Unteroffizieranwärter: Heer Nachrichtenpersonal

     A studio portrait of an Unteroffizieranwärter. An Unteroffizieranwärter (Non-Commissioned Officer Candidate) was a soldier who was considered by his superiors to be a candidate for attending Unteroffizierschule (NCO School). His rank (for the moment) is Gefreiter which was equivalent to a Lance Corporal and this is shown by the “V” shaped silver tress on a triangular wool backing. His status as a NCO school candidate is denoted by the single loop of silver tress on his schulterklappen (shoulderboards). Of interest is his Nachrichtenpersonal (Signals Operator) proficiency badge. This proficiency badge was given to those soldiers who excelled in the tasks required to operate signals equipment but more importantly, how to service, maintain, and repair communication equipment. The color of the “blitz” (lightning bolt) followed the same regulation as the Waffenfarbe (corps colors) and so in this case, it would appear that the Unteroffizieranwärter is infantry and so the “blitz” would be white. Had he been, for example, artillery, then the “blitz” would have been red (the corps color of artillery). As a note, the soustache (the inverted chevron) on his feldmütze (field service cap) would also match the corps color. So, as another example, had this Unteroffizieranwärter been with a Kraftfahrparktruppen (vehicle troop), the piping on the shoulderboards, the soustache, and the “blitz” would all be blue.

     The Litzenspiegel (more often called Litzen; collar patches), prior to 1938, would have matched the Waffenfarbe. However, it was seen that logistically, creating collar patches in all of the Waffenfarbe colors was simply impractical and would have burdened unit tailors with having to sew on new litzen if a unit changed missions (for example, transitioning from a cavalry unit to an infantry unit) or soldiers from other units transferred in. So, after 1938, a universal litzen was introduced with silver-gray threading on a green backing. By 1940, this was changed to a feldgrau (field gray) to more match the uniform but it was never popular and troops, when they could, would wear the green backed litzen and those troops who had the pre-1938 litzen with the Waffenfarbe colors continued to wear them as a sign of pride.

Leutnant der Reserve Paul-Georg Kleffel: 4./Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 3

     Born on September 7, 1920 in Billerbeck, Germany, Paul-Georg Kleffel's early life isn't much known and in fact, much of what we do know concerns his military career. In 1939, Kleffel joined the German Heer (Army), his qualifications permitting him to apply from the outset as a reserve officer (Reserveoffiziere). He was sent to one of the five Kriegsschulen (War Schools) within Germany to attend the standard eight week training course which Kleffel successfully passed, graduating with the rank of Leutnant der Reserve (2nd. Lieutenant) sometime in 1941. 

     Kleffel was posted to the 4./Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 3 (4th. Company, 3rd. Reconnaissance Detachment) which was part of the 3. Panzerdivision. The division was the third of the original three panzer divisions created by the German Army, being formed on October 15, 1935. The 3. Panzerdivision saw action during the invasion of Poland, combat in Belgium, and saw action during the Battle of France. Kleffel, however, did not go into battle with the division until Unternehmen Barbarossa (Operation Barbarossa), the invasion of Russia, that kicked off on June 22, 1941. 3. Panzerdivision was under the XXIV. Armeekorps as part of the 2. Panzerarmee which itself was under Heeresgruppe Mitte (Army Group Center).

     Kleffel remained with the 4./Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 3 for the entirety of the war but curiously, much of his early combat career on the Eastern Front isn't well documented. In fact, the two volume series “Armored Bears: The German 3rd. Panzer Division in World War II”, written by veterans of the 3rd. Panzer Division, makes no mention of Kleffel until his actions in 1943-1944. What we do know is that his first position in the 4th. Kompanie was as a Zugführer (platoon leader). It was during this time that Kleffel was decorated with the Eisernes Kreuz 2. Klasse (Iron Cross 2nd. Class), Eisernes Kreuz 1. Klasse (Iron Cross 1st. Class), Nahkampfspange in Bronze (Close Combat Clasp in Bronze), and the Medaille Winterschlacht im Osten 1941/42 (Winter Battle in the East 1941–42 Medal) which is more often referred to as the Ostmedaille (Eastern Medal). The latter, a campaign medal, was received for service in Russia between November 15, 1941 and April 15, 1942. On November 16, 1943, Kleffel (now a Oberleutnant der Reserve;1st. Lieutenant) was awarded with the Deutsches Kreuz in Gold (German Cross). This decoration was received for either repeated acts of bravery under fire or for examples of exceptional military leadership. A part of the prerequisite to being awarded this medal was to already have earned the Eisernes Kreuz 1. Klasse which Kleffel had.

