7.5cm PaK40/2 auf Fgst Pz.Kpfw II (Sf) "Marder II": Demolitioned Outside Rome

Source: U.S. Signal Corps

     Somewhere outside Rome on June 5, 1944, a U.S. soldier from the 5th. Army examines what is left of a German 7.5cm PaK40/2 auf Fahrgestell Panzerkampfwagen II (Sd.Kfz 131) tank destroyer which was, mercifully, simply called the Marder II. The need to both bolster and improve tank destroying capability resulted in two tank destroyers utilizing the chassis of the Panzerkampfwagen II light tank. 

     The first version was designated the Panzer Selbstfahrlafette 1 für 7.62cm PaK36(r) auf Fahrgestell Panzerkampfwagen II Ausf D¹ und D² (Sd.Kfz 132). Sometimes (again, mercifully) known as the LaS 762, this tank destroyer utilized Panzer II ausf. D and E as well as Flammpanzer II (a flamethrower variant of the Panzer II) chassis and mounted a captured Soviet 76.2mm F-22 Model 1930 field gun rechambered to fire the 75mm round used by the potent PaK 40 anti-tank gun. The LaS 762 was a stop-gap design while more purpose-built tank destroyers were designed and put into production. It was characterized by its tall profile and 201 vehicles were converted between April 1942 and June 1943.

     The second version was the Sd.Kfz 131, a more dedicated tank destroyer design, and it used war weary Panzer II ausf. A, B, and C chassis (but would later use factory "fresh" ausf. F chassis). The Marder II had the excellent 75mm PaK 40 gun as its main weapon. All told, 651 Marder II were produced between June 1942 and March 1944 and saw service on all fronts (though the majority were deployed to the Eastern Front). Both the German Army (Heer) and Waffen-SS were heavy users of the Marder II, equipping the panzerjäger abteilungen of panzer divisions. In addition, some Luftwaffe ground forces used the Marder II in their own tank destroyer units.

     The Marder II in the photograph has lost its entire superstructure save the forward portion and the front of the hull has been completely blown out as has the back of the vehicle. Given the extent of the damage and most notably by the burst barrel of the PaK 40, this particular Marder II was destroyed by the crew using demolition charges. This was not too uncommon when the vehicle could not be recovered from whatever circumstance disabled it (mired in the ground, mechanical breakdown, or battle damage) and so blowing the vehicle up denied its use by the enemy.

Jagdtigers of 2/s.Pz.Jg.Abt.512: Demolitioned Near Letmathe

Source: Author's collection.

     The remains of two Jagdtigers of 2nd. Kompanie, Schwere Panzerjäger Abteilung 512 (2/s.Pz.Jg.Abt.512) sit alongside a road near the German town of Letmathe. On April 11, 1945, 2/s.Pz.Jg.Abt.512, commanded by Hauptmann Walter Scherf, was part of Kampfgruppe (Battle Group) Ernst and set up in hidden positions to check U.S. advances to the Ruhr River. That day, the Jagdtigers fired high explosive ammunition out to 3 miles and the group was able to cause enough havoc to force the U.S. forces to retreat. Despite the victory, 2/s.Pz.Jg.Abt.512 was ordered to withdraw and so during the night, Scherf positioned his Jagdtigers on high ground outside the village of Kalthof. The next day, the Jagdtigers shot up U.S. tanks, again halting the advance of U.S. forces. Nevertheless, 2/s.Pz.Jg.Abt.512 continued to withdraw and by April 14, was in the village of Ergste. 

     The Jagdtigers were situated in a wooded area near Letmathe where mechanics worked to effect repairs. Scherf could see that his men had no fight left and when word came that 1/s.Pz.Jg.Abt.512 was all but finished, that was the final straw. 2/s.Pz.Jg.Abt.512 was ordered to destroy their Jagdtigers and on April 15, 1945, 2/s.Pz.Jg.Abt.512 surrendered. 

     Thus, when the Allies passed through, they found these two Jagdtigers. The second one is difficult to make out but it is parked immediately behind the Jagdtiger in the foreground and it is believed that this Jagdtiger had towed the other after it suffered a mechanical breakdown.

The Type 97 Chi-Ha "Long Gun": Tank Destroyer or Something Else?

      Following the capitulation of Japan on August 15, 1945, the first U.S. personnel flew into Atsugi Kaigun-hikōjō (Naval Air Facility Atsugi), Kanagawa Prefecture on August 28, 1945, starting the occupation of Japan that lasted until April 29, 1952. As was the case following the end of the war in Europe, the U.S. had a keen interest in gathering up any and all military technology that the Imperial Japanese Army and Imperial Japanese Navy had been using but more importantly, had been developing. Intelligence teams fanned out across Japan and one such group was deployed to the Tateyama Naval Gunnery School which was located in Tateyama, Chiba Prefecture.

     Founded on June 1, 1941, the Tateyama Naval Gunnery School was a branch of the Yokosuka Naval Gunnery School. Whereas the latter school instructed pupils on operating and servicing guns utilized on naval ships, the Tateyama Naval Gunnery School taught students how to conduct land warfare, amphibious landing operations, and even airborne (paratrooper) training. As part of such training, anti-tank tactics had been included and as the U.S. intelligence team roamed the school, they found a most intriguing piece of anti-tank weaponry sitting on the grounds.

