British Stuart: Ad Hoc 18-pdr Field Gun Portée

From British and American Tanks of World War Two by Peter Chamberlain and Chris Ellis.

      Although the M3 light tank was U.S. designed and built, it was the British who first took it into action during Operation Crusader which commenced on November 18, 1941 in northern Africa. In British service, the M3 was known as the Stuart and for Operation Crusader, 170 Stuart I light tanks were included in the order of battle for the British 8th. Army. As the battle unfolded, units equipped with the Stuart suffered significant casualties. This, despite the fact the Stuart compared very favorably against two of the most common Axis tanks, the Panzerkampfwagen III Ausf G and the Italian Fiat M13/40. Against the former, the two tanks were evenly matched in terms of speed and armor protection and both the Stuart's 37mm M6 gun and the PzKpfw III's 3.7cm KwK 36 gun could knock the other tank out from over 1,000 meters. Against the Fiat, the M3 dominated the Italian medium tank and the Stuart was invulnerable to the 47mm Cannone da 47/32 AT gun from 1,000 meters and beyond whereas the Stuart could penetrate the M13/40 almost anywhere at that range. Analysis following the Allied victory against Axis forces on December 30, 1941 showed that the high casualty rate had more to do with the skill of German tank crews and superior tactics. The British also found that the two-man turret of the Stuart was problematic, to the point that some Stuart crews tried to squeeze a third man in to facilitate gun handling. The Stuart also did not have a high fuel capacity in comparison to some British tanks (such as the Crusader) which limited its range to only 75 miles. Still, the British appreciated the mechanical reliability of the Stuart and excellent speed. Nevertheless, by mid-1942, the British relegated the Stuart to reconnaissance tasks only, avoiding tank-vs-tank combat wherever possible. The British continued to use the Stuart throughout World War Two. Subsequent models were the Stuart II (Guiberson diesel engined M3), Stuart III (M3A1), Stuart IV (Guiberson engined M3A1), Stuart V (M3A3), and the Stuart VI (M5 and M5A1).

     The British also used a number of variants of the Stuart and two of the most common were the Stuart Recce and the Stuart Kangaroo. The Stuart Recce removed the turret which lowered the profile of the tank and lowered the weight of the vehicle which in turn, improved range. The Stuart Kangaroo also removed the turret and the vehicle was used as an armored personnel carrier (APC). There is debate on if the name “Kangaroo” was ever applied to the Stuart like it was to other similar vehicles derived from the M7 Priest, M4 Sherman, and Canadian Ram tank. These APCs were mostly used by British engineer units attached to armored brigades. A third, relatively common variant, was the Stuart Command which was also a turret-less Stuart but utilized by commanders and was equipped with additional radio equipment.

     This, then, brings us to the subject of the photograph. It depicts a one-off modification to a Stuart in which a British Ordnance QF 18-pounder field gun, sans wheels, was fitted to a simple bracket mount in place of the tank's turret. Although many of these guns were converted into the improved QF 25-pounder gun prior to World War Two, a number of the older guns (which entered service in 1904) remained in service and saw action during the opening stages of the North African campaign. Whether this ad hoc self-propelled gun (or portée) was ever used in action remains unknown but it was certainly constructed during the North African campaign in 1941-42. An examination of the mounting suggests that the gun was centered on the upper hull with the box trail extending over the opening left by the removal of the turret. This would allow the gun to be elevated to a maximum of 37 degrees and permit recoil. Of course, this assumes the gun is the Mk. III or Mk. IV model. If, on the other hand, the gun was an older Mk. I or Mk. II with a single, central trail, then the maximum elevation was only 16 degrees. The gun crew would have operated the gun without the benefit of all-around protection with the only measure of defense coming from the gun shield. It appears that two of the three hull machine-guns (one front hull mounted and one in each side of the upper hull) were removed, likely to make room for ammunition. This left only the front hull machine-gun. If the intent was to provide mobility for the gun and its 6.3 mile range was its defense from enemy attack, then having the additional machine-guns wasn't needed and if need be, crew small arms could also be utilized for close-in defense. How much ammunition the modified Stuart could carry isn't known though with the shell being a little over 1 foot long, an adequate supply could likely have been stowed if the machine-guns and the ammunition for them was removed. How the crew entered the SPG is also not known. It may have been possible for the crew to slip underneath the trailing arm or perhaps the trailing arm was not secured to the rear deck and the gun could be tilted upward to permit the crew to enter. Certainly in action, three men would likely have been crewing the gun from the deck while another remained in the tank, passing ammunition up through the opening where the turret had been. Some have said the modified Stuart was used as an assault gun, utilizing the gun for infantry support in the direct fire role. However, this is unlikely given the high profile of the SPG, the lack of armor protection for the gun crew, and the relatively light armor of the tank itself.

