Russo-Ukrainian War: Damaged Russian 48Ya6-K1 Podlet K1 Radar System

Source: Ukraine_Defence (Instagram)

     On October 23, 2024, a joint mission between the Defense Intelligence of Ukraine and Special Operations Forces located and targeted a Russian 48Ya6-K1 Podlet K1 long-range, high-altitude surveillance radar situated near Cape Tarkhankut, Crimea. The photograph shows the result of the  drone strike. Meaning “Approach”, the Podlet system entered Russian service in 2018 (at a cost of $5.5 million U.S. dollars per unit) and it is designed to detect fast moving targets flying at low altitude. As such, the Podlet plays a key role in providing advance warning to Ukrainian cruise missile attacks (which usually fly at low altitudes) and the system is able to support air defense missile systems such as the S-300 (NATO reporting name SA-10 Grumble) and S-400 (NATO reporting name SA-21 Growler). Alas, as shown, Podlet is not infallible and so far, the Ukrainians have destroyed three Podlet radar vehicles and damaged two others (which includes this one).

     The actual extent of the capabilities of the Podlet's radar suites are not completely known though with the capture of a complete Podlet system in Syria in late 2024, the Podlet's performance may soon be revealed. What is known is that the main detection radar of the Podlet K1 is a 3-coordinate, S-band, phased-array radar which utilizes a circular scan search pattern. It is believed that the maximum detection range is 186 miles (in optimal conditions) and can reach an altitude of 6 miles. The Podlet also has two IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) arrays below the main radar array. One operates in the international standard SIF Mark XII (Selective Identification Feature) (utilized by NATO military aircraft and civilian aircraft) while the other operates in the Russian IFF national standard. Finally, there is a antenna which functions as a counter to electronic jamming, allowing the main detection radar to maintain operability in EW (Electronic Warfare) environments.

     The Podlet is usually supported by a generator truck to provide power and a C2 (Command and Control) vehicle to deliver target data to subordinate air defense units and command. Podlet is a primary component of Russian air defense in the Russo-Ukrainian War, being capable of tracking Ukrainian cruise missiles such as the R-360 Neptune and Western supplied cruise missiles such as the British Storm Shadow.

Russo-Ukrainian War: Captured Russian KamAZ-53949 Linza

Source: Natalia Kravchuk, ArmyInform

     A former Russian KamAZ Linza ambulance now in service as a command vehicle by the 117th. Mechanized Brigade. The Linza (“Lens”) had actually been captured in April 2022 in Kyyanytsia, Suny Oblast after its Russian crew caused the vehicle to overturn during a sharp turn (due to the high center of gravity of the vehicle). For a time, it was used as an ambulance by the Ukrainians until it was refitted as a command vehicle and provided to the signal company of the 117th. Mechanized Brigade late in 2024.

     The 15.5-ton Linza is a variant of the KamAZ-53949 4X4 Typhoon-K MRAP (Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected) vehicle. Power comes from a KamAZ built Cummins 6ISBe 350 P-6 diesel engine paired to an automatic mechanical transmission with a 6-speed gearbox. Maximum road speed is 62 miles per hour with enough fuel carried to provide for a maximum cruise range of 621 miles. The Linza can be upgraded with a more powerful 450 horsepower engine. Off-road performance is enhanced with a CTIS (Central Tire Inflation System) and terrain depending, up to 25 miles per hour can be achieved.

     The crew of 3 (driver, commander, and medic) and up to 10 wounded are protected by the equivalent of STANAG 4569 Level 4 defense. This is made possible by a sandwich-type armor comprised of steel alloy armor plating with an external ceramic layer. As such, the Linza can shrug off up to 14.5x114mm API (Armor-Piercing Incendiary) ammunition at 200 meters and can shed 155mm artillery fragments from as close as 25 meters. Against mines, the Linza has a V-shaped bottom hull and the protection is on par with STANAG 4569 Level 3 defense. This means it withstand blasts from up to 22 pounds of explosive. Crew are provided with blast resistant seats. Run-flat tires permit the Linza to travel up to 31 miles with a blown out wheel. Further protection comes from a automatic fire suppression system.

     The Linza is primarily for immediate first aid and transport out of the battle area to rear area triage locations. It is not normally armed. As such, it is fairly limited in standard onboard medical equipment. It does, however, have a small crane at the rear of the vehicle to assist with loading stretchered casualties. Enough room is available for four stretchers and up to six seated wounded. Up to 2.2 tons of supplies and equipment can be carried if no casualties are present.

     The Ukrainians modified this Linza by creating five workstations for personnel with each station equipped with a laptop, small desk, monitor, and a radio. Two Starlink satellite systems are utilized, one being the Starlink Mini for communication while the Linza is on the move and the standard Starlink equipment which is deployed when the Linza is stationary. Communication transmissions are encrypted. Typically, the workstations (except for the communication unit commander's station) are manned by personnel from units within the brigade such as drone operations (mainly reconnaissance), air defense, EW (Electronic Warfare), and artillery in order to coordinate actions and forward data up to higher echelon units as well as to subordinate units within the brigade.