     The Japanese, for a number of reasons, were very late in the game of developing potent tank destroyers. The main reason for this, and which also stymied tank development, was that early on, the Japanese rarely faced enemy armor that was either deployed effectively, employed in any real numbers, and in some cases, did not pose a serious threat. Other factors included not facing enemy forces that fielded much in the way of other anti-tank weaponry (such as anti-tank rifles and guns), jungle terrain that dominated much of the Japanese holdings did not favor armor, and since the Japanese relied on naval transports to send troops and equipment around the empire, this was a limitation in building heavier tanks. As 1943 wore on, the Japanese were encountering Allied tanks such as the M4 medium tank that proved quite a problem for Japanese tanks. Only the Type 1 47mm gun could offer some challenge to the M4 and this started to equip the Type 97 Shinhoto Chi-Ha (“New Turret” Chi-Ha) in 1942 but even then, the M4 was relatively immune to the Type 1 frontally. The Japanese responded with the Type 1 Gun Tank Ho-Ni I tank destroyer which was fitted with the more potent Type 90 75mm gun. Although production started in 1942, the Ho-Ni I did not see action until 1945. The successor, the Type 3 Ho-Ni III, was fitted with the same Type 3 75mm tank gun as used on the newer Type 3 Chi-Nu medium tank. Under forty examples were built starting in 1944 and were not deployed outside of the Japanese main islands. The Japanese had other tank destroyer designs, some of which made it to a prototype stage. The final tank destroyer design, the Type 5 Na-To, was to replace the Type 3 Ho-Ni III. Built upon the Type 4 Chi-So medium tracked carrier, the Na-To was fitted with a Type 5 75mm tank gun which was used on the Type 4 Chi-To medium tank. Given the state of Japan's industrial complex, only two Na-To were built and though 200 were ordered, the type never entered production.

     What U.S. intelligence personnel saw at the Tateyama Naval Gunnery School is, to this day, debated on what exactly the vehicle was. Was it a tank destroyer prototype? Was it something that was created by personnel at the school as a ad-hoc vehicle to defend the facility? Was it simply a mobile test bed for the gun? What we do know is that the massive gun was the Type 10 120mm anti-aircraft gun. Developed in 1921, the gun entered service in 1926 and was fitted on Japanese aircraft carriers (namely the Akagi and Taiyo classes), cruisers (such as the Aoba, Yubari, and Myôkô classes), and other naval ships. The Type 10 was improved and remained in production from 1942 to 1945. The chassis the Type 10 was fitted to was the Type 97 Chi-Ha medium tank, one of the more common Japanese tanks of World War II. 

     The Type 10 had a weight of 2.9 tons, a uniform twist 34-groove barrel, with an overall gun length that was 18.3 feet long. The lightest single barrel gun mount, as used on some cruiser classes, was 7.7 tons. However, the gun was also used from fixed ground positions and the mount utilized was simpler and lighter than the ship mounts. The Type 10 fired two types of HE (High-Explosive) ammunition, an incendiary shrapnel round, and a illumination round among others. The ammunition used was fixed with a complete HE round being 3 feet long with an all up weight of 75 pounds. Muzzle velocity for the HE ammunition was between 2,707 to 2,723 feet per second and this gave a maximum range of 9.9 miles with the barrel at a 45 degree elevation. Other aspects of the Type 10 included a horizontal sliding-wedge, semi-automatic breech with a hydro-spring recoil system. A skilled gun crew was able to manage 10 to 11 rounds per minute but the average rate was more often 6 to 8 rounds per minute.

     The Type 97 Shinhoto Chi-Ha had a weight of 16 tons total with a length of 18.1 feet. The image of the vehicle is a still from a film and is the only existing image available. It is a certainty that U.S. intelligence took photographs of the vehicle to document it but those photographs have yet to surface. From it, we can deduce several things. The first is the Type 10 is actually longer than the tank itself. The turret was, obviously, removed and the superstructure (upper hull) of the tank was cut away to reduce the height and provide a more flat firing platform. The gun is facing to the front of the tank and it is using a very cut-down version of the mount most often used when the gun was deployed from static positions. By consequence, the elevation of the Type 10 is severely limited though this isn't much of a concern if being used in the anti-tank role. The gun is showing some depression ability, likely no more than 10 degrees. There appears to be some form of crude gun shielding on the sides of the mount and on the front on either side of the gun tube. Other than this, the gun crew operated the weapon from the rear engine deck without any other protection from shrapnel or small arms fire let alone having no protection from the elements. There also appears to be a muzzle brake fitted to the end of the barrel as a means to reduce the recoil. The weight of the gun and gun mounting is evident by how compressed the suspension is on the tank. Given the size and weight of the ammunition, likely only a handful of rounds could be carried on the vehicle itself and assuming it entered service, either it was to be fitted with a trailer to carry additional ammunition or a support vehicle had to accompany the tank destroyer in the field to transport both the crew and ammunition. A anti-tank round was never developed for the Type 10 and the HE ammunition had between 3.75 to 4.1 pounds of explosive in the warhead. This was similar to the postwar Soviet 130mm KS-30 anti-aircraft gun, lighter than the German wartime 128mm Flak 40 which had a 7.5 pound explosive warhead, and also lighter than the U.S. 120mm M1 anti-aircraft gun. How the HE round would have been effective against Allied armor is unknown. Certainly a tank being hit by such a round would suffer ill effects. For example, the Soviet SU-122 assault gun utilized the 122mm M-30 howitzer that fired a HE shell with 8 pounds of explosive in the warhead and this was enough to demolish German tanks via concussive force upon a successful hit. Of course, how accurate the Type 10 would have been is debatable and it is doubtful it would have enjoyed any sort of accuracy beyond 1 mile. Another issue that is brought up is exactly how long the Type 97 chassis would have bore up to the recoil forces of the Type 10 before stress fractures appeared in the tank chassis. The additional weight of the gun would certainly have taxed the 170hp Mitsubishi SA12200VD diesel engine, reducing the 24mph speed of the standard Type 97 tank which would make “shoot and scoot” tactics difficult. In addition, the hull armor of the Type 97 was 25mm in the front, 26mm on the sides, and 20mm in the rear which was totally inadequate against any Allied tank gun. This would have forced the crew to fire at range, with the likely inherent inaccuracy, in order to be able to relocate before return fire is received.

     To this day, it remains unknown what happened to the prototype following the discovery of it and, as already stated, exactly what its purpose was also remains a mystery.

