Russo-Ukrainian War: The KPS-53AV Gun/Bomb Sight

Source: @qnesko007 on Instagram

     A screen capture from a video, taken from the weapon systems officer's (WSO or “Wizzo”) forward view from his cockpit, located in the nose of a Mil Mi-24D gunship (NATO reporting name Hind-D). Directly in front of him is the KPS-53AV gun/bomb sight system which takes up a good portion of his available cockpit space.

     The KPS-53AV is used by the WSO to aim the Yakushev-Borzov YakB-12.7 4-barrel rotary heavy machine gun mounted in a USPU-24 chin turret. In fact, the end of the YakB-12.7 can be seen just above the sight. The toggle on the left front side of the sight reads “ВКЛ СЧИСЛЕНИЕ” which translates as “On Counting” while the red triggers on either side of the unit have “ОГОНЬ” on them which means “Fire”. The angled KS-53 sight glass is in the center. The knobbed grip on the left side of the sight is used to traverse the chin turret (60 degrees to either side of the centerline) with the entire KPS-53AV swiveling to allow the WSO to track targets. On the right side, the other grip controls the elevation and depression of the YakB-12.7 (20 degrees and 40 degrees respectively). The KPS-53AV is stabilized and includes a VSB-24 analog ballistic calculator. Linked to a air pressure sensor and a angle-of-attack sensor mounted in a boom on the exterior of the helicopter (not visible in this screen capture), the calculator takes the data from the sensors and combines them with the ballistics of the YakB-12.7 to provide aiming correction. The KPS-53AV also has a range finder that can determine target distance but the WSO must manually input the size of the intended target. Built into the KPS-53AV is a PAU-457-2M gun camera which records engagements. The camera uses 16mm film and has a 8 frame per second shoot rate. The KPS-53AV is also used by the WSO to deliver unguided bombs. While the pilot has some control over the helicopter's weapons (and has his own sights), only the WSO can accurately conduct bombing runs. The pilot doesn't have a bomb sight though he can jettison the bombs in the cases of emergencies.

     The YakB-12.7 in the Mi-24D is provided with 1,470 rounds of ammunition and unlike most rotary weapons, the YakB-12.7 is purely gas operated and does not need an external motor to drive the barrels. The maximum rate of fire is between 4,000 to 5,000 rounds per minute so with such a ravenous consumption, the WSO will typically fire short bursts in order to conserve ammunition.

     To the left of the KPS-53AV is a radar altimeter which measures the height (altitude) of the helicopter above the ground immediately below it. A look at the reading and at the time of the screen capture, the helicopter was flying a little over 21 feet off the ground. To the right is the screen for a GPS. 

Russo-Ukrainian War: The Mil Mi-2MSB-1 (and Mi-2AM-1)

Source: Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.

     The oldest helicopter design currently seeing active service in the Russo-Ukrainian War is shown in this photograph released by the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine (GUR). The design, the Mil Mi-2 (NATO reporting name Hoplite), first flew in September 1961 and after acceptance, the first examples entered Soviet service beginning in 1965. Although a Soviet design, all Mi-2 production occurred in Poland by the PZL-Świdnik company. Although manufacturing of the Mi-2 ceased in 1999, the Mi-2 remains active service with a number of countries, to include Ukraine. Specifically, the helicopter in the foreground is a Mi-2MSB-1 variant while the one in the background looks to be a Mi-2AM-1.

     The Mi-2MSB-1 is a modernization of existing Mi-2 helicopters undertaken by the Ukrainian company Motor Sich for the civilian market. The first examples of the Mi-2MSB-1 appeared in 2013. The main change is the replacement of the original pair of 400 horsepower Klimov GTD-350 turboshaft engines with two modern (and lighter) 465 horsepower AI-450M turboshaft engines. Along with the updated engines, the Mi-2MSB-1 also comes with a new gearbox, transmission, and new composite material rotor blades. Other changes include updated cockpit instrumentation for the new powerplants and a slightly redesigned fuselage to improve interior space capacity and a passenger door repositioning. Otherwise, the Mi-2MSB-1 is much the same as the original Mi-2. Motor Sich, of course, does offer optional electronic upgrades such as digital navigation systems.