Primary Sources:

https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/01/09/shtab-na-kolesah-zatrofeyena-rosijska-linza-stala-brygadnoyu-komandno-shtabnoyu-mashynoyu/

https://roe.ru/eng/catalog/land-forces/armored-vehicles/kamaz-53949/

Russo-Ukrainian War: D-30 (2A18) 122mm Howitzer

Source: Reuters

     A gunner of the National Police of Ukraine with his D-30 122mm howitzer somewhere in Zaporizhzhia Oblast, January 12, 2025. Designated the 2A18 but far better known as the D-30, the howitzer first accepted for Soviet Army service in 1960 and even today, remains a mainstay in artillery units of over 60 nations. While Russia no longer produces the D-30, it is currently license-built in Egypt, Iraq, and Sudan. In 2020, the Russian Army had 4,570 D-30 howitzers in service compared to only 129 examples in the Ukrainian Army. As of January 13, 2025, Russia has lost 114 D-30 howitzers while Ukraine has lost 16.

     The D-30 replaced the World War II era M-30 122mm howitzer with the D-30 reaching artillery units within Soviet Army divisions and regiments starting in 1963. The D-30 is distinctive in that it uses a tripod carriage which, when deployed, permits 360 degrees of traverse for the howitzer. This also provides a low profile, making the D-30 less conspicuous. Usually, the D-30 is deployed on even ground and once a position is selected, a hydraulic jack underneath the carriage center is lowered to the ground which lifts the howitzer. Once this is complete, the wheels are raised (in the photograph here, they have been removed to reduce the size of the D-30) and the movable two stabilizer legs are deployed and secured. The jack is then lowered so that the stabilizer legs touch the ground. The mount for the howitzer permits 70 degrees of elevation and 7 degrees of depression. It should be mentioned that if the barrel is pointed directly over one of the stabilizer legs, gun elevation is limited to 22 degrees. This is to prevent the D-30 from being displaced due to imbalance. In action, the D-30 weighs a little over 3 tons. When in traveling position, the D-30 is towed by its barrel, the tow ring underneath the muzzle brake. Maximum tow speed on roads is no more than 50 miles per hour. Usually, the D-30 is towed by a 6x6 truck though any vehicle capable of towing at least 3 tons can handle the D-30.

     The D-30 uses a semi-automatic, vertical sliding-wedge breech. By semi-automatic, it means when the howitzer is fired, the empty cartridge case is automatically ejected from the breech which then remains open, allowing a new projectile to be loaded. This permits a skilled crew (usually 6 to 8 men) to fire between 10 to 12 rounds every minute though a more sustainable rate is 5 to 6 rounds per minute. Recoil is reduced by way of a multi-baffled muzzle brake and a hydro-pneumatic recoil system mounted above the barrel. The muzzle brake accounts for half of the recoil reduction though the overpressure caused by firing the D-30 is about twice that of comparable caliber guns. As such, it is a danger to unprotected crew and often, gunners use very long lanyards to enable them to fire the D-30 from a distance to reduce the effects of the overpressure wave.

     The D-30 can fire a wide array of ammunition. The two most common projectiles are the 3OF56 HE-Frag (High-Explosive Fragmentation) and BK-6M HEAT-FS (High-Explosive Anti-Tank Fin Stabilized) munition. The 3OF56 has a nearly 9 pound payload of A-IX-2 explosive and can use a number of fuzes, to include the common RGM-2. The maximum range is 9.6 miles. If using a RAP (Rocket Assisted Projectile), such as the TF ER BB XM09 (made by Yugoimport), that range increases to 13.4 miles. As the D-30 was designed for direct engagement (another reason for the low profile), the BK-6M round (with 3.5 pound A-X-1 explosive filler) can, with a full charge, reliably penetrate 400mm of armor at a little under 1,000 meters (.6 of a mile). For indirect fire, a PG-1M panoramic telescope is most often used (supplemented with a K-1 collimator) and for direct fire, a OP4M-45 telescopic sight.

Russo-Ukrainian War: BMP-2, 141st. Mechanized Brigade

Source: General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine

     A Ukrainian BMP-2 IFV (Infantry Fighting Vehicle) belonging to the 141st. Mechanized Brigade, late autumn 2024. This particular example had been updated by the Zhytomyr Armored Vehicle Factory back in 2021 though it is missing the side skirts. The crew has added a anti-drone cage on the turret and lashed a log unditching beam to the back of the vehicle (a common practice). The BMP-2 is one of the most common IFVs in the world with over 35,000 having been built since 1979 (including variants). It first entered service in 1980 in the Soviet Army and is the successor to the original BMP-1.