Primary Sources:

DiGiulian, T. (2020, October 9). 12 cm/45 10th Year Type. Navweaps. Retrieved December 19, 2021, from http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNJAP_47-45_10ns.php 

Johnson, Curt Artillery (London: Octopus Books, 1976)

Jagdtiger: Victim of U.S. Air Power

(Source: pics_of_warfare @ Instagram)

     On October 14, 1944, both the Royal Air Force (RAF) and U.S. Army Air Force (USAAF) launched Operation Hurricane against German targets. The intent of the operation was to show the Germans that both British and American bomber forces could exert their dominance at will in German airspace. In addition, the intended targets were designed to pummel German communication lines, demoralize the German populace, further inhibit German industry, and attempt to impart the futility of continued resistance. The bombing was mainly done by the RAF, flying 2,589 sorties in twenty-four hours, with some crews flying both daylight and nighttime missions. 10,210 tons of bombs were dropped on several targets in addition to incendiary munitions to cause as much destruction as possible. For the USAAF's part, the VIII Bomber Command (8th. Air Force) worked in conjunction with RAF Pathfinder squadrons to attack German military infrastructure in several cities.

     This brings us to October 16, 1944. On this date, the Nibelungenwerk was struck by Allied bombers. The facility, located in St. Valentin, Austria, was not only the largest tank producer for the German military, it also had the most modern assembly equipment and processes of any other manufacturer. The factory officially opened in 1942 and commenced to producing Panzerkampfwagen IV medium tanks and later, added assembly tasks for Tiger I heavy tanks. The PzKpfw IV and Tiger I tanks were not the only armored vehicles produced and assembled at the Nibelungenwerk through the years and by September 1944, the Jagdtiger commenced to being produced at the factory. This, then, is the subject of the photograph.

     Exactly who struck the Nibelungenwerk on October 16 isn't given in most sources on the Jagdtiger, only that 143 tons of bombs struck the factory, causing an obvious disruption in production. This shouldn't be too surprising as the aerial campaign against German military industry isn't the subject of those books. Still, we can hazard a guess that the most likely candidates were USAAF bombardment groups under the 15th. Air Force that were conducting bombing raids in Austria at the time. For example, on that date, squadrons from the 451st. and 461st. Bombardment Group hit the Hermann Göring benzol (meaning, benzene) fuel additive plant in Linz, Austria which was only some 18 miles from St. Valentin. On the same date, squadrons of the 484th. Bombardment Group targeted munition works in Linz. All three of these groups belonged to the 49th. Bombardment Wing. With the 15th. Air Force having operations in the vicinity of the Nibelungenwerk on October 16, 1944, it is almost certain that one of the twenty-one bombardment groups under the 15th. Air Force was assigned to strike the plant that day.

     The effects of the bombardment were not as damaging as they could have been for one reason or another. For example, the bombs from the 484th. dropped long and to the left of the munition targets, causing little damage to the target itself while cloud cover affected the effectiveness of the bombing against the benzol plant. The bombing of the Nibelungenwerk facility caused a shutdown of production while the damage was cleaned up and repaired and reduced the output by some 55% for the month which, as a consequence, delayed the completion of Jagdtiger vehicles destined for the German military (namely schwere Panzerjäger-Abteilung 653; 653rd. Heavy Tank Destroyer Battalion). The incomplete Jagdtiger in the photograph shows the damage wrought on the chassis by the bombing, to include part of the building on the rear of it. It is said that the factory workers were rather surprised at the extent of the damage to the vehicle. Since the chassis had not yet been put onto the production line, repair was considered impractical and so it was simply scrapped. Because of this, the chassis in the photograph was never assigned a production number. The wheeled device next to the Jagdtiger is a electric arc welder. Another well-known photograph of this same Jagdtiger shows workers with shovels having cleaned up the debris into piles on the factory floor.

Sources:

Davis, Richard G. Bombing the European Axis Powers (Montgomery: Air University Press, 2006)

Devey, Andrew Jagdtiger, Volume 2: Operational History (Atglen: Schiffer Publishing Ltd., 1999)

Spielberger, Walter J., Doyle, Hilary L., and Jentz, Thomas L. Heavy Jagdpanzer (Atglen: Schiffer Publishing Ltd., 2007)

Jagdtiger Chassis No. 305054: Final Fate Unknown

(Source: Panzertruppen via Flickr)

     Sitting on the assembly line at the Nibelungenwerk located near St. Valentin, Austria, is the fifty-fourth Jagdtiger, chassis 305054. Chalked on the side of the Jagdtiger is the date January 16, 1945. This could be the expected completion date and so this photograph could be dated to early January 1945 or November or December 1944 given the extent of the assembly.

     No. 54 is mostly finished except that the torsion bar suspension has yet to be fully installed. The holes for the suspension were drilled into the lower hull on the completed chassis, prior to the fitting of other components such as the gun, engine, and drive train. The torsion bars (drehstäbe) have been fitted and attached to them are the suspension arms (schwingarme). Each torsion bar had a plastic seal where it entered the hull (schwingarmsiegel). The suspension consisted of two shock absorbers (schwingungsdaempher), one per side, connected to the forward and rearward suspension arms, the apparatus for the shock absorbers on the interior of the hull. The first and last torsion bars were built stronger than the others but all had the same ends to which the sheet steel roadwheels were affixed. Each roadwheel consisted of two discs with two rubber rings between them and each was placed on a hub on the suspension arm. It was doctrine that if a roadwheel was damaged and had to be replaced, the hub had to remain on the suspension arm. Work on No. 54 was finished sometime in January 1945, being completed along with nine other Jagdtigers; chassis 305052, 305053, 305055, 305056, 305057, 305058, 305059, 305060, and 305061. All ten of these Jagdtigers were earmarked for assignment to a new unit, schwere Panzerjäger-Abteilung 512 (s.Pz.Jag.Abt.512; 512th. Heavy Panzerjäger Battalion). Documents show that all of the Jagdtigers were released for shipment on January 30, 1945.

