was less than the M-13 already in service. To that end, a new rocket was designed, the M-108. The M-108 was a modified M-30 rocket and it was hoped the new ammunition would be able to reach a range of 3.1 miles but when the new rocket was ready for testing in October 1942, the results were below expectations. The last gasp for the KS-108 was in February 1943 when a new rocket, the 304mm MK-30, was designed and testing showed it could attain a range of 4 miles. Still, this was not enough to warrant continued development and the single prototype is believed to have been scrapped. Still, the work on the MK-30 led to the M-31 which was deployed in 1943 from ground frames until March 1944 when the launch rails were fitted to trucks as outlined above.
In total, the Soviets had 518 rocket artillery batteries in service during World War Two. The BM-13–24 was the only rocket artillery that continued in widespread use after the war and did so for many years. The Soviets continued to improve the “Katyusha“, replacing the BM-13 with the 140mm BM-14 in 1952 and the BM-31 was replaced with the 240mm BM-24 in 1947. The BM-14 was superseded in service in 1963 by the 122mm BM-21 which continues to see service to this day. Massed rocket artillery and regular artillery remains a key component in Soviet operational doctrine. Soviet offensive maneuvering units rely on the artillery to suppress enemy defenses in order to achieve a decisive victory.