British A10 Cruiser Tank Mk. IIA: 7th. Armored Brigade

(Associated Press)

     An Associated Press wire photograph dated January 26, 1941 depicts the crew of a British A10 Cruiser Tank Mk. IIA enjoying a Christmas Day meal. This would put a date of December 25, 1940 when the photograph was actually taken by the war correspondent. According to the tag line, the men were eating a British Christmas pudding which was made from biscuit rations, prunes, marmalade, and rum. The men appear to be haphazardly uniformed but all five men are wearing the standard tank crew pants that featured large thigh pockets. All of the pants show varying degrees of staining from oil, grease, and other grit and grime found inside tanks as well as staining from having to perform mechanical maintenance on their tank. The pants also show various degrees of sun bleaching. Three of the men sport the British Army peaked cap while the other two have knit hats. Given the temperature can plummet even in the desert during the evening and night, all the men have various jackets and sweaters over their uniform blouses for warmth. Of interest, three of the men appear to be carrying captured Italian Beretta Model 1934 semi-automatic pistols judging by the shape and design of the leather holsters. That they are carrying captured Italian weapons can be bolstered by the Carcano Modello 1891 bolt-action rifle seen on top of the tank turret. The AP photograph stated the tank crew was in the vicinity of the Libyan city of Bardia. If this is accurate, it would mean the men were part of the British 7th. Armored Brigade. This was because the unit, along with elements of the 7th. Royal Tank Regiment (RTR), were attached to Australian forces consisting of the 6th. Australian Division along with the 16th. and 17th. Australian Infantry Brigades for the purposes of assaulting Bardia. That the men belonged to the 7th. Armored Brigade is because the only tanks the 7th. RTR had with them for the attack were Matilda II infantry tanks.

     The Australians began building up their forces in the Bardia area beginning in December 1940. The Australian units were not at full compliment and thus it took some effort to fill the gaps with various British forces in the region to ensure the Australian units were at strength. The time was used by the British Royal Air Force to dispatch reconnaissance sorties from No.208 Squadron flying Westland Lysander aircraft escorted by Gloster Gladiator fighters from No.3 Squadron Royal Australian Air Force. In addition, foot patrols goaded Italian artillery to fire which divulged their locations while these patrols also conducted ground reconnaissance of Italian antitank obstacles and barbed wire lines. On December 24, 1940, Christmas Eve, British Major General Richard O'Connor directed the commander of the assembled forces, Australian Lieutenant General Iven Giffard Mackay, to begin planning for the taking of Bardia. Defending Bardia were some 45,000 Italian troops, made up mainly from the remnants of four infantry divisions along with a mixture of Blackshirt divisions, frontier guards, and three companies of elite Bersaglieri infantry troops.

     The attack commenced on December 31, 1940 when RAF bombers began a series of sorties against Bardia which lasted until January 2, 1941. Over 100 sorties were flown by No.70 Squadron RAF and No.216 Squadron RAF with fighters patrolling the skies from No.33, No.73, and No.274 Squadrons RAF. Ground artillery added to the bombardment with the Lysanders from No.208 Squadron acting as spotters for the Australian and British guns. On January 3, the Royal Navy battleships HMS Warspite, Valiant, and Barham along with their escorts commenced ship-to-shore bombardment, firing nearly 245 rounds of ammunition from their big guns before departing, leaving the bombardment duties to the elderly HMS Terror (a monitor launched in 1916) and her escorts, the gunboats HMS Ladybird, Aphis, and Gnat. At 0416, the Australian units were on their start lines and at 0530, the artillery bombardment commenced. Sappers went forward in advance of the infantry to clear lanes and once these lanes were open, the assault got underway. By 0920, the Australian forces had achieved their objectives, having made good progress against the Italian defenders. The second wave of Australian forces commenced their attack following an artillery barrage that started at 1125. The Australians again made progress but the Italian resistance was stiffer and at the end of the day, the Australians and British had penetrated nearly two miles into Bardia. On January 4, the attacks resumed at 0900 and as the day wore on, the Italians lost further and further ground until only isolated outposts remained. General Giuseppe Tellera, who commanded the Italian 10th. Army, considered sending a relief force but in the end, saw that the situation at Bardia was hopeless and any relief effort would be doomed to failure. The combat continued but by the close of January 5, 1941, victory belonged to the Australians and British. All told, the Allies attacked with 16,000 men against the Italian strength of 45,000. Of the Allied forces, 130 perished with 326 wounded but the Italians suffered 1,703 killed in action with 3,740 men wounded. Another 36,000 Italians surrendered to Australian and British forces.