     The typical power plant for the 14-ton BMP-2 is a UTD-20 series, water-cooled, 6-cylinder diesel engine that develops 300 horsepower which is paired to a manual transmission with a 6-speed gearbox (5 forward, 1 reverse). This provides a maximum road speed of 40 miles per hour and, terrain depending, up to 28 miles per hour off-road. Being amphibious, the top speed in calm waters is 4 miles per hour using its tracks as propulsion. 122 gallons of fuel are carried which provides for a maximum cruise range of 342 miles.

     For armament, the 2-man turret is fitted with a 2A42 30mm autocannon, a co-axial PKT 7.62mm machine-gun, and pintle mount on the turret roof for a 9M113 Konkurs (“Contest”; NATO reporting name AT-5 Spandrel) ATGM (Anti-Tank Guided Missile). The Shipunov 2A42, which uses a gas-operated action, has a rate of fire between 200 to 300 rounds per minute or 550 to 800 rounds per minute depending on the gunner's selection. The two most common rounds are the 3UOF8 HEI (High-Explosive Incendiary) and the 3UBR6 APBC-T (Armor-Piercing Ballistic Cap Tracer). The 3UBR6 can penetrate 20mm of RHA (Rolled Homogeneous Armor) at a 60 degree slope at .4 of a mile but can reach 1.2 miles in effective range though the penetration value drops significantly. The 3UOF8 has a maximum range of 2.5 miles. The 2A42 uses a dual feed so the weapon can utilized mixed ammunition. The turret provides for 360 degree of traverse while the 2E36-1 2-plane, stabilized gun mount allows up to 75 degrees in elevation (and 5 degrees of depression), allowing for engagement of low flying aircraft (a 1PZ-3 scope is provided for the commander in this task). The usual ammunition load is 160 rounds of armor-piercing and 340 rounds of high-explosive. The PKT is provided with 2,000 rounds of ammunition. The gunner is provided with a BPK-1-2 binocular sight with low light capability, a TNPT-1 designator, and a FG-126 infrared searchlight (mounted co-axially with the cannon). For the Konkurs, four missiles are carried and the aiming is fully manual. Finally, there are seven firing ports (three per rear side; one in the left rear entry/exit door) for use by occupants in the troop compartment.

     The BMP-2 uses welded steel alloy armor to protect the 3 man crew and up to seven infantrymen with the front hull supporting between 16mm to 25mm thick armor but thanks to the slope angle, the equivalent is 30mm to 46mm. The turret has 20mm thick armor all around but with the angled turret, the equivalent is 28mm. Most BMP-2 turrets have 6mm thick appliqué armor added to them with similar plating on the hull sides. The side armor of the BMP-2 is approximately 13mm thick but benefits little from sloping. Frontally, the BMP-2 is said to be able to withstand standard 23mm armor-piercing rounds while the sides can protect against 7.62x39mm armor-piercing bullets. Other protective systems include a GO-27 radiological/chemical detector, a PAZ overpressure NBC (Nuclear Biological Chemical) system, fire suppression system, and two turret mounted Type 902V Tucha smoke grenade dischargers with three tubes for 81mm grenades per discharger.

     For communication, the BMP-2 is equipped with either a R-123M or R-173 radio. Other systems include a GPK-59 gyrocompass, TNPO-170A periscope (for the driver), TNPO-170A periscopes for the firing ports, OU-3GA2 infrared searchlight on the turret for the commander, TNP-165A designator (for the commander), TKN-3B binocular day/low light sight (for the commander), and a TVNE-1PA night vision scope.

Russo-Ukrainian War: 2A36 Giatsint-B 152mm Howitzer (13th. Khartiia Brigade)

Source: Sofiia Gatilova (Reuters)

     A gunner from the 13th. Khartiia Brigade laying his towed 2A36 Giatsint-B (“Hyacinth”) 152mm howitzer against Russian targets. The photograph was taken somewhere in Kharkiv Oblast on January 6, 2025. Accepted for service by the Soviet Army in 1976, the 2A36 replaced the M-46 130mm field gun. Before the true designation was known to the West, the howitzer had the NATO reporting name of M1976. Designed by Yuri Kalachnikov and built by Uraltransmash, between 1,500 and 2,000 examples (source depending) were produced between 1976 and 1989. Russia, in February 2024, had 600 in service while Ukraine is reported to have at least 75 2A36 howitzers within its military.

     The 2A36 uses a split trail carriage that features a gun shield for the crew and four wheels to help disperse the ground pressure of the 10.5 ton weapon. The gun shield offers minimal frontal protection against some small arms calibers and shell fragments. To assist the tow vehicle (typically a KrAZ-260 6x6 truck) in stopping, the carriage wheels feature brakes. Top tow speed on roads (assuming the KrAZ-260) is 50 miles per hour while off-road, it drops to 28 miles per hour. The gun mounting permits an elevation of 57 degrees and a maximum of 25 degrees of traverse before it becomes necessary to move the howitzer. Crewed by eight men, the loader is assisted by way of a loading tray and a chain-driven hydraulic rammer. This permits a trained crew to fire 6 rounds every minute. The breech is of the horizontal sliding-block type while recoil is handled by a multiple-slotted muzzle brake on the end of the barrel, a buffer, and a recuperator. 