     s.Pz.Jag.Abt.512 began to build up starting late in January 1945 with the intent to field three companies of ten Jagdtigers with the headquarters having three Jagdtigers for a total strength of 33 machines. The bulk of the personnel for the unit came from the remains of schwere Panzer-Abteilung 424 while the staff was filled out with men from schwere Panzer-Abteilung 511. Replacement personnel were to come from Panzer-Ersatz-Abteilung 500 as needed. In command of s.Pz.Jag.Abt.512 was Hauptmann Walter Scherf with 1. Kompanie being commanded by Oberleutnant Albert Ernst and 2. Kompanie was commanded by one of the most successful German tank commanders of World War Two, Oberleutnant Otto Carius. Ernst cut his teeth as a panzerjäger officer while serving with s.Pz.Jag.Abt.519 which operated Nashorn and later Jagdpanther tank destroyers. Carius had been the commander of 2. Kompanie, schwere Panzer-Abteilung 502 that operated Tiger I tanks. Carius had been severely wounded on July 24, 1944 while serving with s.Pz.Abt.502 and after a very long convalescence, was transferred to s.Pz.Jag.Abt.512. As a side note, while he recovered from his injuries, what remained of his old unit was redesignated s.Pz.Abt.511 on January 5, 1945. The final company, 3. Kompanie, was commanded by Oberleutnant Schrader.

     No. 54 was included in a shipment of five Jagdtigers (chassis 305050 through 305054) from Nibelungenwerk to Döllersheim on February 2, 1945. This was the location of Carius' unit where they would commence training with the Jagdtiger in addition to using the gunnery ranges located at the facility. Upon the arrival of the Jagdtigers, training began at once, to include range firing. However, this quickly came to a halt when, on February 16, 1945, s.Pz.Jag.Abt.512 was notified by the Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH; High Command of the German Army) of severe manufacturing defects in the Henschel L801 steering unit housing. All Jagdtigers that had yet to be shipped out were to have the steering units replaced before being dispatched to units and all Jagdtigers that were already in the hands of troops had to be returned to Nibelungenwerk for the repairs to be done. It is here that Jagdtiger No. 54 appears to disappear from the combat record of s.Pz.Jag.Abt.512.

     Mainly, this is because it is not known what tactical number was assigned to Jagdtiger No. 54. Upon the order to return the Jagdtigers to Nibelungenwerk, the chassis numbers for the vehicles were lined through on issue reports. It can be surmised that they did arrive back at Nibelungenwerk and reports from February discuss the timeframe to effect repairs. It would take approximately five days for factory workers to replace the steering units on all eleven vehicles originally earmarked for s.Pz.Jag.Abt.512, including No. 54. However, priority was given to those Jagdtigers already on the assembly line. Also, the factory had to set up another line to receive the returned Jagdtigers parallel to the main assembly line in order to effectively make the steering unit changes. From March 3, 1945 to March 26, 1945, s.Pz.Jag.Abt.512 received a total of 27 Jagdtigers, and we can hazard a guess that No. 54 was included in that number. Due to the mixture of chassis numbers because of the recall, it is not known on what date No. 54 shipped from Nibelungenwerk and to what company it was assigned. Initial shipments were given priority to 2. Kompanie followed by 1. Kompanie and then 3. Kompanie. It should be noted that in a listing of chassis numbers and assigned units given in Janusz Ledwoch's “Jagdpanther Jagdtiger” (Wydawnictwo Militaria No.207), he does not give a unit assignment to No. 54.

     On April 15, 1945, 2. Kompanie destroyed its last six remaining Jagdtigers near Ergste, 1. Kompanie surrendered in Iserlohn on April 16, 1945 with three operational Jagdtigers, while 3. Kompanie ended the war with no Jagdtigers operational (two had been in transit to them but never arrived). The few documented Jagdtigers of s.Pz.Jag.Abt.512 include 305058 (tactical number X7) which was part of 1. Kompanie and commanded by Leutnant Sepp Tarlach. It was abandoned on April 1, 1945 in Obernephen. Another was 305068 and belonged to 3. Kompanie and was scuttled on April 2, 1945 in Paderborn. A third was 305004 and was captured at Sennelager, likely used as a training vehicle. 305057 (tactical number X5) belonged to Leutnant Kubelka of 1. Kompanie and was blown up on April 11, 1945 near Hagen. Finally, the last known chassis number was 305074 and the Jagdtiger suffered a broken track near Offensen. It belonged to 3. Kompanie and was blown up.

Panzerjäger Tiger (P) Ferdinand: Shot Up at Ponyri

     The settlement of Ponyri would see occupation following the advance of the German XXXXVIII Motorized Corps through the area in October 1941. It would remain in German hands until elements of the Soviet 48th. and 13th. Armies pushed the Germans out of Ponyri on February 9, 1943. Ponyri would feature in the greatest armored engagement of World War Two, the Battle of Kursk, which commenced on July 5, 1943 when the Germans launched Unternehmen Zitadelle (Operation Citadel). 

     On July 9, 1943, elements of the XXXXI Panzer Corps moved on Ponyri. Included in those elements was Schwere Panzerjäger-Abteilung 654 (654th. Heavy Tank Destroyer Battalion) which was equipped with the Sd.Kfz. 184 Panzerjäger Tiger (P) tank destroyer, better known as the Ferdinand (later Elefant). Boasting a maximum of 200mm of frontal armor and armed with the potent 8.8 cm Pak 43/2 L/71 anti-tank gun, the Ferdinand was well able to withstand Soviet anti-tank fire. Still, the Ferdinand was able to be beaten. In and around Ponyri, the Soviet 307th. and 1023rd. Rifle Regiment, bolstered by the 3rd. and 4th. Guards Airborne Division and elements of the 3rd. Tank Corps, bloodied the Germans severely and ground down their advance to the point it stalled with most of the German objectives unattained. 

