I am no expert on current Russian military tactics. However, I do have access to IAG-13-U-78 “Soviet Army Operations”, dated April 1978. This is an intelligence manual created by U.S. Army Intelligence and released by the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command. Now, I hear you say, of what good is a manual nearly 44 years old? If one examines the chapter on attacking a defending enemy (Section IV, page 3-61), there are some clear parallels to the current situation in Ukraine which suggests that the tactics referenced in this publication aren't so out of date after all.
Russian forces are reported to have largely bypassed Kharkiv in order to push deeper into Ukraine. This lines up with the tactic of bypassing an enemy in a deliberate defense (of which a city can be considered such) rather than engage it. This may account for lighter forces around the city and use of artillery to keep the defenders in the city. It is doubtful that a concentrated Ukrainian force would engage the Russians in open terrain and lose the benefit of the concealment and cover a urban warzone provides them. As such, outside of aerial attack or artillery, Russian forces are a bit more secure from massed infantry assaults.
Let us move to Kyiv. It is reported that a military convoy some 40 miles long is moving towards the city. This lines up with the first action in the manual that states the first step towards an attack of an enemy in deliberate defense is the buildup of required forces. If, indeed, the convoy is slated for the assault on Kyiv, the evidence is clear. Once the forces are in the field of battle, they will be organized. If they are following the 1978 tactics, the bulk of the forces will be amassed at the planned direction of attack. Russian tactics also allow for feints or ruses to divert the enemy attention away from the main thrust. In such attacks, the Russians, according to the manual, want to have a 4-5 to 1 advantage in troops, 6-8 to 1 in artillery, and 3-5 to 1 in tanks. This is certainly achievable today and likely has not changed much.
The Russians, as they have been since World War II, are big believers in massed artillery and rocket batteries (as seen in the superiority ratio above) and prior to the commencement of the attack, Kyiv would be subjected to a heavy bombardment. In the attack, again, if following these tactics, the Russians will not spread their forces out but instead would reduce unit frontages and have a front line of no more than 4km. Follow-on units behind the main lines would be spread further apart. This allows them to maximize their firepower and focus it towards the enemy. It is possible that the incursions in the suburbs of Kyiv by Russian forces are reconnaissance to attempt to pinpoint Ukrainian positions and capability in preparation of the main attack.
The only hope for the Ukrainian defenders in Kyiv is to withstand the initial assault and bog the Russians down which would break their momentum. Why is this important? According to the manual, the tempo of the attack is to be swift with a fast rate of advance to limit losses and overrun weak positions quickly. If it becomes a brutal, house-to-house fight, it favors the defender who knows the terrain and if Russian objectives are not achieved, it may become a serious problem.
One of the self-propelled artillery assets the Russians have deployed in Ukraine is the 2S19 Msta (after the Msta River). This particular example was abandoned somewhere in Sumy Oblast after the convoy it was traveling with was hit. As one can see, the travel lock for the 2A65 152mm howitzer is still engaged. The gun can fire base bleed shells out to 16 miles or if using rocket assisted ammunition, out to 18 miles. Thanks to a automatic loader, the standard 2S19 can fire up to 8 rounds every minute. A total of 50 rounds of ammunition is carried in the vehicle. The turret has a full 360 degree rotation while the gun can be elevated up to 68 degrees and depressed to a maximum of 4 degrees. For defense, the 2S19 is fitted with a pintle mounted 12.7mm NSVT heavy machine-gun (not seen here) with 300 rounds of ammunition. Built on a T-80 main battle tank chassis, the V-84A 840 horsepower engine can move the 2S19 to a maximum speed of 37 miles per hour (on roads) with a power to weight ratio of 20 horsepower per ton. Speaking of weight, loaded, the 2S19 is 42 tons, is 23.5 feet long, 11.1 feet wide, and 9.10 feet tall with a crew of 5. Armor thickness is unknown but while proof against small arms fire, it would be no defense against anti-tank missiles. It is NBC (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical) protected.
The 2S19 entered service in 1989 and the Ukrainian army had 40 of them as of 2017 though how many remain in service isn't known. However, it is highly likely this abandoned one will be turned around against its former owner.
Originally posted on March 1, 2022.
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