     The 2A36 can fire an array of ammunition but in the photograph, a OF-29 (ОФ-29) HE-Frag (High-Explosive Fragmentation) projectile is ready for loading. This would be followed by the cartridge case that contains the propellant. In the nose of the projectile is a fuze. The OF-29 is spin stabilized, has a boat-tail base for aerodynamics, and two copper driving bands which impart a seal in the barrel and ensure engagement of the barrel's rifling. With a full charge, the OF-29 has a maximum range of 15 miles. Indirect fire sighting is usually accomplished with a PG-1M panoramic telescope. The 2A36 can engage in direct fire though the maximum range is limited to 1.2 miles. An OP-4 series sight would be utilized for direct fire. Using RAP ammunition (Rocket-Assisted Projectile), the 2A36 can achieve a maximum range of 27 miles. A drawback of the 2A36 is that it because of its later design (relatively speaking), it cannot make use of 152mm projectiles that are used in earlier howitzers, some of which remain in service to this day. An example is the D-20 152mm howitzer (NATO reporting name M1955) which, despite its age, continues to see combat.

Russo-Ukrainian War: The Oncilla IFV

Photograph via the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

     A pair of Oncilla armored vehicles belonging to the 13th. Khartiia Brigade, a unit of the National Guard of Ukraine. The Oncilla is derived from the Dozor-B, an IFV (Infantry Fighting Vehicle) designed by KhMDB (Kharkiv Morozov Machine Building Design Bureau) with the first prototype appearing in October 2004. However, production issues resulted in only ten vehicles being delivered by 2016. To overcome both the production issues and also concerns with the initial Dozor-B design, Lacenaire Limited was contracted to take over Dozor-B development in 2013 in league with the Polish armored vehicle manufacturer Mista Ltd. and after finalizing a license deal, the new version entered production as the Oncilla. As of February 2024, some 100 Oncilla vehicles have been delivered to the Ukrainian military and to date, 5 have been lost (3 destroyed, 2 abandoned after being damaged).

     Power comes from a Deutz BF4M 1013 FC turbocharged diesel engine that develops 190 horsepower. The Oncilla can also be fitted with a more powerful Iveco NEF 4 turbocharged diesel motor that can generate 210 horsepower. Either engine is paired to a Allison S1000 automatic transmission with a 2-speed transfer case and a 6-speed gearbox (5 forward, 1 reverse). Maximum road speed is 65 miles per hour and enough fuel is carried to provide for a maximum cruise range of 466 miles. Off-road performance is enhanced by independent suspension and a CTIS (Central Tire Inflation System). Michelin tires with Hutchinson run-flat inserts permit the Oncilla to travel up to 31 miles with all four tires punctured.

     For protection, the Oncilla sports STANAG 4569 (NATO Standardization Agreement) Level 2 armor which is proof against 7.62x39mm API (Armor-Piercing Incendiary) ammunition at 30 meters. Against mines, the Oncilla can weather charges up to 13 pounds with additional crew protection against detonations provided by a rounded bottom hull to deflect blast forces and blast resistant crew seats. Add-on armor packages can beef up the ballistic defense to STANAG 4569 Level 3 which defeats 7.62x51mm tungsten carbide core AP (Armor-Piercing) rounds. Other protective systems include an automatic fire extinguishing system for the engine compartment and a NBC (Nuclear Biological Chemical) filtration system.

     The main armament is a RWS (Remote Weapon Station) fitted to the roof of the Oncilla. The usual weapon is a 12.7mm NSV heavy machine-gun. However, neither vehicle's RWS in the photograph sport the NSV. The gun mount provides for 68 degrees of elevation and 3 degrees of depression with the RWS having 360 degrees of traverse. Firing is done using a joystick, the operator using a 12” monitor with the view coming from a box on the left side of the RWS that contains a color camera, thermal imager, and a laser rangefinder. To the right is a ammunition box that holds up to 450 rounds for the NSV.

     Other systems include a satellite navigation system, internal communication suite, radio suite, HVAC (Heating, Ventilation, Air-Conditioning) system for crew comfort, and a front mounted 6.8-ton winch for self-recovery tasks.

Primary Source:

https://www.army-guide.com/eng/product5107.html

 

Russo-Ukrainian War: M1152 HMMWV with GSh-23

 

Source: General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

    A Ukrainian M1152A1 HMMWV (High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle) belonging to the 1st. Air Force Combined Rifle Brigade fitted with a Gryazev-Shipunov GSh-23 23mm twin-barrel autocannon.

    The GSh-23 first entered service in 1965 and was designed as a armament for fighter aircraft. It was the primary gun armament for late model Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21 fighters (NATO reporting name Fishbed) and all versions of the later MiG-23 (NATO reporting name Flogger) among other aircraft. It is also used in some models of the Mil Mi-24 helicopter (NATO reporting name Hind), notably the Mi-24VP, Mi-24VM, and Mi-35M (export variant of the Mi-24V).

