Russo-Ukrainian War: The 2S19 Msta

 

     I am no expert on current Russian military tactics. However, I do have access to IAG-13-U-78 “Soviet Army Operations”, dated April 1978. This is an intelligence manual created by U.S. Army Intelligence and released by the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command. Now, I hear you say, of what good is a manual nearly 44 years old? If one examines the chapter on attacking a defending enemy (Section IV, page 3-61), there are some clear parallels to the current situation in Ukraine which suggests that the tactics referenced in this publication aren't so out of date after all.

     Russian forces are reported to have largely bypassed Kharkiv in order to push deeper into Ukraine. This lines up with the tactic of bypassing an enemy in a deliberate defense (of which a city can be considered such) rather than engage it. This may account for lighter forces around the city and use of artillery to keep the defenders in the city. It is doubtful that a concentrated Ukrainian force would engage the Russians in open terrain and lose the benefit of the concealment and cover a urban warzone provides them. As such, outside of aerial attack or artillery, Russian forces are a bit more secure from massed infantry assaults.

     Let us move to Kyiv. It is reported that a military convoy some 40 miles long is moving towards the city. This lines up with the first action in the manual that states the first step towards an attack of an enemy in deliberate defense is the buildup of required forces. If, indeed, the convoy is slated for the assault on Kyiv, the evidence is clear. Once the forces are in the field of battle, they will be organized. If they are following the 1978 tactics, the bulk of the forces will be amassed at the planned direction of attack. Russian tactics also allow for feints or ruses to divert the enemy attention away from the main thrust. In such attacks, the Russians, according to the manual, want to have a 4-5 to 1 advantage in troops, 6-8 to 1 in artillery, and 3-5 to 1 in tanks. This is certainly achievable today and likely has not changed much.

     The Russians, as they have been since World War II, are big believers in massed artillery and rocket batteries (as seen in the superiority ratio above) and prior to the commencement of the attack, Kyiv would be subjected to a heavy bombardment. In the attack, again, if following these tactics, the Russians will not spread their forces out but instead would reduce unit frontages and have a front line of no more than 4km. Follow-on units behind the main lines would be spread further apart. This allows them to maximize their firepower and focus it towards the enemy. It is possible that the incursions in the suburbs of Kyiv by Russian forces are reconnaissance to attempt to pinpoint Ukrainian positions and capability in preparation of the main attack.

     The only hope for the Ukrainian defenders in Kyiv is to withstand the initial assault and bog the Russians down which would break their momentum. Why is this important? According to the manual, the tempo of the attack is to be swift with a fast rate of advance to limit losses and overrun weak positions quickly. If it becomes a brutal, house-to-house fight, it favors the defender who knows the terrain and if Russian objectives are not achieved, it may become a serious problem.

     One of the self-propelled artillery assets the Russians have deployed in Ukraine is the 2S19 Msta (after the Msta River). This particular example was abandoned somewhere in Sumy Oblast after the convoy it was traveling with was hit. As one can see, the travel lock for the 2A65 152mm howitzer is still engaged. The gun can fire base bleed shells out to 16 miles or if using rocket assisted ammunition, out to 18 miles. Thanks to a automatic loader, the standard 2S19 can fire up to 8 rounds every minute. A total of 50 rounds of ammunition is carried in the vehicle. The turret has a full 360 degree rotation while the gun can be elevated up to 68 degrees and depressed to a maximum of 4 degrees. For defense, the 2S19 is fitted with a pintle mounted 12.7mm NSVT heavy machine-gun (not seen here) with 300 rounds of ammunition. Built on a T-80 main battle tank chassis, the V-84A 840 horsepower engine can move the 2S19 to a maximum speed of 37 miles per hour (on roads) with a power to weight ratio of 20 horsepower per ton. Speaking of weight, loaded, the 2S19 is 42 tons, is 23.5 feet long, 11.1 feet wide, and 9.10 feet tall with a crew of 5. Armor thickness is unknown but while proof against small arms fire, it would be no defense against anti-tank missiles. It is NBC (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical) protected.