     The Mi-2MSB-1 is operated by a crew of one, the pilot. If outfitted for passenger service, the Mi-2MSB-1 can accommodate up to 8 people. Internally, the Mi-2MSB-1 can carry up to 1.1 tons of cargo or if using external cargo slings, pendants, or cargo netting, the Mi-2MSB-1 has a slightly higher carry capacity of 1.2 tons. For performance, the maximum speed of the Mi-2MSB-1 (without cargo) is 130 miles per hour with a cruise speed of 124 miles per hour. The typical flight range on internal fuel capacity is 466 miles. Maximum service ceiling is 3 miles with the optimum ceiling being 1.4 miles.

     The particular Mi-2MSB-1 seen here, operated by the Defense Intelligence Aviation of  Ukraine, is outfitted for medical evacuation. The modernization and outfitting was funded by international monetary donations managed by the Olena Zelenska Foundation to the sum of $500,000USD. The helicopter is fitted with a modern Garmin navigation system while all of the medical equipment was produced by Weinmann Emergency Medical Technology GmbH. Equipment includes artificial lung ventilators, electrocardiogram (EKG) machine, cardiac event monitors, defibrillator, oxygen assist module (OAM) with pressure regulator, electric aspirator, and other medical supplies. Casualty capacity is three if they are ambulatory but only a single casualty if on a litter. The exterior pods are fuel tanks. Typical medevac time is 15 minutes to the location of the request though time can vary due to weather conditions, distance, and enemy activity.

     The Mi-2AM-1, also used for medical evacuation operations, is similarly outfitted as the Mi-2MSB-1. One of at least two Mi-2AM-1 helicopters, one was purchased through donations made by Polish citizens to the Zbroimy Ukrainę charity organization.

 

Russo-Ukrainian War: The Lofting Attack Technique

Source: Reddit

     A tactic being used by both Ukrainian and Russian pilots when firing unguided rockets is called “lofting” and that technique is being illustrated here by a Ukrainian Mil Mi-8 (NATO reporting name Hip) helicopter firing S-13 122mm rockets from its B-13L launchers.

     To execute a lofting attack, the helicopter (or ground attack jet) flys low to the ground to make it a difficult target for anti-aircraft gun fire and/or MANPADS (Man Portable Air Defense System). When the pilot gets near the release point, he pulls up sharply while ripple firing the rockets. Once the rockets  are on their way to the target, the pilot turns sharply away while deploying flares (and/or other countermeasures) and returns to low level flight to egress the area.

     Lofting has two main benefits. The first is that it extends the range of the rockets. The most common unguided rockets used by both the Ukrainians and Russians is the 80mm S-8 rocket and to a lesser degree, the 122mm S-13 rocket. The maximum range for the S-13 (which depends on the type) is between 1.4 miles up to 3.7 miles. Lofting can greatly increase this range (sometimes doubling the range) which brings about the second benefit, keeping the helicopter or jet further away from enemy air defense.

     The S-8 and S-13 are direct fire rockets, meaning the helicopter or jet has to fly at a higher altitude and in a relatively straight line in order to unleash the rockets against the target and achieve hits. Of course, this leaves the helicopter or jet vulnerable to anti-air defenses during the attack run. If firing direct within the rocket's maximum range, the rockets maintain a tighter grouping when they hit the target area. Lofting, however, gives the rockets more time to spread out due to their longer flight time. This reduces the number of rockets that strike the intended target. In addition to the fewer number of rockets impacting on target, unless the loft is executed perfectly, the rockets may overshoot or undershoot the target. This is not so much of an issue if the intent is to simply bombard an area without any specific target in mind.

     Despite the lack of accuracy, it is pretty clear that lofting will continue to be a common practice by both sides in order to preserve air assets which are not easily replaced (especially on the Ukrainian side) but more importantly, the crews themselves.