    Designed by the KBP Instrument Design Bureau, the GSh-23 uses a Gast principle action. The action works in that the recoil of one barrel firing loads and charges the second barrel. When the second barrel fires, it loads and charges the first. This permits a high rate of fire with the GSh-23 able to reach 3,400 rounds per minute. Empty, the weapon has a weight of 108 pounds.

    The GSh-23 can fire a wide range of 23X115mm ammunition. Two of the more common types are the OFZ which is a HEI (High-Explosive Incendiary) round and the BZ-A which is a API (Armor-Piercing Incendiary) round. The OFZ carries a .7 of an ounce A-IX-2 explosive payload and uses either an AG-23 or AG-23D fuze. The BZ-A is a solid shot round with a incendiary filled ballistic cap. When firing on ground targets, the effective maximum range is just under 1 mile (.9 of a mile). The BZ-A round, at 200 meters, is able to penetrate 10mm of RHA (rolled homogeneous armor). As such, it is only much of a threat to soft skinned vehicles and very lightly armored vehicles.

Primary Sources:

https://weaponsystems.net/system/416-23mm+Gryazev-Shipunov+GSh-23

https://kintex.bg/product-4-293

https://web.archive.org/web/20230201163056/http://www.russianammo.org/Russian_Ammunition_Page_25mm.html#8

Russo-Ukrainian War: The RPV-16 Thermobaric Weapon

Source: General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

     A soldier of the 30th. Mechanized Brigade “Konstantin Ostrozky” showing off a RPV-16. The RPV-16 is a Ukrainian designed and built rocket-assisted thermobaric weapon, akin to the Russian RPO-A Shmel. The RPV-16 first appeared around January 2022, just prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Since then, it has seen continued combat though it isn't often seen in photographs.

     The 93mm thermobaric warhead is designed to engage enemy infantry, especially those within bunkers or hardened positions. It does this by generating a fireball upon detonation which can reach temperatures approaching 2,500 degrees Celsius (about 4,532 degrees Fahrenheit) in addition to causing a overpressure wave from the blast. What isn't incinerated at the epicenter of the blast, the lethality of the RPV-16's explosion extends out to a radius of 262 feet. In a more confined space, the overpressure wave is compressed by walls and other surfaces, increasing the effect against infantry. Besides death, the wave's force can cause internal bleeding and even break bones.

     The RPV-16 comes standard with a dioptric sight (seen here in the photograph) which permits targeting between 100 meters out to 600 meters which is the optimum engagement range bracket. The weapon can fire out to a maximum range of 1,000 meters (.6 of a mile). The sight can be replaced with more advanced optics for aiming. Firing is through a electrical circuit trigger and there is a safety switch to prevent accidental firing. While the launch tube is one-use, the rest of the RPV-16's hardware can be re-used by securing it around a fresh tube via three latches. Loaded, the RPV-16 has a weight of 24 pounds and a length of 3 feet.

     Usually, the RPV-16 is fielded by a unit's CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear) company (which the 30th. Mechanized Brigade has) though it is not exclusive to such companies.

 

Russo-Ukrainian War: The 'Hetman Sahaidachny'

 

     The pride of the Ukrainian Navy's small fleet, the frigate Hetman Sahaidachny, has been scuttled in its moorings at Mykolaiv. The ship, a Krivak III-class frigate displacing 3,100 tons, was under repair in Mykolaiv when the commander of the ship ordered it scuttled by flooding the vessel's hull. This was done, it is said, on February 27. The scuttling was confirmed by Ukrainian defense minister Oleksiy Reznikov.

     The battle for Mykolaiv is still ongoing. Initial skirmishes occurred on February 26 with some Russian units penetrating into the city but were repulsed. Following the taking of Kherson, the bulk of the Russian forces pushed again on Mykolaiv, commencing an attack on February 28 through the city of Bashtanka, located just to the north of Mykolaiv. This attack, however, was blunted by Ukrainian forces. As of March 4, the governor of Mykolaiv Oblast, Vitaly Kim, reported that Russian forces had been repulsed from the city limits but Russian counterattacks were ongoing from three directions, leaving only the western side of the city free from attack. Ukrainian forces also retook Kulbakino Airport which is located close to 7 miles to the southeast of Mykolaiv's city center.

     The Hetman Sahaidachny, named after Ukrainian political and civic leader Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny, Hetman of the Zaporozhian Cossacks (b. 1582 d. 1622), was the flagship of Ukraine's navy and it is believed the ship was scuttled in order to deny the Russians the propaganda coup of capturing the ship intact. The ship is armed with a single AK-100 100mm gun, two AK-630 30mm Close-In Weapon Systems (CIWS), two quad-tube 533mm torpedo launchers, and two RBU-6000 anti-submarine rocket launchers. It can carry up to two Kamov Ka-27 helicopters.

Originally posted on March 5, 2022.

