Gefreiter Heinrich Severloh: Refuting the "Beast of Omaha"

     Online stories proclaim him as the “Beast of Omaha” but the reality of it was, Grefreiter Heinrich Severloh was not all the title makes him out to be. It was more a case of hyperbole which arose from the pages of his memoir entitled WN 62 – Erinnerungen an Omaha Beach Normandie, 6. Juni 1944 published by Hek Creativ Verlag in 2000. In it, Severloh claimed to have caused between 1,000 to 2,000 casualties among U.S. troops storming ashore on Omaha Beach on June 6, 1944. Was he posted to Omaha Beach? Severloh very much was present and did take part in the defense of the beach but his casualty claim is only believed by Severloh himself. Objective historians, on the other hand, dismiss his claim as outright fiction and have good cause to refute his words.

     Severloh was born in Metzingen, Germany on June 23, 1923, his parents farmers. On July 23, 1943, Severloh found himself conscripted into the Heer (Army) at the age of 19. Following initial training, he was posted to the 19. Leichte Artillerie-Ersatzdivision (19th. Reserve Light Artillery Division) which at the time, was based in Hanover, Germany. After a short stint with the reserve unit, Severloh was transferred to 3. Batterie, Artillerie-Regiment 321. As a side note, the reserve division was responsible for providing replacement troops to the regiment. With the regiment, he was trained as a kradmelder, or dispatch rider. Typically riding motorcycles, kradmelder were important components of artillery units with these men delivering messages between battalions and higher echelon units. As kradmelder often operated alone, their training included motorcycle maintenance so that common mechanical failures could be repaired in the field using spare parts carried on the motorcycle. In December 1942, Artillerie-Regiment 321 was deployed to the Eastern Front and instead of performing as a kradmelder, Severloh was made a pferdeführer (animal handler) and was posted to one of the unit's non-motorized supply trains. Perhaps upset with his lot, Severloh was cited by his superiors for uttering disrespectful and dissenting comments which resulted in him being put to hard labor where he was so severely worked, it resulted in him being hospitalized for six months. After his convalescence, Severloh was granted leave to return the Metzingen in order to assist his family in collecting the farm's harvest. 

     Despite the disciplinary action against him, Severloh was made a Unteroffizieranwärter (NCO aspirant) and sent to the Unteroffizierschule (Non-Commissioned Officer School) located in Brunswick, Germany in October 1943. Before he could graduate, Severloh was recalled from the school after less than a month of training and returned to Artillerie-Regiment 321 which had a number of units transferred into the 352. Infanterie-Division. The regiment's staff along with 2. Batterie, 3. Batterie, and 7. Batterie were all absorbed into Artillerie-Regiment 352 which was the 352. Infanterie-Division's artillery component. The division was moved to defensive positions in Normandy and specifically, Severloh was posted to Widerstandsnester 62 (WN62; Resistance Nest 62), one of fifteen such strongpoints situated along Omaha Beach. Specifically, WN62 was on the eastern side of the beach, overlooking two of the ten sectors the U.S. Army planned to hit: Easy Red and Fox Green. WN62 was between 40 to 164 feet above the beach depending on the position within WN62 which spanned 354 yards in width with a depth of 363 yards.

     When the U.S. landing commenced, WN62 was manned by twenty-seven troops from 716. Infanterie-Division along with thirteen men, including Severloh, from the 352. Infanterie-Division. WN62 was well armed and had a 7.5cm Flak M 37(t) (captured Czech 7.5cm Kanon PL vz. 37), two 5cm Panzerabwehrkanone 38 anti-tank guns, two 5cm leichter Granatwerfer 36 mortars, four machine-guns (one twin MG 34 mount and two captured 8mm Polish Ckm wz.30 machine-guns), and anti-personnel mines and barbed wire obstacles in addition to the thick concrete portions of the position. The task of the men from the 716. Infanterie-Division was to man the guns while the men from the 352. Infanterie-Division were mainly assigned as forward observers to direct fire from the unit's 10.5cm liecht Feldhaubitze batteries located 3 miles inland from the beach near Houtteville. Severloh was the Ordonnanz (Orderly) to Oberleutnant Bernhard Frerking. This meant that Severloh was Frerking's personal servant and acted as a runner, drove Frerking's vehicle, maintained Frerking's uniform and gear, served as a bodyguard to Frerking, among other tasks Frerking assigned to Severloh.