     Littered around Ponryi were the wrecks of several Ferdinands of Schwere Panzerjäger-Abteilung 654 of which this vehicle was one. With the tactical number 712 and belonging to the 7th. Company, the vehicle had suffered numerous strikes to the superstructure front armor with no penetration and a glancing blow can be seen in the armor on the hull front as well as on the gun tube. The Ferdinand is also pock-marked from machine-gun fire. The disabling hits came from two rounds into the gun, one cracking the gun mantlet and the other the barrel itself. Due to the 65 ton weight of the Ferdinand, recovery of damaged vehicles was a very difficult task during combat operations and more often than not, they had to be abandoned even when the damage received was quite repairable.

Belgian C.47 on Carden-Loyd Mk. VI: Too Much On Too Little

A captured Carden-Loyd Mk. VI tank destroyer being inspected by German troops. The emblem for the 2e Régiment de Cyclistes-Frontière along with the Belgian roundel can be seen on the side of the vehicle, the roundel just behind the pivot for the gun shield. (Author's Collection)

     The Carden-Loyd Tankette, designed by Sir John Carden and Vivian Loyd, enjoyed commercial success both domestically in Britain as well as in foreign markets. Production commenced in 1927 and ran through 1935 with the most widely built model being the Mark VI. The Carden-Loyd Mk. VI was a small, lightly armored, two man tankette and it set the standard for future tankette designs. The Mark VI had a combat weight of 1.5 tons, was 8.1 feet long, 6.6 feet wide, and a height of only 4 feet. The typical weapon fit was a single .303in. Vickers machine-gun provided with 1,000 rounds of ammunition. The crew, driver and commander, was provided with 6mm to 9mm of face-hardened armor for protection. Power came from a Ford 4-cylinder, inline engine that developed 20 horsepower and was paired with a Ford 2-speed epicyclic transmission that gave the Mark VI a maximum road speed of 30mph and ten gallons of fuel was carried to give the tankette a operational range of 100 miles.

     The British Army was the largest purchaser of the Carden-Loyd Mk. VI, with some 325 of them in service as machine-gun carriers, reconnaissance vehicles, and gun tractors for light artillery among other uses. On the foreign market, sales were brisk with such countries as Bolivia, Canada, China, India, Greece, and more placing orders for the tankette. Thailand was the largest customer, having purchased 60 of the vehicles. Even Japan was a buyer, obtaining six examples with the Imperial Japanese Navy using them in service as the Type 6 Machine-Gun Car (Rokushiki Kikan Jū-sha or Ka-shiki Kijū-sha meaning Carden-Loyd Tankette). Another foreign buyer, among others, was Belgium and what they decided to do with the Carden-Loyd Mk. VI is the subject of the photograph here.

     The Belgian Armed Forces were looking for a way to fully mechanize a gun by fitting it to a tracked vehicle. This had the advantage of providing the gun with a self-propelled mounting that didn't need to be towed into combat and could be more rapidly deployed. By being fitted on a tracked vehicle, this also provided for better cross-country mobility. Given the popularity of the Carden-Loyd Mk. VI, Belgium submitted an order for six examples and received them in 1931. Two guns were chosen as the test weapons with the first being the 76mm Canon de 76 Fonderie Royale des Canons (FRC; Royal Cannon Foundry) infantry support gun while the second was the Canon Anti-Char de 47mm Fonderie Royale de Canons Modèle 1931, mercifully shortened to C.47 FRC Mod.31. Each gun was fitted in a fixed mount centered on the front of the Mark VI which meant that while the gun had some elevation capability, to effect traverse, the entire vehicle had to turn in place. A gun shield was fitted to a metal frame that provided some frontal protection for the crew but when the vehicle was not in action, the gun shield could be tilted up and backwards that gave a meager measure of overhead protection from the elements. When testing commenced, the problems with the design were immediate. The biggest problem was the recoil of both guns with the Canon de 76 FRC having the largest amount of recoil despite its hydro-spring recoil mechanism. The recoil forces caused the front of the Mark VI to kick upwards and once the front end hit the ground again, the gun was no longer sighted and the target had to be re-sighted or reacquired. In addition, the violent motion caused undo strain on the chassis and running gear. Another problem was that the addition of the gun to the Mark VI along with the ammunition brought the combat weight of the tankette to 3 tons, a doubling of the weight without any compensation in regards to a larger, more powerful engine. As a consequence, the maximum speed was reduced and both the engine and the transmission suffered from more rapid wear which required additional maintenance hours as well as decreased the service life of the motor and drive components. Other problems included the very weak armor, the lack of crew protection overall, poor off-road handling, too little ammunition carrying capacity, and the fact that two men had to operate guns that normally were crewed by 3 to 5 men. The Canon de 76 FRC equipped Mark VI was refitted with the C.47 FRC Mod.31 and the remaining four were also converted to use the anti-tank gun, turning the vehicles into tank destroyers.

     Despite the problems with the tank destroyer Mk. VI, all six were issued to the elite Régiment des Chasseurs Ardennais (Ardennes Chasseur Regiment), a mountain division formed in 1933 and which continues to serve to this day in battalion strength. The C.47 FRC Mod.31 was formidable anti-tank gun, the armor-piercing round having a muzzle velocity of 2,400 feet per second and capable of going through 1.9 inches of armor plate at 300 meters. This put it on par with many of its contemporaries and at the beginning of World War Two, it was a threat to many light and even medium tanks. Unfortunately, the tank destroyers were a disaster in service with the regiment where both the elevation and mountainous terrain degraded not only the mobility but the performance of the already overburdened engine as well. The Régiment des Chasseurs Ardennais hastily dumped the six tank destroyers on the Régiment Territorial des Cyclistes Frontière (border guard regiments) and the vehicle shown in the photograph specifically belonged to the 8e Compagnie, 2e Régiment de Cyclistes-Frontière under the command of Capitaine-Commandant G. Verjans.