Russo-Ukrainian War: Ukrainian Special Forces in Irpin

     To some analysts, Kyiv should have fallen by now. With the well publicized “40 mile” convoy of Russian vehicles, some pointed to this being the build-up to finally taking down Kyiv. Except it hasn't happened. The city is under bombardment from Russian rockets, namely from M-21OF 122mm rockets fired from BM-21 “Grad” launchers. Rocket type depending, the M-21OF has a maximum range of between 8 miles to as much as 25 miles. But so far, the Russians have been unable to penetrate into Kyiv proper.

     The convoy has stalled and is now being subjected to Ukrainian attacks at the hands of small Ukrainian units and drone strikes. To the Ukrainian military, hitting supply lines only exacerbates an existing problem of Russian combat units being low on fuel and troops low on food. Russian tanks and vehicles cannot run if they have no petrol. This leads to the relatively common sight of abandoned trucks and vehicles that fall into the hands of Ukrainian forces.

     The photograph here shows a man by the first name of Volodymyr (in the soft cap), a Special Forces team leader, with two of his men. The team is operating in the Kyiv suburb of Irpin', some 14 miles from the city center of Kyiv. Bucha, another suburb just to the north of Irpin', has also been the scene of combat between the Russians and Ukrainians. Special Forces are playing a significant role in repelling numerous attempts by the Russians to push into both suburbs. These units operate at night, some even using tactical drones of their own with thermal optics to pinpoint Russian targets. Poor weather has seen the Russian Air Force limit sorties though Ukrainian troops are equipped with U.S. built FIM-92 Stinger surface-to-air missiles supplied by Lithuania, Latvia, the Netherlands, and Germany. Such weapons have already claimed some Russian aircraft. For anti-tank work, the units are using British supplied NLAWs (Next Generation Light Anti-tank Weapon).

     Fitted into Volodymyr's tactical vest are three 40mm HE-SD (High-Explosive Self-Destruct) grenades (next to a "BIC" lighter) for the under-barrel GP-25 or GP-30 grenade launcher. The SD feature is important when fighting within urban environments. After launch, the fuze will arm and within 14 to 19 seconds, the grenade will detonate. Thus, if the grenade doesn't explode upon impact, the grenade will still detonate and thus not pose a hazard to Ukrainian troops or civilians which would not be the case with the standard 40mm grenade that would remain active if it failed to detonate. The gloved soldier has his hands on what could be a silencer or suppressor for his AK-74 assault rifle. It could be a PBS-1 silencer which was more of a sound suppressor, only reducing the discharge by 15 decibels (dB) from 150 dB. Also, as the phrase “An army marches on its stomach”, spoken by Frederick the Great and Napoleon, still holds true today, the soldier in the background has a plastic spoon tucked into his gear, ready for use when the next meal comes around.

     All three men are using caution tape for identification and possibly could belong to the 72nd. Information Warfare and Psychological Operations Center (based in Brovary, a suburb of Kyiv) or from the Special Operations Forces Command which is based in Kyiv proper.

Originally posted on March 5, 2022.

Russo-Ukrainian War: Abandoned 2K22 Tunguska

     One of the more curious aspects of the war is the lack of Russian air power in the skies. In a November 2021 report from Flight International, the Ukrainian Air Force fielded 37 Mikoyan MiG-29 Fulcrum multi-role fighters, 12 Sukhoi Su-24 Fencer attack jets, 17 Su-25 Frogfoot attack/close air support jets, and 32 Su-27 Flanker multi-role fighters. Against these 98 combat aircraft (Ukraine has no bombers any longer), the Russians have arrayed at least 300 combat aircraft in the region. Yet, even now, Ukrainian pilots are still able to sortie against Russian ground targets and engage in low-level aerial combat with what Russian aviation is about in the sky.

     So why is this the case? There are many opinions out there. The first is a lack of PGMs (Precision Guided Munitions) coupled with the inability to accurately deliver said ordnance. The latter is due to inadequate pilot training. It is believed that Russia's inventory of PGMs is very low and thus if any strikes were to be carried out, it would be done with unguided bombs and rockets. By having to use such munitions, it forces the aircraft into range of Ukrainian surface-to-air missiles, especially man-portable ones.

     Another factor is the fear that Russian ground forces will shoot first and ask questions later. Considering that a decent portion of Russian troops are conscripts, this fear is very much valid. Combine this with the fact the Ukrainian Air Force flies the same exact types of aircraft the Russian Air Force does, the risk is very real and the last thing the Russian Air Force wants is lost planes due to friendly fire.

     Finally, some think that the typical Russian pilot lacks flight hours, and thus the needed skill to engage in actual combat successfully, in comparison to Western pilots. On average, a Russian pilot gets under 100 hours in the cockpit every year while, for example, U.S. Air Force pilots can get up to 240 hours each year.