     The 2S19 entered service in 1989 and the Ukrainian army had 40 of them as of 2017 though how many remain in service isn't known. However, it is highly likely this abandoned one will be turned around against its former owner.

Originally posted on March 1, 2022.

Russo-Ukrainian War: 113th. Territorial Defense Brigade

     Kharkiv remains contested with light Russian units attempting to penetrate into the city but so far, they continue to be repulsed. On February 28, the Russians again sought to push into the northeastern suburbs, subjecting the area with rocket fire which claimed 1 civilian dead, 16 civilians wounded, and 15 soldiers wounded. Once more, they were forced to withdraw. This daily tally is via the Kharkiv city council. The total dead in the last 3-4 days of combat is 2 civilians killed, 5 soldiers killed, 20 soldiers wounded, and 24 civilians wounded. It would appear that, to date, the Russians have not deployed heavier armor and tanks to support the infantry as they attempt to push into the city. Instead, they are using GAZ-233014 “Tigr” 4X4 armored IMVs (Infantry Mobility Vehicles) and the burned out example shown here was destroyed somewhere in the suburbs of Kharhiv.

     The Tigr entered Russian service in 2005 and has a crew of 2 and can carry between 9 to 11 infantrymen model depending. The 7.9 ton vehicle is fitted with a 5.9 liter, 6-cylinder, 180 horsepower engine paired to, most often, a 5-speed manual transmission. This provides the Tigr with a maximum road speed of 87 miles per hour and a top off-road speed of 50 miles per hour (terrain depending). Enough fuel is carried to give the Tigr a 620 mile operational range. For armor, the thickness ranges from 5mm to a maximum of 7mm. While this is proof against small caliber weapon fire, it is worthless against heavier weapons, let alone anti-armor missiles or rockets. For example, the 12.7X108mm DShK heavy machine gun used by Ukraine can punch through 20mm of armor up to 500 meters. Even the common RPK machine-gun, chambered for the 7.62X39mm round, can fire a standard armor-piercing ammunition that can penetrate 6mm of armor at 300 meters while another armor-piercing round, the 7N23, uses a steel penetrator to further increase the round's ability to punch through armor. For defense, it is fitted with smoke grenade launchers and has a pintle mount for either a 7.62mm PKP machine-gun, a 12.7mm Kord heavy machine-gun, or a 30mm AGS-17 grenade launcher.

     The latter is what is being recovered from the wreckage, no doubt to be checked out if it can be returned to service. The Plamya (“Flame”) is an old weapon, entering service in 1970 but has yet to be fully replaced by the lighter AGS-30 Atlant. The weapon is fed by a belt that holds twenty-nine 30X29mm grenades. The belt is contained in a drum fitted to the right side of the weapon. The Plamya can fire High-Explosive (HE), smoke, or practice rounds. Sighting is done using iron posts with the option for optical sights. The weapon has a low muzzle velocity of 606 feet per second, enough to provide a maximum effective range of 1,700 meters. The maximum rate of fire is 400 rounds per minute. It would appear that before the Tigr was hit, the gunner fired off at least four grenades judging by the empty belt hanging out of the feed. The fire was enough to burn off much of the Tigr's paint and burst the bullet proof glass. The Plamya itself seems no worse for the wear, the fire apparently not having discharged the remaining grenades in the drum magazine and a likely reason these soldiers are recovering it.

     Attempting to get current unit patch identification is pretty difficult and it is highly likely such information on existing unit insignia is purposely suppressed so as not to provide intelligence to the Russians. However, these are men of the 113th. Territorial Defense Brigade. Of note, the soldier in the foreground has a well-worn AKMS, the most numerous folding stock version of the AK-47. It can be told apart from the earlier AKS-47 by the two ridges on the receiver cover (as the AKS-47 had a smooth cover). Also note that he has tied off his medical pouch to his tactical vest with cord. Snaps can come loose on gear and this prevents it from being lost.

Originally posted on February 28, 2022.