     On April l13, 1944, now Kompaniechef (Company Commander) of the 4th. Kompanie, Kleffel and his unit was situated in a wooded area to the east of Orhei (today in the Republic of Moldova). There, they spotted Soviet infantrymen advancing through the woods and Kleffel understood that if the Soviets were allowed to establish themselves there, it would pose a very real threat to the German defensive lines to the south of Orhei. Without orders, Kleffel moved to attack, committing eight Schützenpanzerwagen (SPW), the term German officers used for the Sonderkraftfahrzeug 251 (Sd.Kfz 251) half-track. As the half-tracks crested a hill, Soviet anti-tank guns greeted them but skillful use of the terrain and mobility of the half-tracks allowed Kleffel to maneuver to the flank of the Soviet infantry where the machine-guns tore into the Soviet troops, sending them into a panic. Not one to pause, Kleffel pushed the attack against the routed infantry, chasing them despite driving into the effective range of the Soviet guns. The Soviet troops, part of a regiment, were decimated but before the Soviets could mobilize a counter-attack, Kleffel pulled his half-tracks back to his line. For this action, Kleffel was presented with the Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes (Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross) on May 14, 1944. Kleffel, during his combat career, was wounded seven times though interestingly, his known decorations do not include the Verwundetenabzeichen (Wound Badge). Even if the injuries were relatively minor, it would have certainly been enough to warrant the Verwundetenabzeichen 3. Klass. In addition, sometime in the latter half of 1944, Kleffel was promoted to Hauptmann (Captain).

     Kleffel survived the war but whether he served any time as a POW is not known. He finished an apprenticeship and starting in 1949, he worked in the film industry until 1956 when he joined the Bundeswehr. Entering into service as a Hauptmann, in keeping with his rank from World War Two, Kleffel completed his general staff training and became the G3 (operations) staff officer for Panzergrenadierbrigade 13 from 1959 to 1963. He then spent a year at the Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr (Bundeswehr Leadership Academy) until 1964 when he transferred to, interestingly, the 3. Panzerdivision as their Chief of Staff. Promoted to Oberst (Colonel), Kleffel became a planner in 1968 at the Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (Federal Ministry of Defense) until taking over as the commander of Panzergrenadierbrigade 16 whose command he held until April 30, 1972. Following that command, Kleffel moved to lead the III. Korps until September 1973 when he then assumed command of the 12. Panzerdivision until September 30, 1976. Kleffel would hold several other positions until he retired from the Bundeswehr on September 30, 1980. Bundeswehr decorations he received included the Verdienstkreuz 1. Klasse (Cross of Merit 1st. Class) in 1973 and the Großes Verdienstkreuz (Commander's Great Cross of Merit) in 1979.

     After retiring, Kleffel became the manager for Johanniter-Unfall-Hilfe (Johanniter Accident Aid), a Christian charity organization. He remained as manager until 1987. Paul-Georg Kleffel died in Bonn, Germany on February 19, 2020 at the age of 99.

     The photograph here is likely a postwar autograph card. It shows Kleffel as a fresh Leutant der Reserve as denoted by his schulterstücke (shoulder boards) and he is wearing the Dienstanzug für Offiziere (Service Uniform for Officers) in the Modell 1936 style, evidenced by the dark, blue-green collar. That is could be postwar is that the photograph is cropped in such a way as to not show the swastika of the adler (eagle) above the right breast pocket. The display of the swastika in Germany was banned following the approval of Strafgesetzbuch (Criminal Code), Section § 86a in the 1950s.