     At the start of the German invasion of Belgium that commenced on May 10, 1940, 8e Compagnie had only four of the Carden-Loyd tank destroyers left and all four were in poor condition. The remainder of the unit was comprised of six more modern T-13 tank destroyers, also equipped with the C.47 FRC Mod.31 gun. Verjans deployed the four Carden-Loyd tank destroyers into fixed camouflaged positions as part of the third Position Fortifiée de Liège (Fortified Positions of Liège or PFLIII) and in support of the 6e Compagnie under the command of Lt. A. Parent. Their defensive line was situated between the village of Lixhe and a connecting canal between the Maas (Meuse) River and the Albert Canal. The unit went into action on May 11, 1940, sometime in the late morning, early afternoon when German troops were spotted along the banks of the Maas River. Sporadic fire erupted between the Belgians and the Germans but the Germans made no attempt to cross. However, by 3pm that day, German forces had crossed the Albert Canal and at 10:30pm that night, the order to retreat was given. 8e Compagnie abandoned the four Carden-Loyd tank destroyers along with a number of T-13 tank destroyers due to mechanical problems. By May 20, 1940, the company was down to only four T-13s with the last battle being fought by 8e Compagnie on May 24, 1940 when the remaining T-13 tank destroyers covered the Belgian retreat to the Leie (Lys) River where the troops set up a defensive line between the villages of Izegem and Ingelmunster. Interestingly, the Germans did not attack the gathered Belgian forces there but accepted their surrender when Belgium capitulated on May 28, 1940.

 

Jagdtiger "234": Scuttled in Zeiskam

GIs pose with the remains of "234" (Author's Collection)

      Leutnant Kasper Geoggler commanded three Jagdtigers from 3rd. Kompanie, Schwere Panzerjäger Abteilung 653 (3/s.Pz.Jg.Abt.653). Geoggler’s mount was “331” while “323” and “234” made up the remainder of the unit. The kampfgruppe was situated outside Neustadt and on March 22, 1945, the unit engaged an armored column from the U.S. 3rd. Army. As was a common tactic, the Jagdtigers shot up the lead and rear tanks, sandwiching the remainder of the tanks between the wrecks. In the chaos, the Jagdtigers picked off the U.S. tanks with relative ease. In all, Geoggler’s three Jagdtigers claimed a total of 25 tanks destroyed, including M4 Shermans and M10 Wolverine tank destroyers. “331” and “323” suffered a total of 10 hits from U.S. tank rounds but not a one penetrated the thick armor of the Jagdtigers. 

     Geoggler withdrew the kampfgruppe into Neustadt proper. There, “323” broke down while attempting to get into a firing position within a garden. “331” was situated along Landauer Strasse, across from the immobilized “323,” which gave it a dominating field of fire along the road. In time, “331” was down to its last round and so Geoggler ordered the recoil cylinders drained and had the final round fired. This jammed the gun in full recoil, rendering it useless to the Americans. The crews boarded their SdKfz 251 half-tracks and along with Jagdtiger “234”, abandoned Neustadt and made for Zeiskam. 

     There, “234” went into action at a railway crossing until a shot penetrated the right front fender and broke the track. With no chance to repair the track or recover “234”, it was abandoned and blown up by its crew. The photograph shows “234” following the U.S. Army entry into Zeiskam. The internal fire caused the suspension to drop which is why the Jagdtiger appears to be “sitting” so low. Curious GIs, such as these men, spent many a moment clambering up onto “234” and taking photographs with it.

The British FV4401 Contentious: An Ambitious Airmobile Tank

     One of the more interesting post-World War Two tank designs was the British FV4401 Contentious. The intent of the FV4401 was to provide a light (up to 20-tons), easily transportable armored fighting vehicle (AFV) that could be air dropped and provide armored support for airborne and rapid deployment forces. There were two designs put forward under the FV4401 designation. The first was a one man, thinly armored vehicle fitted with two 120mm L6 WOMBAT recoilless rifles, the latter being used due to their light weight. Each L6 was equipped with a autoloader fed from a seven-round rotary magazine. This first design was more of a tank destroyer, akin to the Japanese Type 60 tank destroyer developed from 1956 to 1960. The second design is the focus here. 

     Work commenced on the two-man FV4401 (sometimes called the Contentious II) in the mid-1950s and the design had a number of novel features. For armament, the Ordnance QF 20-pounder (84mm) gun was initially selected as, at the time, it was a excellent gun and was also used in the British Centurion main battle tank (MBT). Rather than put the gun in a true turret from the outset, the gun was fitted into the hull of the prototype in a very limited traverse mounting. This kept the height of the FV4401 low and also saved weight. The gun was provided with an autoloader which could effectively fire twelve rounds per minute. To elevate and depress the gun, the FV4401 was fitted with suspension that could be raised and lowered and to provide additional traverse, the tank was turned in place. To speed aiming, the gun had an optical light pulse sight which was tied into a servo that allowed for automatic adjustment of the gun and monitored the alignment of the gun as a whole. This was akin to an early implementation of a Movement Reporting System (MRS). Both the commander and the gunner had complete driving and gunnery controls. For armor protection, the front glacis was to feature horizontal rows of metal ridges. The purpose was to break up incoming projectiles before they struck the armor proper. Behind this was a four foot empty space that was filled with diesel fuel. When full, the fuel provided the equivalent of twenty-four inches of armor and behind that was a 40mm thick back plate which separated the fuel compartment from the crew compartment. Components for the initial prototype, namely the lower chassis, were taken from a British FV4101 Charioteer medium tank, the road wheels from the FV300 series (a project for lightweight armored fighting vehicles), and for an engine, a Rolls-Royce B Range diesel engine was used. This engine series, topping out at 187 horsepower for the B81 model (as used in the FV430 AFV series), wasn't to be the final engine fit as the Contentious II was to use an engine developing between 300 to 500 horsepower. The FV4401 was envisioned that at the sacrifice of added weight, a turret could be fitted as well as be fully Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) sealed. The proposed turret was to be low in profile so as not to add significant height to the Contentious II.

