Russo-Ukrainian War: Russian Sniper Decoy

Source: Military Informant

     The Russo-Ukrainian War is notable for the relatively widespread use of decoys with the Ukrainians making significant usage of decoys that mimic high value targets. Such targets include the M142 HIMARS, the MIM-104 Patriot, and NASAMS. Decoys which have seen deployment include artillery pieces, IFVs, tanks, missile batteries, and even decoy drones. The intent of decoys in the current battlefield in Ukraine is to lure in drones and cause the enemy to expend them on the decoys and not the actual weapon systems. However, they can also be used to deceive enemy intelligence in regards to troop disposition and strength. More rarely seen is the use of decoy soldiers and in this photograph, appearing in social media in March 2025, Russian soldiers have created a decoy sniper and set it up in a damaged building. Some may question the logic of expending the effort to create this decoy but Major John L. Plaster, USAR (Ret.) in his book The Ultimate Sniper provides the likely purpose: counter-sniping.

     As the name suggests, counter-sniping is the methodology of locating and eliminating an enemy sniper. Plaster devotes an entire chapter in his book on techniques that can be used to locate an opposing sniper and then engage him. One of these techniques is the use of decoys. The purpose of a decoy is to fool the enemy sniper into firing on it which then betrays his location and allows the counter-sniper to engage. This is because the counter-sniper positions his decoy and understands the likely avenues in which the enemy sniper may take the decoy under fire. As such, the counter-sniper actively surveils these avenues and if the bait is taken, he can quickly seek and eliminate the opposing sniper following the shot.

     However, Plaster makes it clear that decoys are no guarantee, stating “...do not forget that your opponent is a breathing, thinking human being with intelligence and determination just like you.” What this means is that no matter how much effort is put into making a realistic decoy, it may not fool the enemy sniper. Or the very decoy in question could be there to lure a counter-sniper. Plaster says that the sniper needs to assess the situation in that, does it make sense for a sniper to be located in the area. Also, he goes on to say that “if the shooting opportunity looks too good to be true, it probably is.” It should be pointed out since the mannequin generates no heat, in night operations where thermal imagers would be used, the decoy may not even be visible as it will match the background temperature.  To remedy that, somehow, the mannequin would need to have a heat source when the air temperature is cold. Another concern would be if a sniper is using quality optics, the crudeness of the “rifle” may be evident and thus the decoy would be ignored. A better option would have been to utilize a genuine, though non-functional, rifle for authenticity and and make it believable.

Russo-Ukrainian War: The Gerbera Drone

Source: Reddit

     The purpose of a decoy, first and foremost, is to deceive. The more life-like the decoy is and assuming proper deployment and employment, it has the chance to trick the enemy into believing something that is not true. Interestingly, in military parlance, a “dummy” refers to a decoy that mimics a piece of weaponry or equipment that is in use on the battlefield. Nevertheless, the term decoy is used broadly regardless if the decoy in question is a dummy or not. The Ukrainian Army makes heavy use of decoys, notably of 155mm M777 howitzers, NASAMS surface-to-air missile systems, M142 HIMARS vehicles, and other high value military weapons. This is to preserve, as long as possible, the equipment they have from losses.

     The Russian Federation forces also make use of decoys though not to the extent the Ukrainians do. In fact, many of the photographed front line decoys put together by Russian units are not too convincing. However, the Russians are using far more realistic decoys of S-300 (NATO reporting name SA-10 Grumble) and S-400 (SA-21 Growler) long-range surface-to-air missile systems. For example, the Russian company BalticAir offers an inflatable S-400 for $22,235...a steal in comparison to the cost of the genuine article. These decoys are being deployed in the Far East to replace actual S-300 or S-400 units which have been diverted to Ukraine and they are also seen in Crimea. However, in some instances, these decoys are easily spotted as they are placed without the accompanying vehicles associated with these missile batteries, to include separate radar, tow, and/or command post vehicles.

     Unfortunately, there is one Russian decoy that is quite difficult to differentiate from the real thing and that is shown here in the form of a downed Gerbera drone. The Gerbera (sometimes known as the Gerber) mimics the general shape of the Iranian HESA Shahed 136 loitering munition which Russia has purchased from Iran as well as the Russian license-built version, the Geran-2. Both the Shahed 136 and the Geran-2 make up the majority of the weapons deployed in Russian drone strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure as well as civilian targets. The Gerbera is reported to have first appeared in service starting in late July 2024.