Gefreiter Heinrich Severloh: Refuting the "Beast of Omaha"

     Online stories proclaim him as the “Beast of Omaha” but the reality of it was, Grefreiter Heinrich Severloh was not all the title makes him out to be. It was more a case of hyperbole which arose from the pages of his memoir entitled WN 62 – Erinnerungen an Omaha Beach Normandie, 6. Juni 1944 published by Hek Creativ Verlag in 2000. In it, Severloh claimed to have caused between 1,000 to 2,000 casualties among U.S. troops storming ashore on Omaha Beach on June 6, 1944. Was he posted to Omaha Beach? Severloh very much was present and did take part in the defense of the beach but his casualty claim is only believed by Severloh himself. Objective historians, on the other hand, dismiss his claim as outright fiction and have good cause to refute his words.

     Severloh was born in Metzingen, Germany on June 23, 1923, his parents farmers. On July 23, 1943, Severloh found himself conscripted into the Heer (Army) at the age of 19. Following initial training, he was posted to the 19. Leichte Artillerie-Ersatzdivision (19th. Reserve Light Artillery Division) which at the time, was based in Hanover, Germany. After a short stint with the reserve unit, Severloh was transferred to 3. Batterie, Artillerie-Regiment 321. As a side note, the reserve division was responsible for providing replacement troops to the regiment. With the regiment, he was trained as a kradmelder, or dispatch rider. Typically riding motorcycles, kradmelder were important components of artillery units with these men delivering messages between battalions and higher echelon units. As kradmelder often operated alone, their training included motorcycle maintenance so that common mechanical failures could be repaired in the field using spare parts carried on the motorcycle. In December 1942, Artillerie-Regiment 321 was deployed to the Eastern Front and instead of performing as a kradmelder, Severloh was made a pferdeführer (animal handler) and was posted to one of the unit's non-motorized supply trains. Perhaps upset with his lot, Severloh was cited by his superiors for uttering disrespectful and dissenting comments which resulted in him being put to hard labor where he was so severely worked, it resulted in him being hospitalized for six months. After his convalescence, Severloh was granted leave to return the Metzingen in order to assist his family in collecting the farm's harvest. 

     Despite the disciplinary action against him, Severloh was made a Unteroffizieranwärter (NCO aspirant) and sent to the Unteroffizierschule (Non-Commissioned Officer School) located in Brunswick, Germany in October 1943. Before he could graduate, Severloh was recalled from the school after less than a month of training and returned to Artillerie-Regiment 321 which had a number of units transferred into the 352. Infanterie-Division. The regiment's staff along with 2. Batterie, 3. Batterie, and 7. Batterie were all absorbed into Artillerie-Regiment 352 which was the 352. Infanterie-Division's artillery component. The division was moved to defensive positions in Normandy and specifically, Severloh was posted to Widerstandsnester 62 (WN62; Resistance Nest 62), one of fifteen such strongpoints situated along Omaha Beach. Specifically, WN62 was on the eastern side of the beach, overlooking two of the ten sectors the U.S. Army planned to hit: Easy Red and Fox Green. WN62 was between 40 to 164 feet above the beach depending on the position within WN62 which spanned 354 yards in width with a depth of 363 yards.

     When the U.S. landing commenced, WN62 was manned by twenty-seven troops from 716. Infanterie-Division along with thirteen men, including Severloh, from the 352. Infanterie-Division. WN62 was well armed and had a 7.5cm Flak M 37(t) (captured Czech 7.5cm Kanon PL vz. 37), two 5cm Panzerabwehrkanone 38 anti-tank guns, two 5cm leichter Granatwerfer 36 mortars, four machine-guns (one twin MG 34 mount and two captured 8mm Polish Ckm wz.30 machine-guns), and anti-personnel mines and barbed wire obstacles in addition to the thick concrete portions of the position. The task of the men from the 716. Infanterie-Division was to man the guns while the men from the 352. Infanterie-Division were mainly assigned as forward observers to direct fire from the unit's 10.5cm liecht Feldhaubitze batteries located 3 miles inland from the beach near Houtteville. Severloh was the Ordonnanz (Orderly) to Oberleutnant Bernhard Frerking. This meant that Severloh was Frerking's personal servant and acted as a runner, drove Frerking's vehicle, maintained Frerking's uniform and gear, served as a bodyguard to Frerking, among other tasks Frerking assigned to Severloh.