     During the attack, Frerking directed the artillery bombardment of the beach area from WN62's bunker while Severloh moved to a foxhole position that was 557 feet from the beach seawall and 492 yards from the drop zone of the landing craft. There, he manned a Maschinengewehr 42 (MG 42) machine-gun along with two Karabiner 98k bolt-action rifles. According to Severloh, a Unteroffizier (Sergeant) kept him supplied with ammunition to the point that Severloh claimed he went through over 13,500 rounds of machine-gun ammunition and 400 rounds of rifle ammunition. In 2004, he doubled down that he for sure caused 1,000 casualties but it was most likely 2,000.

     Despite the artillery fire, machine-gun fire, and mortar fire, U.S. troops (mainly from the 29th. Infantry Division and 116th. Infantry Regiment) made headway and Frerking called for a retreat from WN62, the men to make for the village of Colleville-sur-Mer. During the retreat, Frerking was shot in the head and killed, Frerking never to see his daughter who was born three months after his death. As for Severloh, he and the survivors from WN62 surrendered to U.S. troops on June 7, 1944. As a POW, Severloh was shipped to the United States and imprisoned in Boston, Massachusetts. After serving over a year and a half as a POW, in December 1946, Severloh was transferred to Bedfordshire, England to serve as forced labor on British road projects. Finally, in March 1947, Severloh was returned to Metzingen, Germany after his father petitioned the British to release him as he was needed to work on the family farm. Severloh died on January 14, 2006 at the age of 82 in Lachendorf, a town near Metzingen.

     Returning to Severloh's claim, according to the U.S. Army V Corps, U.S. fatalities on Omaha Beach was 694. A further 331 were missing and 1,349 were wounded. All told, this is 2,374 casualties. It is simply not possible for Severloh to have been the primary cause of these casualties, especially as Omaha Beach was some 5 miles long. The MG 42 had a maximum effective firing range of 1.2 miles when on its bipod. If fitted with the Lafette 42 tripod, it was 2.2 miles. Thus, he did not have the range to take the entire breadth of the beach under fire. It is also unlikely that he would have had the full range pf his weapon due to terrain limitations from his position. Despite the MG 42's range, it has been calculated that between 25,000 to even 100,000 rounds of ammunition had to be expended to result in a casualty. Numerous factors go into this but study depending, about 30% of casualties were caused by bullets. The reported casualties also include those killed or wounded by mortar fire and artillery fire, both of which were the main causes of casualties. This also doesn't include the unfortunate soldiers that drowned when their landing craft dropped them in deep water. The MG 42 was fed by 250-round belts and if Severloh is to be believed, he ran through 54 total belts. In action, typically, the barrel of the MG 42 had to be changed out every 150 rounds to allow the barrel to cool. Most machine-gun teams had one to two spare barrels with them to continually rotate them. If the gunner did not rotate the barrel, it would get too hot which would degrade accuracy as well as risk a weapon malfunction. So, assuming Severloh was changing out barrels and firing at the more practical rate of 150 rounds per minute, he would have consumed 13,500 rounds of ammunition alone in an hour and a half. If firing at the weapon's 1,200 rounds per minute, 13,500 rounds would have lasted a little over 11 minutes of firing time. It is said that the Unteroffizier was delivering ammunition to Severloh until 3:30pm. However, the assault on the two sectors of the beach had started at 6:00am with troops hitting the beach before 7:00am. If, indeed, Severloh was in action all that time, then he wasn't maintaining a constant fire which would reduce his ability to inflict casualties. In addition, some question that a single MG 42 had such a quantity of ammunition available. Since the MG 34 machine-guns used the same ammunition, one has to suspect that either the Unteroffizier was taking from the stockpile for the MG 34s or Severloh's accounting is simply way off.