     The photograph here shows an abandoned 2K22 Tunguska somewhere around Kharkiv. The 2K22 is the replacement for the ZSU-23-4 Shilka, a rather lethal self-propelled anti-aircraft gun (SPAAG) that entered service in 1960. So lethal was the Shilka that many NATO nations stated in their infantry combat doctrine that any time a ZSU-23-4 was spotted in a column being ambushed, it was to be destroyed immediately before any other target as the quadruple 23mm cannons would quickly put an end to the attack. Although the Russian Marines still deploy the Shilka, the Russian Army uses the 2K22.

     The 2K22 is built on a GM tracked chassis, powered by a V-46-6-MS turbocharged, V-12, fuel-injected, water-cooled diesel engine developing between 780 to 840 horsepower. This gives a top road speed of 40 miles per hour and enough fuel for a 310 mile operational range. The SPAAG is equipped with the Hot Shot (NATO code-name) system that combines a parabolic E-band target acquisition radar (what we see in the folded position in the photograph) with a J-band monopulse tracking radar fitted in the center of the turret front. The target acquisition radar has a 360 degree field of view, can detect aerial targets out to 11 miles and flying as low as 50 feet off the ground. It can track targets starting within 10 miles at an altitude of 2 miles or less. Engagement can occur when the target speed is 1,640 feet per second or less with the response time of the weapon systems being 6-8 seconds. The Hot Shot system is all-weather, day and night.

     Speaking of weapons, the 2K22 is fitted with two 2A38M 30mm guns with each gun provided with 1,904 rounds of ammunition. Underneath each gun is a battery of four 9M311 surface-to-air missiles (NATO code-name SA-19 Grison), for a total of eight ready-to-fire missiles. The combined fire of both cannons is 3,900 to 5,000 rounds per minute but the usual is brief bursts of 83 to 250 rounds target depending. The maximum effective range is 2,000 meters while with the 9M311, the maximum range is between 5 miles to 6.2 miles. The missiles cannot be fired while the 2K22 is on the move though the guns can when set to full automatic computer controlled engagement. If need be, the gunner is provided with a stabilized sight for manual engagement, using the radar for range data.

     The 2K22's armor protects the four man crew from small arms fire and shell fragments but it is incapable of surviving hits by anything heavier. It is well equipped with good ventilation, heating system, NBC (Nuclear Biological Chemical) system, automatic fire suppression, night vision, extensive communication equipment, and navigational systems.

     The Ukrainian Army had, in a 2012 report, 70 Tunguska on strength but built on a 2S6 chassis rather than a GM chassis. How many remain in service now is unknown. It is believed that this example may have ultimately been destroyed by Ukrainian forces. This assumes the Russians rendered the 2K22 unusable prior to abandoning it.

Originally posted on March 3, 2022.

Russo-Ukrainian War: Abandoned Russian D-30 in Kherson Oblast

     It should be noted that Ukraine is not being invaded by one country, Russia, but also Belarus and Chechnya. The latter is a de facto independent state but is within the Russian republic while Belarus is an independent country. Both of these countries have supplied troops to the invasion and in the case of Belarus, allowed Russian troop movements through their territory.

     The city of Kherson, located in south Ukraine, is being reported as surrendering to Russian forces as of March 2. The city's mayor, Igor Kolykhaev, stated that Russian soldiers are within the city and that there are no Ukrainian military forces within the city limits. However, other reports state there are still skirmishes occurring outside the city proper. If Kherson is, indeed, under Russian occupation, it gives the Russians a vital port on the Black Sea and secures a base of operations to launch attacks against Odessa. The Kherson Oblast (region) continues to see combat with several battles having been fought and still ongoing within the area. Cities lost to Russian forces include Melitopol and Berdiansk while the cities of Mykolaiv and Zaporozhzhia are still being contested.

     The photograph here shows a part of a Russian column destroyed somewhere within the Kherson Oblast. The gun being towed is a D-30 122mm howitzer. This is a weapon nearly 60 years old, having entered service in 1963. Although no longer built in Russia, the Russian military still has some 4,750 D-30 howitzers in service. It is still built in other countries and over 60 nations (including Ukraine with a reported 129 examples) have the D-30 in their military arsenals. This is a testament to its design and robustness. When deployed in action, the D-30 unfurls three stabilizers with the gun in the center, fitted atop a turntable that allows 360 degree rotation. The hydro-pneumatic recoil system sits on top of the gun barrel which allows for a low profile of the D-30. The gun has a maximum elevation of 70 degrees and a maximum depression of 7 degrees. The D-30 uses a semi-automatic, vertical sliding-wedge breech. The howitzer has a crew of seven and a trained team can run 10 to 12 rounds through the gun per minute though in practice, it is usually half that rate of fire. In part, this is because the muzzle brake is so large (in order to absorb half the recoil forces) that is creates a massive over-pressure around the gun. This means the crew typically uses a long lanyard to fire the gun and stands well away from it, reducing load times. The low profile also means the D-30 can be used for direct fire and comes with a telescope sight for anti-tank duties. The typical range of the D-30 using standard high-explosive rounds is 9.6 miles but with rocket-assisted shells, it can attain a range of 13.6 miles.