     During the attack, Frerking directed the artillery bombardment of the beach area from WN62's bunker while Severloh moved to a foxhole position that was 557 feet from the beach seawall and 492 yards from the drop zone of the landing craft. There, he manned a Maschinengewehr 42 (MG 42) machine-gun along with two Karabiner 98k bolt-action rifles. According to Severloh, a Unteroffizier (Sergeant) kept him supplied with ammunition to the point that Severloh claimed he went through over 13,500 rounds of machine-gun ammunition and 400 rounds of rifle ammunition. In 2004, he doubled down that he for sure caused 1,000 casualties but it was most likely 2,000.

     Despite the artillery fire, machine-gun fire, and mortar fire, U.S. troops (mainly from the 29th. Infantry Division and 116th. Infantry Regiment) made headway and Frerking called for a retreat from WN62, the men to make for the village of Colleville-sur-Mer. During the retreat, Frerking was shot in the head and killed, Frerking never to see his daughter who was born three months after his death. As for Severloh, he and the survivors from WN62 surrendered to U.S. troops on June 7, 1944. As a POW, Severloh was shipped to the United States and imprisoned in Boston, Massachusetts. After serving over a year and a half as a POW, in December 1946, Severloh was transferred to Bedfordshire, England to serve as forced labor on British road projects. Finally, in March 1947, Severloh was returned to Metzingen, Germany after his father petitioned the British to release him as he was needed to work on the family farm. Severloh died on January 14, 2006 at the age of 82 in Lachendorf, a town near Metzingen.

     Returning to Severloh's claim, according to the U.S. Army V Corps, U.S. fatalities on Omaha Beach was 694. A further 331 were missing and 1,349 were wounded. All told, this is 2,374 casualties. It is simply not possible for Severloh to have been the primary cause of these casualties, especially as Omaha Beach was some 5 miles long. The MG 42 had a maximum effective firing range of 1.2 miles when on its bipod. If fitted with the Lafette 42 tripod, it was 2.2 miles. Thus, he did not have the range to take the entire breadth of the beach under fire. It is also unlikely that he would have had the full range pf his weapon due to terrain limitations from his position. Despite the MG 42's range, it has been calculated that between 25,000 to even 100,000 rounds of ammunition had to be expended to result in a casualty. Numerous factors go into this but study depending, about 30% of casualties were caused by bullets. The reported casualties also include those killed or wounded by mortar fire and artillery fire, both of which were the main causes of casualties. This also doesn't include the unfortunate soldiers that drowned when their landing craft dropped them in deep water. The MG 42 was fed by 250-round belts and if Severloh is to be believed, he ran through 54 total belts. In action, typically, the barrel of the MG 42 had to be changed out every 150 rounds to allow the barrel to cool. Most machine-gun teams had one to two spare barrels with them to continually rotate them. If the gunner did not rotate the barrel, it would get too hot which would degrade accuracy as well as risk a weapon malfunction. So, assuming Severloh was changing out barrels and firing at the more practical rate of 150 rounds per minute, he would have consumed 13,500 rounds of ammunition alone in an hour and a half. If firing at the weapon's 1,200 rounds per minute, 13,500 rounds would have lasted a little over 11 minutes of firing time. It is said that the Unteroffizier was delivering ammunition to Severloh until 3:30pm. However, the assault on the two sectors of the beach had started at 6:00am with troops hitting the beach before 7:00am. If, indeed, Severloh was in action all that time, then he wasn't maintaining a constant fire which would reduce his ability to inflict casualties. In addition, some question that a single MG 42 had such a quantity of ammunition available. Since the MG 34 machine-guns used the same ammunition, one has to suspect that either the Unteroffizier was taking from the stockpile for the MG 34s or Severloh's accounting is simply way off.

     While Severloh was certainly a contributor to the casualties suffered by U.S. troops attacking the two sectors of Omaha Beach in his defense of the area, there are too many factors that cast doubt on his ability to have inflicted such a huge number on his own. Between his limited zone of fire with the MG 42, rate of fire concerns, ammunition availability, and the fact both artillery and mortar fire were impacting the beach in addition to small arms fire all add up to refute his claims. This also doesn't take into account that fact that his 2,000 casualties claim accounts for almost the entirety of the casualties across all 5 miles of Omaha Beach. Of course, you can be your own judge.