     When Russia launches an air attack against Ukrainian targets, mixed into the Geran-2 and Shahed 136 munitions are Gerbera drones. Their purpose is to draw Ukrainian anti-air fire to them which allows the lethal munitions to get through to the target. Generally, the Gerbera does not carry a payload but a Ukrainian defender does not have the time to determine if the Gerbera is or is not a Geran-2 of Shahed 136 as they look much the same. This results in Ukrainian anti-air units having to expend ammunition (to include surface-to-air missiles [SAMs]) on the decoys when they could have been used against actual targets. While heavy machine-gun ammunition and light cannon ammunition is more readily available for resupply, the Ukrainian military does not have very large stocks of replacement SAMs for potent systems such as the MIM-104 Patriot, IRIS-T, MIM-23 Hawk, and NASAMS. This is one reason the Ukrainian military is using older SAMs to make up for expenditures. This includes the S-200 (SA-5 Gammon) and the even older S-125 (SA-3 Goa). In fact, Ukraine had retired the S-200 in 2013 but has since taken them out of mothballs starting in the summer of 2023.

     The Gerbera is primarily built from plywood with foam plastics to make them very inexpensive to produce, light, and also radio-frequency transparent (meaning, radio waves can pass through the drone with little to no interference). Power usually comes from a Chinese DLE60 2-stroke, 60cc ICE (Internal Combustion Engine) made by Mile Hao Xiang Technology. Some Gerbera have also been shown to use a slightly more powerful Stinger 70cc ICE made by the Chinese company RCGF Stinger Company, Ltd. Either rear mounted engine drives a wooden, 2-bladed propeller. Overall, the Gerbera is 6.6 feet long with a wingspan of 8.2 feet. This is a bit smaller than the Geran-2 which is 11 feet long but the Geran-2 shares the same wingspan as the Gerbera.

     A rather disturbing fact about the Gerbera is the number of components that are not Russian. Besides the Chinese engines, the electronics are from around the world...even from the United States. The XK-F358 mesh network (a broad band communication system for drone control) inside downed Gerbera drones has been proven to show hardware obtained from U.S. companies Analog Devices, Micron Technology, Xilinx Inc., Altera Corp., and even Texas Instruments. Other countries include Germany (Infineon Technologies), Ampleon (Netherlands), Realtek (Taiwan), and UIY, Inc. (China). Controlled radial pattern antennas and their related hardware (CPRA; used to protect GPS systems from interference/jamming) have been sourced from Analog Devices (United States), NXP Semiconductors (Netherlands), Integrated Silicon Solutions (United States), Monolithic Power Systems (United States), Linear Technology Corp. (United States), and again from Texas Instruments. So far, the 3-axis gimbal mounted camera used by the Gerbera comes from the Chinese company Topotek. Universal flight controllers and the hardware that goes with them is mainly Texas Instruments products. Other parts for the flight controllers has been obtained from XLSEMI (China), ATMEL Corp. (United States), U-Blox (Switzerland), STMicroelectronics (Switzerland), and NXP Semiconductors (Netherlands). Some downed Gerbera drones were found to be using Ukrainian SIM cards which permitted the drones to use Ukrainian high-speed connections for control guidance.

     Besides being a decoy, the Gerbera has also been shown to come in two other variants. The first is a loitering munition (much like the Geran-2 it mimics). At this task, it is not as successful as the Geran-2. It is believed the explosive payload is only 22 pounds compared to 198 pounds of the Geran-2. The normal decoy Gerbera has a range of around 186 miles but the loitering munition variant is thought to have a shorter range due to the added weight. Also, the camera used by the Gerbera is of a low quality, broadcasting using TV channels. It means the drone operator must manually fly the Gerbera into the target, much like a FPV drone, but without the superior maneuverability of a FPV drone. The second variant is used for reconnaissance, either using video cameras or gathering electronic data.

     As a note, the slogan scrawled on the left wing translates to “There will be no truce!”