     While Severloh was certainly a contributor to the casualties suffered by U.S. troops attacking the two sectors of Omaha Beach in his defense of the area, there are too many factors that cast doubt on his ability to have inflicted such a huge number on his own. Between his limited zone of fire with the MG 42, rate of fire concerns, ammunition availability, and the fact both artillery and mortar fire were impacting the beach in addition to small arms fire all add up to refute his claims. This also doesn't take into account that fact that his 2,000 casualties claim accounts for almost the entirety of the casualties across all 5 miles of Omaha Beach. Of course, you can be your own judge.

The Raketenpanzerbüchse 54: Germany's Bazooka

(Author's Collection)

     Two men from the Panzer Lehr Division form a team to practice with the Raketenpanzerbüchse 54 (RPzB 54; Rocket Anti-Tank Rifle Model 54) which was better known as the "Panzerschreck" or "Tank Terror." The RPzB 54 was the German response to the U.S. Army's M1 "Bazooka" and fired an 88mm rocket propelled shaped-charge grenade designated the RPzB. Gr. 4322. With an effective range of 150m, the grenade was capable of penetrating 216mm of face-hardened armor at an angle of 90 degrees. Typical engagement range was around 70m but because of the smoke created by the rocket once fired, the weapon was often called the "Ofenrohr" ("Stove Pipe") and it forced crews to quickly abandon their firing position before enemy fire was brought to bear. The photograph depicts the first version of the RPzB 54 which lacked a protective face shield of later makes. Thus, the firer is wearing winter mittens (of which the white lanyard connecting them can be seen) to protect his hands, a gas mask without a filter to protect his eyes and face, and a hood (likely also a winter one) to protect the rest of his head from the rocket's back blast. The loader, having taken a knee, has lowered his head in an effort to protect his face from both the blast and the dirt that the rocket would kick up after leaving the tube. The wooden crate next to the loader could hold two RPzB. Gr. 4322 grenades. The loader is armed with what appears to be a Maschinenpistole 43/1 (MP 43/1) judging by the stock shape and size.

     That the men belong to the Panzer Lehr Division is denoted by the schulterklappen (shoulder boards) visible on the loader. The cypher in the middle of the bottle-green colored schulterklappen is the letter "L" of "Lehr" which means "teach." The piping around the board was a light green. The Panzer Lehr Division was first formed on December 30, 1943 and was made up of instructor personnel from Panzertruppenschule I, Panzertruppenschule II and other Panzerwaffe training and demonstration units (hence the unit name). Thus, from the very beginning, the unit was considered elite due to the vast experience of the men within its ranks. Because of this status, it was the only panzer division to be completely equipped with tanks and half-tracks for the mechanized infantry. The division saw extensive combat on the Western Front.

The 37mm M1916: Soldiering On In WW2

     The Canon d'Infanterie de 37 Modèle 1916 TRP (standing for Tir Rapide, Puteaux; fast firing [made by] Puteaux), whose name was shortened to 37mm mle.1916, was a weapon whose purpose was to bring under direct fire hardened emplacements, such as machine gun “nests” and other hard points so as to facilitate assaults against enemy lines. As it was to be hauled into action by the crew, the mle.1916 was small and four men could carry the gun once broken down. In action, only two men were needed to operate it. A well trained crew could fire up to 35 rounds per minute. Entering service in 1916 with the French army, the gun was accepted into service with the U.S. military as the 37mm M1916. 

     The M1916 was not well liked and it was felt that mortars were better able (and in a way, more safely able) to bring enemy strongpoints under fire. Nevertheless, the M1916 remained in U.S. service for many years after the end of World War One, typically in a training role. This photograph depicts U.S. Marine soldiers “training” with the M1916. Given the Marine in the background is relaxing and reading a newspaper, this photograph was most likely staged rather than showing actual range training. 

     By 1941, the M1916 was either in storage or repurposed but during the Philippines Campaign (1941-1942), the M1916 was brought out in order to plug shortfalls in equipment. France still had the mle.1916 in service by 1940, using it to fill out anti-tank units still waiting for the more potent Canon de 25mm Semi-Automatique Modèle 1934 anti-tank gun. Enough mle.1916 guns remained that the Germans put captured examples into service as the 3.7 cm IG 152(f). The Japanese thought enough of the gun to obtain a license from the French to build it as the Type 11, putting it into service in 1922. The Type 11, despite being obsolete, would remain in service with the Japanese until the close of the war in 1945.