     Sometime in the late 1950s, the FV4401 Contentious II prototype was completed. It was far more of a test vehicle for the adjustable suspension, gun mounting, and fire controls as the prototype was unarmored and the fuel tanks were situated outside the tank, secured to the track guards. The armor concept had been tested and showed that ignition of the diesel fuel following penetration did not occur. If a fire was started, the crew compartment offered some protection and it was planned to house the fuel within the space in armored tanks which would be able to contain any explosion. The explosion risk came more from the tank being penetrated when the fuel level was low and fumes were more in abundance within. To minimize fuel loss, the fuel in the front part of the hull were to be inside compartmentalized tanks. This novel armor, however, was not fitted to the prototype but would have had the Contentious II program continued and more refined prototypes produced. The 20-pounder gun was sighted to 2,000 yards and at that range, the Armor-Piercing Discarding Sabot (APDS) ammunition could penetrate 290mm of rolled homogeneous armor and at 1,000 yards, it could punch through 330mm of armor. This was more than enough to deal with two of the most common Soviet tanks, the T-54 and T-55. Ranging was accomplished by a pulse radar (seen here on the bracket above the gun). Despite the good performance of the 20-pounder gun, work was done on up-gunning the Contentious II with either a 120mm gun, a 155mm gun, or even a larger caliber gun.

     As for being air dropped, tests were done using steel constructed replicas in the general shape of the turreted Contentious II design starting in November 1956. They were deployed from a Blackburn Beverley heavy transport, the replicas fitted directly with skids and air bags as a form of impact cushioning. However, these tests were not overly successful, the steel showing significant damage from the landing forces despite the parachute braking and air bags. At least one of the damaged replicas ended up as a range target after impacting the ground, the test personnel seeing no worthwhile reason to recover it.

     The FV4401 Contentious II prototype was also tested at Lulworth Range in Dorset, England, against a 6X6 vehicle, the TV1000 Rhino, which was envisioned in a similar role as the FV4401 but using wheels. The TV1000 had stability problems, the rubber on the wheels wore out at an alarming rate, and the TV1000 used skid steering, much like a tank does, and thus offered little over the FV4401 which was deemed superior. 

     Despite the novel features and relative success during testing, the FV4401 was not put into production nor were further prototypes completed (some sources say at least two more were built) in the FV4401's final form. Had the FV4401 entered service, it would have given British airborne forces a significantly more advanced weapon in comparison to the U.S. M56 Scorpion which entered service in 1957 and would have also been superior to the Soviet ASU-57 airborne assault gun that began service in 1951.

     Today, the prototype shown in the photograph at Kirkcudbright Training Area survives to this day, able to be seen at the Tank Museum at Bovington in Dorset, England. Unlike the photograph, the FV4401 at Bovington is armed with a Royal Ordnance L7 105mm gun which was added for display purposes.

Jagdtiger "102": Demolition Outside Rittershoffen

     By 1900 hours on March 16, 1945, the 3e Division d'Infanterie Algérienne (3rd. Algerian Infantry Division; 3e DIA) had wrested control of the towns of Oberhoffen and Schirrhein from the Germans and solidified their positions. In the vicinity was Schwere Panzerjäger-Abteilung 653 (Heavy Tank Destroyer Battalion 653; s.Pz.Jg.Ab.653) who was preparing to evacuate damaged Jagdtigers by trains out of Soultz with their destination being the repair works in Bellheim. All three of the battalion's companies, 1./653, 2./653, and 3./653, were converging at Soultz with the hopes that the two trains positioned at Soultz could be loaded up and then dispatched under the cover of darkness. As work got underway with loading the Jagdtigers onto the rail cars, it was decided that a kampfgruppe (battle group) remain behind to provide a covering force to ensure the trains departed for Bellheim without incident. Put in charge of the kampfgruppe was Oberleutnant Werner Haberland, the commander of 1./653. The unit was made up of the remaining Jagdtigers from 1./653 and 2./653, seven Jagdtigers in all, plus those of 3./653 which was at its full strength of nine Jagdtigers. The kampfgruppe moved out and took up a position in the forest near Biblisheim and it did not have to wait very long before elements of the U.S. 36th. Infantry Division ran into the Jagdtigers during their push towards Gunstett. Haberland's Jagdtigers were able to punish the advancing U.S. troops enough to stall their advance. During the night, the 257th. Volksgrenadier Division launched an attack against the 3e DIA but failed to beat the Algerian troops. However, the trains departed from Soultz unimpaired and so their job done, Haberland had the kampfgruppe withdraw towards Wissembourg.

     Along the way, Jagdtiger “102” broke down near the town of Rittershoffen. It was decided that “102” could not be repaired nor taken with the kampfgruppe and so demolition charges were set and the Jagdtiger was blown up. The detonation blew a portion of the roof off the vehicle as well as blasted the gun mantlet clean off. The photograph here, though, depicts the remains of “102” after the end of the war. It was in the process of being scrapped in situ and one can see the Maybach HL 230 P30 engine has been completely removed along with the tracks, much of the rear hull and superstructure has been cut away along with a portion of the 128mm PaK 44 L/55 gun. The photograph does show the large breech block to good effect. Of note, some publications caption the post-WW2 photographs of “102” as evidence of the destruction caused by the demolition charges but this would be incorrect.

     As for s.Pz.Jg.Ab.653, by mid-March 1945, the unit's commander, Major Rudolph Grillinberger, issued a report to the Oberkommando des Heeres (Army High Command) which stated he had eighteen operational Jagdtigers with sixteen total needing repair, all of which had been dispatched by rail to Bellheim. Thus, the war was not yet over for s.Pz.Jg.Ab.653.