     The truck the howitzer is being towed by appears to be either a ZiL-131 or a Ural 4320. The white “Z” on the rear gate has been the subject of a number of online articles. Some state the “Z” means the unit is part of the thrust into Ukraine from the east. A “Z” with a white square around it indicates forces coming up from Crimea (from the south) into Ukraine while a “O” means units from the north that pushed into Ukraine from Belarus. Chechen units are believed to use a white “X”, special forces a white “A”, and Russian Marines a white “V”. Some other sources state these may simply be general identification marks to avoid friendly fire incidents without any specific allocation to where units are going within Ukraine.

Originally posted on March 2, 2022.

Russo-Ukrainian War: The 2S19 Msta

 

     I am no expert on current Russian military tactics. However, I do have access to IAG-13-U-78 “Soviet Army Operations”, dated April 1978. This is an intelligence manual created by U.S. Army Intelligence and released by the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command. Now, I hear you say, of what good is a manual nearly 44 years old? If one examines the chapter on attacking a defending enemy (Section IV, page 3-61), there are some clear parallels to the current situation in Ukraine which suggests that the tactics referenced in this publication aren't so out of date after all.

     Russian forces are reported to have largely bypassed Kharkiv in order to push deeper into Ukraine. This lines up with the tactic of bypassing an enemy in a deliberate defense (of which a city can be considered such) rather than engage it. This may account for lighter forces around the city and use of artillery to keep the defenders in the city. It is doubtful that a concentrated Ukrainian force would engage the Russians in open terrain and lose the benefit of the concealment and cover a urban warzone provides them. As such, outside of aerial attack or artillery, Russian forces are a bit more secure from massed infantry assaults.

     Let us move to Kyiv. It is reported that a military convoy some 40 miles long is moving towards the city. This lines up with the first action in the manual that states the first step towards an attack of an enemy in deliberate defense is the buildup of required forces. If, indeed, the convoy is slated for the assault on Kyiv, the evidence is clear. Once the forces are in the field of battle, they will be organized. If they are following the 1978 tactics, the bulk of the forces will be amassed at the planned direction of attack. Russian tactics also allow for feints or ruses to divert the enemy attention away from the main thrust. In such attacks, the Russians, according to the manual, want to have a 4-5 to 1 advantage in troops, 6-8 to 1 in artillery, and 3-5 to 1 in tanks. This is certainly achievable today and likely has not changed much.

     The Russians, as they have been since World War II, are big believers in massed artillery and rocket batteries (as seen in the superiority ratio above) and prior to the commencement of the attack, Kyiv would be subjected to a heavy bombardment. In the attack, again, if following these tactics, the Russians will not spread their forces out but instead would reduce unit frontages and have a front line of no more than 4km. Follow-on units behind the main lines would be spread further apart. This allows them to maximize their firepower and focus it towards the enemy. It is possible that the incursions in the suburbs of Kyiv by Russian forces are reconnaissance to attempt to pinpoint Ukrainian positions and capability in preparation of the main attack.

     The only hope for the Ukrainian defenders in Kyiv is to withstand the initial assault and bog the Russians down which would break their momentum. Why is this important? According to the manual, the tempo of the attack is to be swift with a fast rate of advance to limit losses and overrun weak positions quickly. If it becomes a brutal, house-to-house fight, it favors the defender who knows the terrain and if Russian objectives are not achieved, it may become a serious problem.

     One of the self-propelled artillery assets the Russians have deployed in Ukraine is the 2S19 Msta (after the Msta River). This particular example was abandoned somewhere in Sumy Oblast after the convoy it was traveling with was hit. As one can see, the travel lock for the 2A65 152mm howitzer is still engaged. The gun can fire base bleed shells out to 16 miles or if using rocket assisted ammunition, out to 18 miles. Thanks to a automatic loader, the standard 2S19 can fire up to 8 rounds every minute. A total of 50 rounds of ammunition is carried in the vehicle. The turret has a full 360 degree rotation while the gun can be elevated up to 68 degrees and depressed to a maximum of 4 degrees. For defense, the 2S19 is fitted with a pintle mounted 12.7mm NSVT heavy machine-gun (not seen here) with 300 rounds of ammunition. Built on a T-80 main battle tank chassis, the V-84A 840 horsepower engine can move the 2S19 to a maximum speed of 37 miles per hour (on roads) with a power to weight ratio of 20 horsepower per ton. Speaking of weight, loaded, the 2S19 is 42 tons, is 23.5 feet long, 11.1 feet wide, and 9.10 feet tall with a crew of 5. Armor thickness is unknown but while proof against small arms fire, it would be no defense against anti-tank missiles. It is NBC (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical) protected.

     The 2S19 entered service in 1989 and the Ukrainian army had 40 of them as of 2017 though how many remain in service isn't known. However, it is highly likely this abandoned one will be turned around against its former owner.

Originally posted on March 1, 2022.