The Type 3 Ho-Ni III Tank Destroyer: Last of the Line

Ho-Ni III tank destroyers and Type 3 Chi-Nu medium tanks belonging to the Imperial Japanese Army's 4th. Tank Division after the war. (U.S. Army Signal Corps)

     The tanks of Japan throughout the World War Two years, taken as a whole, showed a more or less obsolescence in comparison to not only German tanks but also many Allied tanks. A factor in this was that the opponents the Japanese faced in the early years of the war either did not have significant anti-tank capability or the tanks that opposed the Japanese were obsolete themselves or deployed in such a manner as to be ineffective. Prior to the war, the Japanese did not pay much heed to heavy tanks though wisely, they had abandoned tankettes which were of limited combat value. There was not the arms race as was seen between Germany and the Allies (namely the British, the U.S., and the Soviet Union). Thus, when the Japanese began to fight against U.S. tanks such as the M4 Sherman and M3 Lee medium tanks, a sizable majority of the Japanese light and medium tanks came up short. To compound matters, by 1943, U.S. bombing raids against Japanese industry started to impact Japanese tank production which in and of itself was suffering from a lack of skilled labor, material shortages, and given a lower priority versus aircraft and naval vessel construction. While the Japanese sought to put forward more powerful tanks to compare favorably against the Allies, it was a race that was already lost. A concept that the Japanese did not put significant effort towards until it was too late was that of the tank destroyer. A simplified definition of a tank destroyer was a combat vehicle whose sole mission was to seek out and destroy enemy tanks. A sizable majority of tank destroyers used in action by both the Axis and the Allies consisted of heavy caliber guns mounted on tank chassis already in production with the guns in limited traverse mountings fitted into turretless superstructures. By using existing tank chassis, this eased logistical concerns (for example, parts supply) while dispensing with turrets simplified production, lowered cost, and permitted larger caliber guns which existing turrets may not have been able to accommodate. Examples of this type of tank destroyer included the German Jagdpanther (which used the Panzerkampfwagen V Panther chassis), the Soviet SU-100 tank destroyer (which used the chassis of the T-34 medium tank), and the British Archer (which used the chassis of the Valentine infantry tank).

     The first tank destroyer the Japanese put into service was the Type 1 Ho-Ni I. It utilized the chassis of the Type 97 Chi-Ha medium tank and the turret was removed and replaced with a open casemate that provided armor protection from the front and sides only. For a weapon, the Type 90 75mm field gun was utilized which could fire a wide array of ammunition that included high-explosive, armor-piercing, incendiary, smoke, illumination, and anti-personnel (shrapnel) rounds. It also boasted a range of a little over 9 miles which compared well against its contemporaries. The limited traverse mounting provided a gun depression of -5 degrees, a maximum elevation of 25 degrees, and 20 degrees to the left and right. To effect further traverse, the entire Ho-Ni had to move. The casemate provided 51mm of armor on the front and sides though the hull only supported 25mm of armor. No defensive machine-gun was fitted. A total of 54 rounds of ammunition were provided. The prototype Ho-Ni I was completed in June 1941 and after evaluation, production started in 1942. In all, only 26 Ho-Ni I tank destroyers were built and the first of these did not see combat until January 1945 during the Battle of Luzon with the tank destroyers being under the Imperial Japanese Army's 2nd. Tank Division. Their small number, combined with Allied superiority, meant they had little effect on the outcome and those Ho-Ni I vehicles which remained also had little impact on Allied operations.

     In July 1942, a successor was tested and this would become the Type 1 Ho-Ni II. The Type 97 Chi-Ha medium tank again provided the chassis but this time, the casemate was slightly modified to include four observation visors (the Ho-Ni I only had two) and a new gun was fitted, the Type 91 105mm howitzer. The gun was capable of firing much the same ammunition types as the Type 90. Following testing, the Ho-Ni II was put into production beginning in 1943 but like its predecessor, production output was very limited with only 54 examples being completed sometime in 1944. The gun's range of motion was much the same as the Ho-Ni I except elevation was limited to 20 degrees. Also, the Ho-Ni II carried less ammunition given the larger, two part shells (projectile and power bag) used by the Type 91. Unlike the Ho-Ni I which was used both in the direct fire, anti-tank role as well as indirect fire, the Ho-Ni II served more as a self-propelled gun, providing indirect fire in the support role rather than engaging enemy tanks. A handful of Ho-Ni II saw combat during the Burma and Philippines campaigns in 1944 and 1945.

     The Ho-Ni II was not to be the last and the final successor, and shown here, was the Type 3 Ho-Ni III. Of the Ho-Ni family, the Ho-Ni III was the most capable. It continued the use of the Type 97 Chi-Ha chassis but utilized a completely redesigned casemate which provided complete protection for the crew by being totally enclosed and was slightly enlarged to allow for more room for the gunners to operate. Two hatches were fitted to the top of the casemate and the entire back portion of the casemate could open up via two hinged panels. However, armor protection was less, being a maximum of 25mm on all sides. This reduction in armor may have been the result of needing weight savings given the casemate redesign. Another change was a rearrangement of observation visors of which one was on each side and two in the rear with four horizontal vision slits cut into the front of the casemate. Underneath the slits and the visors was a vertical slit which were likely to allow the crew inside to utilize small arms to defend the Ho-Ni III in close combat given the vehicle did not have any defensive machine-gun. Each of the vertical slits had a shutter on the interior that closed off the slits when not in use. Finally, the potent Type 3 75mm gun was fitted as this gun was also used on the Type 3 Chi-Nu medium tank which was designed to go up against the M4 Sherman on relatively equal terms. At 1,000 meters, the Type 3 gun was capable of penetrating up to 65mm of armor which could go through the frontal armor of a Sherman (which, model depending, was around 50mm). Hitachi Ltd. was tasked with designing the Ho-Ni III and early in 1944, production commenced but due to the late war situation, only a limited number were built with numbers ranging from as few as 21 to as many as 41 (source depending) being finished. Sources also differ on if any Ho-Ni III were deployed into combat but the majority agree that it is very likely most, if not the entire production run of Ho-Ni III tank destroyers were kept within Japan to counter the anticipated invasion by the Allies of the home islands.